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FBIS-EEU-96-010 *16 January 1996*

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Belgium Seeks Command of Mission in E. Slavonia

LD1501133896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1320 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Jan. 15 (TANJUG)—Belgium has conditioned its participation in the U.N. peace mission in the Srem-Baranja region in Eastern Slavonia by gaining command over the operation.

The U.N. Security Council on Monday should adopt a resolution on the U.N. operation in the region.

After Croatia occupied the U.N.-protected sectors west, south and north of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), the Srem-Baranja region is the only part of the RSK in which U.N. peacekeepers are still stationed.

Belgian Foreign Ministry sources confirmed that defence secretary [minister] Jean-Pol Poncelet said his country expected to get a command post and was prepared to send to the region a staff of 250 officers and military experts, in addition to 700 troops.

The Belgian contingent would be the largest in the 4,500-strong new formation.

Belgian and Russian troops, who had been part of the earlier U.N. peace mission in Eastern Slavonia, will be joined by troops from Indonesia, Pakistan, Slovakia and Argentina, Belgian Foreign Ministry sources said.

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Berisha Interviewed on Mitterrand, Paris Meetings

AU1301152796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Jan 96

[Interview with President Sali Berisha by Vjollca Vokshi in Tirana on 12 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Along with many world leaders, Albanian President Sali Berisha participated in the farewell ceremony for former French President Francois Mitterrand held in Paris yesterday. After his return from Paris, we conducted this interview:

[Vokshi] Mr. President, what impressions do you bring back from Paris?

[Berisha] Yesterday, Paris and France, but I would say all of Europe, bid the last farewell with special dignity and great honors to former French President Francois Mitterrand, who led the country for 14 successive years. Mitterrand will be remembered in the memory of the French nation, but also that of Europe, as one of the presidents and high-ranking heads of state of this century who worked with great devotion for European integration. It was not by chance that he was honored by almost all the heads of states and governments of Europe and the world.

President Mitterrand was a courageous fighter for the values of democracy. He rendered a genuine, real, and precious assistance to the countries that emerged from communist dictatorships, among them Albania. Thus, he undoubtedly was a distinguished friend of Albania and the Albanian people. Mitterrand was also an undaunted fighter against his disease. With human dignity, special force, and courage, Mitterrand stood bravely until the last moments of his life.

[Vokshi] Mr. President, leaders from all over the world took part at the ceremony organized in Paris. What were the contacts you had with them?

[Berisha] During the lunch that President Jacques Chirac hosted at the Elysee, I had the chance to greet and exchange opinions with President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Alain Juppe as masters of the house. We discussed their visits to Albania and the support they have rendered and will render to Albania on the road to its integration in Europe.

During the same lunch, I also had short and warm exchanges of opinions with President Herzog, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, U.S. Vice President Al Gore, President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, then the area's presidents—Greek President Stefanopoulos, Turkish President Demirel, Hungarian President Goncz, Czech President Havel, Bulgarian President Zhelev, the prime ministers of West Europe, the queens of Netherlands and Belgium, and European Commission President Mr. Jacques Santer. During all these meetings, my interlocutors assured me that they will economically support Albania and its integration in Europe. We agreed to further strengthen cooperation in all the fields, in particular on the economic level, as Albania has special interests here.

I can say that this ceremony served a better understanding and was held in the spirit and the last message that President Mitterrand left in Berlin, when he declared that his last inheritance left is the spirit of cooperation. Such was also the lunch that President Jacques Chirac hosted at the Elysee.

Gjirokaster Circles Greet Berisha's Visa Decree

AU1301154596 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Albanian President Berisha's decree to abolish visas for Greek nationals entering Albania has been particularly greeted by business circles in Gjirokaster. Niko Curri, director of the Ioannina Chamber of Commerce Office in Gjirokaster, stated that the decree will increase the number of Greek businessmen and investors who visit Albania and will strengthen the economic relations between the two countries. [passage omitted]

President Berisha's decree is assessed to be a positive step that shows that the two countries are moving toward positive relations.

Omonia 'Hails' Removal of Visas

AU1401205996 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 13 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by P.Re.: "Omonia Applauds Berisha's Decree"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Omonia hails President Berisha's lifting of visas for Greeks. "It is a positive step for bilateral relations," Omonia leader Sotir Qirjazati said only a few hours after the president's decree on granting passports and waiving visas. Qirjazati thanked President Berisha during the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the foundation of the organization.

"We have always said that we are not nihilistic and we cannot say that we have gained nothing. However, we cannot say that we have gained everything, and we therefore wait for the consolidation of democracy in Albania, which will be for everybody," said the leader of the organization that protects the rights of the Greek minority in our country. The Greek Foreign Ministry also welcomed the Albanian president's decree waiving visas for Greek citizens.

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Kosovo's Bukoshi, PR-LDSh's Godo View Autonomy

AU1301155496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the Kosova Representation Office in Tirana, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, received Mr. Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party [PR] and of the rotating presidency of the Albanian Rightist League [LDSh].

At the meeting, they discussed current events in Kosova and demanded a more intensive activity on the part of Albanians themselves to protect the nation, and, in particular, to establish a just solution to the Kosova issue.

Sabri Godo said that the PR and the LDSh confirm, once again, their statements that they will, in no case, give up their demands for the complete independence of Kosova and its right to self-determination. The acceptance of autonomy under the Serbian domination, be it of any kind, leaves Kosova under a colonizing situation contrary to the principles of international and European charters.

Speaking about eventual talks between Prishtina and Belgrade in the presence of a third party, Godo said that they should be held on the basis of creating ways to give independence to Kosova, a right that all the other peoples of the former Yugoslavia have won. Godo also stressed that, to deprive Kosovars, who make up 90 percent of the population in their land, from this right only for the sake of conjunctures is antinational and completely unacceptable. We support the activity of the Government of the Republic of Kosova to extend the recognition of the Republic of Kosova to all the states who are predisposed for such a thing.

On the occasion, Prime Minister Bukoshi hailed the position and views of the PR and the LDSh on the Kosova issue and considered them to be very important for the current moment, the Kosova Information Center reports.

'Anti-American' Pamphlets Distributed in South

AU1601102296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 14 Jan 96 p 5

[Report by Aleksander Cipa: "Pamphlets Invade Gjirokaster Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gjirokaster—The pamphlet fashion has swept over the south. This time, its fans have favored Gjirokaster, the birthplace of the man who held the Albanians in his fist for 50 years. This time clandestine communist pamphlets with appeals to support left-wing forces in the next elections were distributed in the busiest part of town, the large market of the 18 September neighborhood. The pamphlets started with the World War II slogan "Death to fascism, freedom to the people." The code to the meaning of this demand has not yet been cracked, although it is clear that the authors are prominent figures from the former regime or admirers of the regime who are nostalgic for a very distant past. The pamphlets provoked an immediate reaction from the responsible authorities, and investigators started their search for the possible authors.

Perhaps because of the secrecy of the investigations, there has still been no official confirmation of who distributed the pamphlets or who is behind them. This incident is not an isolated one in the south. Such pamphlets have previously been distributed in Sarande, Tepelene, and elsewhere. Reports come from the Sarande Procurator's Office that the case of the pamphlets is still being pursued. The case concerns pamphlets deemed anti-American and calling for public protest against our government's military agreements with the United States. In this case, which is said to be still under investigation, various people well-known for their communist convictions and their nostalgia for the former communist regime have been taken in for questioning.

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FRY Delegation Meets Foreign Policy Commission

AU1501113996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Jan 96

[Report by Vladislav Ustoich]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the National Assembly this morning a meeting took place between the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission and a delegation from the Yugoslav Federal Assembly led by Radmilo Bogdanovic, chairman of the Federal Assembly's Chamber of the Republics.

The two sides discussed bilateral relations, regional cooperation, transborder communications, the situation in former Yugoslavia following the Dayton agreement, and the rights of the Bulgarian minority. Both sides expressed the view that the meeting was constructive and that the prospects for developing Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations are very good.

To Expand Economic Cooperation

AU1601111396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 16 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov has a meeting in parliament with the Yugoslav parliamentary delegation led by Radmilo Bogdanovic, chairman of the Chamber of the Republics. They discussed the development of bilateral relations, the Bosnian peace process, and the visit by Mr. Sendov to Belgrade that has been agreed in principle.

The Yugoslav side declared that our two economies complement one another and that the border between our countries should be opened to the fullest possible extent. In the near future, the Yugoslav Parliament is to pass legislation to facilitate the expansion of economic cooperation with Bulgaria and to assist the formation of joint enterprises.

This morning, the Yugoslav delegation also met representatives of the parliamentary groups of the Democratic Left, People's Union, and the Rights and Freedoms Movement.

A short time ago, Academician Sendov started a meeting with outgoing U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery.

Russian Envoy on Passage of Troops to Bosnia

AU1101195796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 11 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with reports in the press on the possible passage of Russian troops and combat equipment through Bulgaria to Bosnia, Aleksandr Avdeyev, ambassador of the Russian Federation to Bulgaria, said in Ruse today that Russian troops must be deployed in Bosnia to preserve the peace. This report came from BTA.

Ambassador Avdeyev believes that Bulgaria welcomes the peace in Bosnia and will assist any international initiative for keeping the peace. Asked whether Russian troops and tanks are likely to pass through Ruse, Ambassador Avdeyev replied that there are a number of alternatives, but the question is a technical and military rather than a political issue.

Videnov Views Grain Crisis, Cabinet Changes

AU1201170996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov by unidentified KONTINENT and Bulgarian Television correspondents; place and date not given: "Zhan Videnov: I Will Evaluate the Cabinet When It Completes Its First Year"]

[KONTINENT] Mr. Videnov, are you satisfied with the debate in the National Assembly?

[Videnov] The debates concentrated on an exceptionally important issue. It should have been approached with much more responsibility. I think that the truth was concealed behind many lies, manipulations, and elementary incompetence. It is rather easy to determine the truth—the country can successfully resolve the grain problem because we have all the necessary resources.

[KONTINENT] How could the truth about the grain be proven?

[Videnov] I prefer to see the practice do this. It will become clear in the next two to three months.

[KONTINENT] If the grain issue could have been resolved, why did you not do it until now?

[Videnov] Everything, to a large degree, is a matter of time. You understand yourself that now it is impossible to compensate within less than one month incomplete state quotas and other factors which require a lot of maneuvering throughout the country.

[KONTINENT] Is it true that Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev has resigned?

[Videnov] This issue is not topical right now. For me, an evaluation of the cabinet is mandatory only after completing the first year of its tenure. I have a commitment to the party and our coalition partners to present at that time my assessment of the cabinet's activity.

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[KONTINENT] Mr. Videnov, do you think that cabinet changes are necessary at this stage?

[Videnov] At this stage, I prefer to continue the process of forming my opinion on the issue.

[KONTINENT] What necessitated the removal of Nevena Gyurova [one of Videnov's advisers who gave a controversial interview to Radio Free Europe on 20 December, in which she attacked former Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov] from the Council of Ministers?

[Videnov] One moment, we are discussing a completely different issue here in the National Assembly. Do not bother me now with this issue.

Ministers Tsochev, Chichibaba Submit Resignations

AU1201141796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 12 Jan 96

[Report by Kalina Stancheva]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference today, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov announced that Trade Minister Kiril Tsochev and Agriculture Minister Vasil Chichibaba had submitted their resignations in writing. The reason that they gave was the insufficient degree of trust and cooperation shown toward them, including on the part of the Democratic Left.

The prime minister said that the two ministers' successors will be chosen within a week or two, and that they will be persons who are politicians and experts in their fields.

BSP Conference Criticizes Municipal Elections

AU1301170996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 13 January the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia City Organization Conference opened. After various procedural issues, Aleksandur Marinov, chairman of the BSP Sofia City Organization, read a report on the results of the municipal elections.

The report's analysis was based on the following basic criterion: Setting the BSP Sofia City Organization goals at the conference on the basis of the results of the 1995 municipal election, within the context of the comprehensive electoral and political behavior of the BSP Sofia Organization since 1991.

Aleksandur Marinov's basic conclusion was that, during the Sofia election campaign, the positive factors and the BSP Sofia organization's possibilities were overestimated, while the negative factors and the opponent were underestimated.

Nevertheless, Mr. Marinov pointed out that, I quote, the others who supported Ventsislav Yosifov [the independent candidate for the post of Sofia mayor, supported by the BSP] and I continue to think that while not ideal, Mr. Yosifov's candidacy was possibly the best and most realistic candidacy.

Most of the statements read after the report described Ventsislav Yosifov's candidacy and the election campaign as inadequate and unsuccessful, our correspondent Vanya Manolova reports.

Conference Suggests Videnov Resign From BSP

AU1301171096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The conference of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia City Organization continues in Sofia. Our correspondent Vanya Manolova reports:

[Manolova] Good day. We overestimated the favorable factors and our own possibilities, and at the same time, we underestimated the opponent, who taught us a lesson regarding how an aggressive and strong election campaign must be conducted. This was one of the basic conclusions in the report-analysis on the results of the municipal elections results, read by Aleksandur Marinov, BSP Sofia City Organization chairman.

In his report, Mr. Marinov based his analysis on three criteria: the implementation of the goals of the BSP Sofia Organization Fifth Conference, which were achieving a victory at the mayoral elections and a good result at the municipal elections; a comparison with the results of the 1994 municipal elections; and the comprehensive political and electoral record of the BSP Sofia City Organization since 1991.

Mr. Marinov explained the failure in the Sofia elections with a series of reasons, among them, mistakes in the sociological polls, thwarted agreements with other political forces such as the Bulgarian Business Bloc, the Democratic Alternative for the Republic, and others, and a weak support on the part of the central government, which created the impression that Sofia had already been written off.

The inadequate candidacy of the banker Ventsislav Yosifov, who, by the way, just entered the conference hall—this was the emotional common denominator in the statements of the delegates to the conference until now.

The statements contained a flood of critical remarks, such as failure, haste, stupidity, and mistakes.

The others who supported Ventsislav Yosifov and I did not think at the time that his candidacy was ideal, but

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continue to think up to today that his candidacy was the most realistic and best under the circumstances, Mr. Marinov said. Those who were against the candidacy, and continue up to today to speak against it, should not assume the pose of sages and play Monday morning quarterbacks, in order to settle political accounts, he said.

A delegate from the Kremikovtsi region said that a BSP election campaign should not be conducted with cellular telephones, Mercedes cars, and bodyguards.

Dimitur Ostoich recalled that he had said at the time that Ventsislav Yosifov did not have an appropriate electoral behavior, and this applies both to his slogans and to the reaction of the DUMA daily, which according to him, could learn a lesson from DEMOKRATSIYA [the daily of the Union of Democratic Forces] how an election campaign should be conducted.

Those statements also contained certain recommendations for specific steps, such as: Zhan Videnov should resign from the BSP Supreme Council and direct his efforts toward his activity in the Council of Ministers; the leadership of the BSP Sofia City Organization must be renewed as soon as possible; the BSP must propose its own candidate, rather than an independent one for the post of president.

In about one or two hours, Zhan Videnov, BSP Supreme Council chairman, is expected to arrive. Doncho Konakchiev already is in the hall. Deputies and representatives of the BSP leadership also are attending the conference, and as I already said, a short while ago, Ventsislav Yosifov entered the hall.

BSP Leader Sees 'Division' in Sofia Organization

AU1301190196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Fifth Conference of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia City Organization analyzed today the results of the 1995 municipal elections and noted the relevant consequences. Vanya Manolova reports:

[Manolova] Only toward the end of today's meeting of the Fifth Conference of the BSP Sofia City Organization, a more specific proposal, which has not been voiced before, was expressed: Dimitur Chunchev from Sofia's Krasno Selo District proposed to strip Aleksandur Marinov, chairman of the BSP Sofia Organization, of confidence, because of the unsatisfactory results of the municipal elections. I must tell you that I left the conference hall a few minutes ago, and I do not know the result of the voting on this proposal. Nevertheless, it is more than certain that, as a result of the verbal skirmish that developed in the conference hall, which I witnessed, Aleksandur Marinov will not be stripped of confidence. Let me also point out that stripping a leader of confidence at a meeting like today's conference, does not also mean removing him from his specific post. Only an accountability-election conference can do this.

Already next Sunday [21 January], the BSP Supreme Council will hold a plenum at which it will decide when to begin the accountability-election campaign. It appears that the campaign most likely will be held from 1 February until the end of April.

The question is what new results were produced at today's meeting of the BSP Sofia Organization Fifth Conference? Did it not leave the BSP Sofia Organization somewhere back in 1995, by dealing with conclusions which were well-known and published already in December 1995?

I report all this, because this also is a part of the basic conclusions in the report of Aleksandur Marinov and the ensuing conclusions and decisions.

According to the meeting today, the basic reasons for the BSP's failure or, if you will, insufficient success at the elections are: Overestimating the favorable factors and the BSP's capacity, and underestimating the opponent; incorrectly reading the sociological polls; failing to develop cooperation with other forces; and neglecting the solution of Sofia's problems on the part of the central government.

Doncho Konakchiev, who attended the conference, both as a delegate and representative of the BSP supreme leadership, categorically rejected the last conclusion. We will listen immediately to what he has to say. Let me only report some of the decisions adopted today: The BSP city and municipal councils did not do enough to implement the decisions and goals of the previous meeting of the Fifth Conference of the BSP Sofia City Organization, and a purposeful work related to the upcoming presidential elections must begin immediately. And now let us listen to Doncho Konakchiev:

[Konakchiev] If someone expected that a concentrated action on the part of the central executive power would have defeated our political opponent, then he is not a member of our party.

[Manolova] What you mean is that if someone is to be blamed for the results, then this is the BSP Sofia City Organization leadership. Actually, this is what you said in your statement today. Specifically, what did you mean? Did you also have the upcoming presidential elections in mind, especially avoiding making the same mistakes?

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[Konakchiev] Yes, I said that the job was not done well. Of course, if someone is to be blamed, or better, let me use the word responsibility—if responsibility is to be sought—then I must say the following: Such basic matters as electing the Sofia mayor or the Bulgarian president, and determining what the national coat of arms should be, must be decided on the basis of a consensus, unity of thought, and the people's opinion. What we saw here is a division at the very leadership of the BSP Sofia City Organization on the candidacy of Mr. Yosifov for the post of Sofia mayor. This was a worthy candidacy, and a worthy candidacy should not cause a division in our ranks.

European Committee Considers Nuclear Safety

AU0801201396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 8 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government Committee on European Integration met today under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Zhan Videnov. It accepted a report by Konstantin Rusinov, chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, and Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which considers nuclear safety problems. Bulgaria will commit itself to steadily modernizing its nuclear installations in conformity with European standards, reads a statement released by the Council of Ministers Press Center.

The committee also discussed a report by Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, which presents a view on the economic reconstruction in former Yugoslavia in the course of the implementation of the peace agreement and on initiatives for promoting regional security and stability. The committee also discussed opportunities for our unarmed civilian police officers to participate in the UN international police contingents that will help create local civilian police forces in Bosnia.

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IFOR Battalion Dissatisfied With Salaries

LD1301134396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1331 GMT 13 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, Jan. 13 (TANJUG)—A dispute has emerged over pays of soldiers and officers of the Czech IFOR (Implementation Force) battalion preparing for participation in the peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As unofficially learned, between 150-200 of those with lowest pay were dissatisfied not only with small pay but also with the large difference between the officers' and ordinary soldiers' pays.

The command of the 865-strong battalion said 26 soldiers have left the unit and given up on going to Bosnia. Eleven have said the reason was low pay, while 15 gave 'family reasons' as an explanation.

Dissatisfaction was highest among drivers. Their pay was 1,250 dollars and 7,000 kroner on top (26.5 kroner to the dollar) paid to their account in the Czech Republic. They believe this was insufficient given the high risk involved as drivers were more frequently than others killed or wounded by mines or in ambushes.

They also think the officers' pay—about 3,000 dollars—was much too high.

The Czech battalion would join a British division (Canadian brigade) and would be stationed around the town of Prijedor, northwestern Bosnia.

An advanced party numbering 25 Czech officers and soldiers has already reached destination. Another group of about 150, who were to prepare the arrival of the whole unit in the first half of February, was to leave in a few days.

Zieleniec on EU Membership Application

AU1201081696 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Jan 96 p 8

[Article by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec: "The Czech Republic Submits Its Application"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In November 1989 we chanted that we wanted to go "back to Europe." In the same breath, however, we emphasized that we have always belonged to Europe and that even the temporary entrapment in the Soviet Eastern empire could not deprive us of our heritage of European culture and civilization. So, we cannot return to Europe, we were saying, and even less admitted to it by someone!

In a few days, the Czech Republic will submit an application for membership in the EU. What significance does this step have for us, and what for Europe?

We have always emphasized that the process of integration of the Czech Republic into the EU depends, above all, on the changes in our country, that we understand it exclusively in correlation with the success of the transformation of our economy and gradual stabilization of our political system. We wanted everyone, and above all ourselves, to understand that the act of submitting the application cannot make up for the necessary domestic political development. Everything has its natural sequence, and one's own efforts cannot be substituted with pompous gestures. At this time, we are submitting the EU membership application as the only country of the former Eastern bloc that has its prosperity, economic dynamics, and political stability clearly evidenced by our newly acquired membership in the OECD.

The development in the EU is also approaching the commencement of talks on its expansion. At the EU December summit, which I attended together with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, it was decided that studies would be prepared on each individual country courting membership in the EU, so that the debate on admission could commence within six months after the Intergovernmental Conference ends. Hence, it is not likely for our application to remain in the proverbial drawer in Brussels for a long time.

When we discussed the circumstances of the submission of the EU membership application by the Czech Republic at the Foreign Ministry and later in the Cabinet, we were aware of this step's having a major historical significance in addition to its topical political import. Therefore, we decided to enclose with the brief text of the letter, in which we apply in the name of our country for membership, a memorandum that provides more details about the points of departure and the motives leading the Government of the Czech Republic to this momentous step. The memorandum reads: "By its decision (...), the government of the Czech Republic takes a step that is unique by its significance in the modern history of the country (...) and assumes a great historical responsibility before contemporary and future generations. It has arrived at a conviction, however, that this very responsibility to the citizens of our own country and the generations of other European nations does not permit any other alternative."

The phenomenon of European integration, on which the West European states have worked for several decades, is now an irrevocable challenge to the entire continent. The West Europeans are aware of this. When I speak with politicians from these countries, I ascertain that

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further expansion of the Union is, if not more, then just as burning an issue for them as it is for us. They realize just like us that the EU without us is just a torso and not the Europe that can face the challenges of the 21st century. Precisely for this reason is the reassessment of the very foundations of this community and its future orientation on the agenda of the day.

In this context, it is important to again remind ourselves of the roots of our Europeanism that we discussed so much in November 1989. It is also done in the memorandum enclosed with the application, when it states that "... the Czech national identity has been for most of its history a part of European formations with a great number of dissimilar ethnic and cultural communities and traditions. (...) The favorable and the painful historical experience enable the Czech Republic to understand the integration processes based on the solidarity of European nations, the benefits and the risks that exist on this path. This understanding is enhanced by the fact that the territory of the present Czech Republic has been for centuries, with the involuntary exception of several recent decades, a natural and prominent part of the West European civilization process...."

Of course, the importance of European integration for the Czech Republic is not evident only on the level of great historical and geopolitical dictums, but also on the level of very practical needs. The issues on which decisions are made within the EU on a daily basis concern us directly. They affect not only life within the union but also here. At the same time, we do not have any chance to codecide on these issues. It is not just that the relevant ministers do not take part in the decisionmaking processes, but the same is true about our experts from hundreds of different areas in which the EU institution interferes. Economic life of our entire continent follows the rules set by the EU. The nonparticipation results in a disadvantage in the international competition. Permanent nonparticipation would be for us not only unnatural but also economically very disadvantageous.

There is no need to talk about the significance of EU membership for the security and stability of our country. Integration into the EU will be for the Czech Republic a seal on the irreversibility of the implemented changes and confirmation of their resistance to the complex development to which we bear witness in other parts of Europe.

Nevertheless, the Czech Government does not follow any particular goals or implementation of one-sided advantages and guarantees by submitting the EU membership application. That would be a myopic approach, which history never tolerates. We want and, I must say, have the right to become an equal member with the same advantages and the same obligations as the others.

Admission of the Czech Republic and other countries into the EU will mean the healing of a deep scar left on our continent by communism. It simply is a reunion of a family that was divided forcibly and against its will.

Therefore, after we and some other countries are admitted to the EU, not only the West Europeans to us but also we to them will be able to say: Welcome to Europe!

Zieleniec on Czech-German Declaration

LD1301094096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We are now coming back to the talks between Foreign Ministers Klaus Kinkel and Josef Zieleniec on the preparation of a [joint] declaration on mutual relations. Our Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec has been interviewed by our correspondent Jiri Halousek.

[Begin recording] [Zieleniec] This meeting was not planned to be a final one. These were consultations. The long duration of the meeting is proof of this. We have planned it as a long meeting that would enable us to study the whole draft text of the declaration, that would enable us to take stock of what has already been done. We have done this, and it can be said that our discussions have shown that the problem lies in one issue only. This issue, however, is a key one.

We have proposed the declaration in order to express our will, together with Germany, not to burden our future relations with political and legal problems that have their origin in the past. I must say that Germany has difficulties in finding a way in which to express this.

[Halousek] Minister, you are to meet Minister Kinkel again soon. Could you tell us when this meeting might take place, and do you not think that, in view of the problems you mentioned, it might be necessary to hold talks at the highest level as well?

[Zieleniec] Here I would wait for some development in Germany first of all. The problem I talked about must be discussed among the coalition partners in Germany. On the Czech side we have a clear consensus, we have set very precisely the limits we insist on in these issues as well as all the possibilities that exist.

I think it is not possible to say with precision when this meeting might take place. We will nevertheless make use of this time between negotiations to organize various multilateral meetings. We will continue. Contacts

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between ministries headed by state secretaries will continue as well. This is the system we have launched in the future [as heard] and that has brought us to the present day, when the majority of [word indistinct] problems are already behind us. [end recording]

Klaus Discusses 1995 Economy, Privatization

AU1101151396 Prague EKONOM in Czech 4-10 Jan 96 No 1, pp 11-13

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Klvacova and Jan Prikryl; place and date not given: "Living on the Edge Is Difficult"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are meeting with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in the New Year edition of EKONOM for the fifth time. The topical issues change with time, while the prime minister's views, assessment, and hopes do not. We spoke about many things, but there is only one message: Let us curb the partial interests, partial pressures of interest groups. That is our chance to survive and succeed.

[EKONOM] We recently became a member of the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is sometimes referred to as the "club of the rich." Of course, so far we are something like a poor relative in this club. What is the political significance of this membership? And what is its, let us say, symbolic significance?

[Klaus] I must begin with the symbolic effect, although there is nothing empty in this symbolism. I believe this symbolism to be very extensive and firm. We are at a stage today where we really needed such recognition. At the beginning of the transformation, back in 1990, I myself was trying for recognition of this type. The result was the historically fastest attainment of membership in the IMF and the World Bank. Not such a marked step has been achieved since that time. Membership in NATO or the EU is somewhere beyond the horizon. For myself, in this sense, I consider joining the OECD very important. Its tangible effects cannot be listed easily, but you yourself are aware of the entire economy's being based on trust and credibility, on the conviction that this particular partner is such and such, and therefore I do or do not conduct business with him. In this respect, the significance of our joining the OECD may be very practical.

[EKONOM] Let us stay with the supranational institutions for a while. You have never hidden your Euroskepticism—or let us better and moderately say Eurorealism—your certain aversion to the bureaucratization of the structures of the EU and some of its other features. How many degrees of freedom do we have if we want to join the EU?

[Klaus] I believe that we do not have much freedom in the sense in which you ask. Of course, we must accept the rules of the institution we are joining, and the idea that the rules would be changed because of us is false in its very essence. On the other hand, I am completely convinced that today, the homogeneity of the EU is far from being such as it would appear to be from some external demonstrations or some external documents of this institution. If you look at the political, economic, social, or any other system in Ireland, Portugal, Finland, or Greece, you will learn that the differences are tremendous. There simply cannot be any talk at all of complete homogeneity. In this sense, there certainly is room there also for our specificity and dissimilarity. Some more room is given by the EU not being a firm point. It is not a matter given definitely once and for all but, rather, something on the move, developing. If it did not develop, the intergovernment conference that is to take place in 1996 would not be of such importance. The fact that this conference is considered of major importance, that it should predetermine how Europe will look in the future, only demonstrates that it is a moving target rather than a firm point, which we are to observe.

[EKONOM] Perhaps we should make our question more specific. What pressure is there to be expected in the direction of an absolutely specific role of the state in the economy? What pressure can be expected to be put on us to implement certain agricultural policy or certain industrial policy? Or perhaps social policy?

[Klaus] I believe particularly that a restructuring or a transformation—to use our terminology—will take place in the EU itself. You know that leading philosophers and economists always postulate that ideas matter [English phrase used], or that ideas have significance, consequences. There are logical temporal delays. First, there are ideas, the ideas captivate the academic and intellectual community, then the public, and then, with a certain delay, the politicians, and finally they are projected into international relations and international institutions. These are relatively most immunized to all this, and the delay there, in my opinion, is the largest. So, I believe that the ideational revolution that took place in the 1970's and the 1980's will soon be projected into the international institutions. Incidentally, a different generation will work in them. It will no longer be the clerks, a significant part of whom founded the European Economic Community in the 1950's and have been sitting there ever since.

[EKONOM] There is no reason not to apply to the EU the well-known observation by Max Planck that a new scientific truth normally triumphs because its opponents die out gradually, and a new generation grows up that accepts this truth quite naturally.... Let us return to the

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Czech Republic. How do the economic results of 1995 appear to you?

[Klaus] They are truly extraordinary, and not even the biggest harbinger of gloom can view them differently or call them something else. I really think this economy is evolving roughly the way we had imagined. No unexpected phenomena have occurred. The resulting economic growth should be about 5 percent, and there are even question marks here about the accuracy of our statistics, more about price statistics than quantitative statistics. Our inflation should come down. I believe that December 1995/December 1994 inflation will be under 8 percent, that it will begin with the number 7. The results also indicate that the level of unemployment will remain very low, that the exchange rate will stay at the level it is, and that the massive influx of foreign capital will continue. We were convinced of all of this. Of course, we knew that the acceleration of the domestic economy would bring about disparity in the balance of trade. We regarded this as a logical phenomenon on the one hand and a temporary one on the other. If there is something a tad different from what we had assumed, it is the rate of this phenomenon or the volume of the balance-of-trade deficit.

[EKONOM] In what way do you intend to pay, so to speak, for the existing deficit? Tourism and its services are doing as much as they can, but it seems that this task is somewhat more complicated than had been anticipated.

[Klaus] The first thing is that part of the balance-of-trade deficit that is covered by the surplus of the other items in the balance-of-trade current account. That is something that not even I would call financeable. It is natural that, of the single aggregate that is the balance-of-payments current account, a certain item has a plus sign, another has a minus sign, and the total is the way it is. So, I would consider this part to be completely normal, and there is no point in discussing it. I always say that there is no doubt that in Austria and Majorca they have a permanent balance-of-trade deficit because they have the surplus of the effect from tourism, and they will have it forever. To this effect, I would not rule out the possibility that—for example, from the point of view of the assets or liabilities of tourism—we may also be in the same situation. What there is on top of this, what has to be resolved at a given moment to the detriment of the balance-of-payments capital account, is something else. In the long term, this would be an unfavorable, truly alarming thing. But, in the short term, it is a more or less normal phenomenon.

[EKONOM] What is your view on the completion of the privatization process? The National Property Fund [FNM] currently administers relatively substantial property and administers it, to say the least, as badly as the former state enterprises and State Planning Commission administered it. Or even worse.

[Klaus] I think worse. Even considerably worse. We do not have to convince one another that central management, vertical management, is, in essence, unsuccessful. On the other hand, vertical management is better than nothing. And, to this effect, despite all my scorn for the former central planners and ministerial bureaucracy, they did, after all, apply some brakes and little brakes to the insatiable behavior of the enterprises. I have the feeling that there are no braking mechanisms at the FNM because they simply cannot be there. It took decades of work to establish the central management system. The couple of dozen officials at the FNM are responsible for a far larger number of enterprises than any central institution bureaucrat was in the past.

[EKONOM] Of course, it cannot be helped; the FNM is an independent legal person listed in the company register, and it is to be expect that, while the Privatization Ministry will pass away quietly, calmly, and quickly, the Fund will effectively fight tooth and nail against its termination.

[Klaus] It would in any case. I also consider its establishment to be the biggest mistake of our entire transformation process, a mistake we did not have the strength to prevent. The only solution I see now is the rapid clearance of the FNM. (I am aware, however, that this involves a certain chronological cycle and that it is impossible to implement a solution before the elections.) What kind of method to select for this, to what extent to return to the nontraditional method that we have applied twice already, and whether to privatize, so to speak, overnight, if you like another wave, or gradualistically, is a slightly different consideration. I have to say that no one has a mandate for this today. It has to be given in the elections.

[EKONOM] Coupon privatization created the first owners. They are far from being responsible owners that take proper care of their property. The solution is, let us hope, a concentration of ownership. This may, of course, affect the small investor quite significantly.

[Klaus] Our public opinion is terribly contradictory. On the one hand, we are under constant criticism for not creating concentrated ownership. We explain that the economy has to settle, that the process of concentrating ownership cannot be speeded up, and that the level of concentration commensurate to the country's overall climate and society will be created on its own account and in the course of time. A U.S. investor comes along and purchases shares in five enterprises. Public opinion

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is vexed that the Klaus government is to blame for the poor small investors not having this or that. This appraisal of the situation goes from one extreme to the other.

[EKONOM] This is because the average citizen has not studied economics and does not know the cliche that there is no such thing as a free lunch. He wants ownership concentration and, in addition, protection for the minority owner.

[Klaus] It is not because the average citizen has not studied economics. It is because the economic commentators in our mass media have not studied it. And they then urge the average citizen to think in this way. I am saying perhaps for the thousandth time that the holder of one General Motors share in America does not aspire to make joint decisions on what this company will or will not do. He knows that he has one option—to wait for the yield on his share. Of course, he can sell it at the appropriate time. So, this yelling about the whittling away of the rights of minority citizens is very often a chant on a false note. Because the public is unprepared, it quite likes to take hold of these false notes.

Naturally, the legislation of the Czech capital market is not perfect. It would be hard for it to be perfect. I spoke recently with one of the most powerful men in the United States, with Federal Reserve System Chairman Allan Greenspan. He heard my lecture in Washington on the 10 commandments of Czech transformation. In a discussion on whether transformation or legislation should lead the way, he said an interesting thing. When the United States was expanding westward, people went first and only then did legislation make its way there and refine itself. It cannot be any different in our country, even though Milos Zeman may deduce from this that the Wild West is being established here.

[EKONOM] Your answer is very interesting, but it is possible to raise at least one objection. Protection for the small investors does not only concern little old ladies from the Orlicke mountains, small investors from coupon privatization. It concerns all of the privatization funds and all of the potential minority investors from home and abroad. Are we to amend our laws concerning the capital market so that the concentration of ownership proceeds with standard protection for minority owners as is commonly known? Even at the cost of ownership concentration becoming rather too expensive from the investors' point of view?

[Klaus] This is an issue that really vexes us. Legislation of the capital market is not a one-way street. The idea that a change would mean unequivocally an improvement in the legislation, that it would only have plus signs and no minus sign is incorrect. I simply do not share it. The principle of something for something always applies, in the economy as in real life. The issue involves living on the edge, seeking a level that would maintain, stabilize, and guarantee something. But we have to do it in such a way that we do not hamstring the natural processes we need and that we always think we have rather few of. Living on this edge is unbelievably difficult. When the advocates of this or that group tell me that they know of guaranteed directions, methods, and procedures for dealing with a problem, I always object to them; yes, but you see the situation from one specific angle, from the point of view of one partial group. Our task is—unfortunately and thank goodness—to try and put things together. This is not theorizing; I believe it is entirely the heart of the matter.

[EKONOM] You ended your recent lecture to the Czech Economic Society with the entreaty that we must not permit the further depletion of the transformation cushions, wages to rise faster than productivity, and domestic prices to increase faster than foreign ones. Of course, the state has let go of many instruments. Wage regulation is gone, the koruna is convertible.

[Klaus] We created a certain economic situation with two cushions in which some equations apply slightly differently than they would if these cushions did not exist. Now the issue involves whether they are not already depleted. Because, if we were to continue with an erroneous notion, it would be a big mistake. I really think the wage cushion is still here but will not last long. You are right that the state no longer has too many instruments for preventing wage growth. It has a traditional macropolicy, and I think we are doing well in this traditional macropolicy.

In the lecture you are referring to, I said—and, I think I am generally not mistaken economically—that we have no indicator other than disinflation on whose basis we could ascertain analytically whether the cushions have been depleted. You published my Zofin speech last year. I said at that time that our inflation is caused by, among other things, a higher than average rate of economic adaptation on the micro level. Last week, during my visit to the United States, I arrived at the theory that, in a nonstationary economy, there is something like a natural rate of adjustment [English expression used], a natural rate of economic adaptability, just as there is a natural rate of unemployment. And this natural rate of economic adaptability is confirmed by lots of standard characteristics—shifts in the demand and supply factors, the rate of technological change, movement of the labor force, and so on. A natural rate of economic adaptability causes nonzero inflation in a situation of imperfect markets. If the markets were absolutely perfect, there would not have to be any inflation—some

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prices would go up, others down. Because there are all sorts of rigidities on the markets, movement is more in an upward direction. All of this applies generally, regardless of the macroeconomic situation, regardless of the situation in the money supply.

So, to sum up, the rate of adjustment on the micro level in our country is far, far above average. On the other hand, we have lesser quality markets, from which it follows on that core inflation [English expression used], inflation built into the system, is higher in our country than in standard West European countries. Therefore, I think that changes in the rate of inflation are a very precise indicator, a sign of the depletion of the cushions. I am not afraid of this; I think that natural forces will come into operation here and that the state will not have to perform any somersaults, take any ingenious measures.

[EKONOM] What is your current view on the stability of the exchange rate?

[Klaus] The theory that a transforming economy needs a kind of anchor still applies. If you are not sure about inflation, wage movement, and a whole series of other quantities, you need something to hang on. The signal effect of this anchor is even now indisputable. The only problem is to what extent the anchor gives us certainty and to what extent too much comfort. This is a basic conflict that is always here. To argue on the basis of a trivial textbook and to criticize me for not being liberal is unfair. For instance, you would have to find fault with Milton Friedman—that his firm rule for the growth of money supply is also pronouncedly nonliberal. I can imagine that, instead of an anchor for the exchange rate, I could calmly use the anchor of a 5 or 3 percent rise in the money supply. The issue involves which anchor is better and which is worse.

But I think the exchange rate in the one and only sense is not such a fixed irreconcilable anchor, and, thus, I leave the view ahead open. It is not because it is fixed not against only one currency but against two that have very nonsymmetrical movements. To put it differently, for each specific participant in foreign currency transactions who operates not with an aggregate but with a specific commodity and a specific currency, our exchange rate is not fixed. We could begin to unravel this whole tangle here.

[EKONOM] Let us pause at one more specific issue. Why is health-care transformation proceeding so terribly painfully?

[Klaus] If we had a certain attitude toward design and evolution throughout society, it would be completely the opposite in health care—with regard to the far greater scale of its evolution and its branch-related, specific, professionally conceived pressures tinged with special interest. No one has come into health care with a clear vision, with an idea for a transformation strategy. Health care did not get someone in 1990 who was obstinate and headstrong, someone convinced of his vision and that he was right. A system came about that I knew would not function from the start. It functioned only as long as it was accompanied by money poured into health care from the rest of the economy or society. This fact is often forgotten today. Many a time, a certain incubation period is also necessary before a disease manifests itself fully.

[EKONOM] In principle, we could apply the same or very similar logic to education and its transformation.

[Klaus] Yes, but with the proviso that, in education, there was no major development in the cost of educational aids, while the costs of medicines and medical equipment have risen enormously. So, the collision with the macro barrier is not so drastic in education as it is in health care.

[EKONOM] We are talking, in principle, about partial pressures, about their promotion to the detriment of others. Do you see a chance of curbing them? Your book on this subject, *Countdown*, ends on a tone a bit like skepticism, a bit like a challenge.

[Klaus] You know very well that this topic is topic No. 1 for me. Everyone has an inner motivation to promote his own partial interest, and it is clear that, when a partial group demands that each of its members get 1,000 korunas more, then, even if the outcome were that each member of society would have 2,000 less, this partial group has, all the same, sufficient reason for promoting its interest. This is the biggest problem of our time. We have to find a mechanism to keep a curb on partial pressures.

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Yugoslav Diplomat Upbeat on Normalization of Ties

LD1401165096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1246 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, Jan 14 (TANJUG)—The charge d'affaires of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bratislava, Tomislav Stankovic, has said that a normalization of the Slovakia-Yugoslavia relations was in full swing and that the trade exchange between the two countries would amount to 400 million dollars this year.

In an interview with the Bratislava paper PRACA, Stankovic said that several inter-state agreements were being finalized and that they should be signed by the end of the month before a planned visit by Slovakia Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav diplomat praised Bratislava's policy on the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia and said that Slovakia had kept good relations with all the parties to the conflict which had ensured it the legitimate position of a mediator in the quest for a peaceful solution.

HZDS Deputy Questions NATO's Goals in Bosnia

AU1201142796 Bratislava ZMENA in Slovak No 2, 1996 p 17

[Article by Deputy Roman Hofbauer of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS: "What Kind of a Dialogue Is It When a Machine Gun Is Aimed at You? NATO? For What?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not once in the long years of my life did I see so many generals with smiling, happy, and literally beaming faces and decorated with so many stars and distinctions as at the meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels at the end of November 1995, when the unanimous decision was made to send NATO troops to Bosnia. This phenomenon is so interesting that it is appropriate to pause to consider it. Throughout its existence, NATO has been justifying its establishment and its existence by the need to protect the Western values of freedom, democracy, and market economy against aggression by an external enemy and by the need to guarantee the internal security and stability of states making up this military alliance.

Yet, in the decades of NATO's existence, there has not been even one instance of one of its members being attacked militarily by an outside aggressor. For NATO armies' commands and, above all, for arms manufacturers, this has served as an argument justifying NATO's existence and armament and the constant replenishing and reequipping of its armies with ever newer and more expensive weapon systems, even though skeptics were saying that the same argument of preventive deterrent could also be used to explain the extraterrestrials' failure to attack the Earth.

Violent and bloody armed conflicts such as the massacring of Hungarians by Soviet tanks in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact armies in 1968 were no reason for NATO to suspend its idleness because these conflicts took place outside this military alliance.

The military conflicts between Greece and Turkey or the bloody suppression of the Kurdish, Basque, and Irish national liberation movements by the Turks, Spaniards, and English left NATO just as idle because these were, for a change, conflicts within the alliance, did not pose an outside threat to it, and, last but not least, the Kurds, the Basques, and the Irish are just terrorists, anyway....

Hence, in the almost 40 years of NATO's existence, there have been no aggressors to attack this military alliance. After 1989, even NATO's potential adversary on the world's political scene, whose existence was NATO's raison d'etre, vanished. What now?!

The existential concerns within the army circles of the Western hemisphere and the even greater nervousness among arms manufacturers were thus fully warranted. Hardly anyone was smiling at NATO's Brussels headquarters then. What purpose do armies and NATO serve, and who needs weapons when no one has been fighting for decades, when the military pact has no enemy, and when its doctrine has been rendered obsolete?

At the end of 1990, the military conflict in the Balkans started to smolder. After the assiduous adding of wood to the smoldering fire by the participating parties, at long last, the fire flared up in full so that a return to the previous state of affairs became impossible. After four years of unbelievable butchery and the expulsion of the civilian population and after destruction of values such as not even World War II veterans can remember, NATO finally decided to deploy its armed fist. However, the peculiar nature of this military intervention is exceptional.

The NATO states are stepping in against someone who does not threaten them in the least, and their move is thus inconsistent with the NATO doctrine.

The NATO generals are supposed to command the military contingents of states that are not even NATO members, which is an incomprehensible subordination.

NATO's military intervention is being undertaken against nations and states that are neither members of NATO nor past members of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact.

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After almost 40 years, NATO's weapon systems will, at long last, be tested in fire. The coordination of commanders, units, and operations will be tested not in staff maneuvers in offices, at training compounds, and at firing ranges, but in real life, against living targets in a populated country. Not by coincidence have Euroskeptical peace doubters renamed the Bosnian operation "Joint Violence," instead of "Joint Endeavor."

Extremely peculiar diagnosis, therapy, and dialogue are thus being applied on our continent in the late 20th century. Is it coincidence that the journal for European integration, EUROPSKY DIALOG, published by the EU's headquarters in Brussels, which is also NATO's headquarters, has on its cover a NATO soldier holding a submachine gun as a symbol of this dialogue? Who is he aiming at? Slovakia is too small a state, and the objections to our existence too many for us to remain stoically calm.

Do we remember that, in July 1995, Meciar and Slovakia appeared on the interstate level on the same list with Milosevic and Serbia and with Tudjman and Croatia, in connection with a statement about fascism? [allusion to speech made by Hungarian-born U.S. financier George Soros at an international forum in Crans Montana, Switzerland]

Do we realize that the main NATO transit base, set up for the purpose of NATO armies' deployment, was established in Kaposvar, Hungary?

Do we still take lightly the nationalist screaming about fascism in Slovakia by Miklos Duray [Coexistence chairman]?

Did the Western "bastions of freedom and democracy" not make sufficiently evident, by their acceptance of anti-Slovak lies and slanders in three demarches, their ill will over our existence and, simultaneously, their urgent concern about the "terribly oppressed" Hungarian minority in Slovakia...?

Is it just a coincidence that the accumulation of the above phenomena takes place at a time when 1,632 pieces of the Slovak Army's equipment—822 tanks, 386 armored carriers, and 424 artillery systems and aircraft squadrons—have been liquidated, a fact that NATO commissions have been monitoring conscientiously on the spot? Are we not going to be short of these weapons when building home guard units? Or was that the intention?

Did we notice that NATO stepped in militarily, with the decisiveness of a marshal [s marsalskou rozhodnostou], only when it lost an equal partner, against an entity that cannot be a military match for it in any respect?

Do we realize that the main negotiator and "architect" of NATO's Bosnia operation, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, held talks with President Michal Kovac in the United States and got married in the summer in...Budapest?

So is this NATO's European dialogue?

Press on Primakov as New Russian Foreign Minister

AU1301155896

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA and Bratislava SME in Slovak on 11 January publish commentaries on the appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov as the new Russian foreign minister.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 11 January on page 7 carries a 650-word commentary by Blazej Panik entitled "A Native of Kiev Replaces a Native of Brussels at the Head of Russian Diplomacy." Panik views as "symbolic" the fact that Kozyrev, who was born in Brussels, has been replaced by Primakov, a native of Kiev. He believes that this change exemplifies Moscow's determination "to place far greater emphasis on relations with the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union than on those with the West." According to Panik, the "acceleration of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space under Moscow's dominant role" is now in Russia's vital interest, "if for no other reason than because the internally weakened great power does not have the necessary influence and capacity to assert its interests elsewhere in the world." Panik believes that Kozyrev "had to go because he rather underestimated this vector of the Russian foreign policy line" and because his preference for "the scarcely realistic concept of strategic partnership with the United States and the West" did not produce "any major success for Russia" but, quite the contrary, "the Americans and Germans had started to push the Russians out of everywhere." While Panik admits that Kozyrev could not work any "miracles," given the "disintegration of the Russian Army and economy" and his "pitifully paid diplomats," he believes that "he could have done more for Russia by not carelessly leaving the idea of 'Russian greatness' to the communist and nationalistic opposition."

Panik continues: "All this should now be set right by Yevgeniy Primakov, the former chief of the Russian intelligence service, known and respected in important world capitals and scarcely assailable by domestic critics. His choice was a good move on the part of President Yeltsin, at least from the domestic political point of view. Primakov is not only well connected with

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the decisive domestic power elites (the new and the older ones), but is also politically neutral, which makes him acceptable to virtually all party camps." As for Russian foreign policy under Primakov, Panik believes that, "until the June presidential elections, it would be premature to make any prognoses regarding any long-term 'adjustment of priorities' of Russian foreign policy, except for the one mentioned at the outset of this commentary."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 11 January on page 6 carries a 500-word commentary by Basa Javurkova entitled "Primakov Is Stepping Forward From the Backstage." Referring to Primakov's "reputation as an uncompromising defender of his ideas about the foreign policy line of the former Soviet Union and today's Russia," Javurkova believes that, "while Primakov's appointment may not mean a change of direction, at least for the time being, it will mean a far more vigorous assertion of what he considers to be Russia's state interests." Javurkova goes on to say: "What is interesting for us is Primakov's opposition in principle to NATO's eastward expansion. Since, officially, the Slovak Republic expresses interest in NATO membership, this is not a negligible fact. In a famous speech to the State Duma last October, Primakov proposed that NATO extend security guarantees to East European countries, without them joining NATO. At that time Juraj Schenk, the Slovak minister of foreign affairs, put Primakov's statement into context as the toughening of rhetoric before the approaching elections in Russia and pointed out that part of Russian society was disillusioned because Russia no longer plays such a role as in the past. If Kozyrev was being held responsible for the loss of Russia's position as a great power, it is clearer than daylight that Primakov will be expected to save whatever can be saved. Following the electoral victory of the communists and nationalists, President Yeltsin must do all he can to halt the permanent criticism by his opponents in the State Duma, triggered amply by Kozyrev's diplomatic maneuvers. The new chief of diplomacy and former foreign intelligence chief may, perhaps, be able to cope successfully with the problem of satisfying the critics at home, without being a disappointment abroad."

Meciar Interviewed on Current Issues

LD1201231996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1738 GMT 12 Jan 96

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Bibiana Gunisova on 12 January; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Gunisova] Prime Minister, the visit by the OSCE high commissioner for ethnic minorities, Max van der Stoel, was undoubtedly one of the top events of the last week. What were the results of your talks held on 10 January? According to your spokeswoman, you were assured by Max van der Stoel that in his final report he would make only one recommendation for the Slovak Government.

[Meciar] As a diplomat and a politician, Mr. van der Stoel did a good job in familiarizing the international public with the permanent observation of human and civil rights, as well as the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities, in the Slovak Republic. A great deal has been achieved due to the activities and communication with Mr. van der Stoel during the three years of his mission. At the same time, both sides assessed the situation as having made progress and agreed that there was no longer any need for the mission to continue. The mission will end its activity on 26 May 1996 and we shall continue our communication through standard working relations and contacts, the same as those between the OSCE and the government of any standard democratic country.

The second conclusion, at which we have arrived, is linked to the status of ethnic minorities—that is, to the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and of the Slovak minority in Hungary. In these two instances the quality of the problem is different. In the case of the Hungarian minority [in Slovakia], the issue at stake is the improvement of the international standard, which is already high, while in the case of the Slovak minority in Hungary it is its survival that is at stake.

The third important issue was the explanation of the language law and of the territorial division. However, we did not comment on the content of these laws because neither side saw any problems here.

The statement to the effect that the mission has fulfilled its role gives us the licence to conclude that, through its democratic system, the Slovak Republic has met all of the international legal requirements related to the status of minorities and the guarantees of their rights.

[Gunisova] Max van der Stoel has also met representatives of Hungarian parties whoh have voiced their disagreement, for example, with the language law and also with the proposal of a new territorial-administrative division which, in their view, will harm minorities. It is becoming clear that the problems of the territorial-administrative division are very important because, for example, also the Association of Towns and Villages in Slovakia [ZMOS] has not yet arrived at a unified view on this issue.

[Meciar] [Passage omitted] The Hungarian political parties announced in the Council of Europe and everywhere

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else that we would be dividing Slovakia along the north-south line. As usual, they were not telling the truth. For example, the former region of East Slovakia will be divided into two parts, the northern and the southern. This division runs not along the north-south but along the east-west line. The citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin live in the south, so their numbers in the region will increase.

The former region of Central Slovakia is to be divided into the northern part, with the seat in Zilina, and the southern part, with the seat in Banska Bystrica. Again, the proportional representation of Hungarians in this region will improve.

The situation is similar in the region of West Slovakia, where a new region of Trencin will be set up. It will also incorporate parts of the districts of Topolcany, Partizanske, and Banovce. The southern part will be divided between the districts of Trnava and Nitra and will, in fact, result in an improved ratio of Hungarian citizens in the region.

I wish the Hungarian parties did not mislead and presented serious arguments. Views that territorial units should be set up on the basis of ethnic origin are reactionary and (?present) attempts at creating ethnically pure regions with the help of administrative means. We are not going to do that. Simply, the regional demography will not change, but the administration will. It will change for the benefit of all citizens who live there regardless of their ethnic origin. [passage omitted]

[Gunisova] Prime Minister, deliveries of Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline were suspended over the last few days. [passage omitted] How could we prevent the recurrence of such situation? Could we look for any other solutions?

[Meciar] [Passage omitted] In my view there is no danger of Russia not meeting its obligations. Moreover, the Adria oil pipeline acts as a precaution. It is a substitute source even though oil has not yet flowed through it. We are also considering the possibility of building near Bratislava a connection between the Druzhba pipeline and the western pipeline system Schwechat [in Austria]. Alas, we have not yet met with a favorable response on the other side yet. This connection would represent yet another essential measure and enable oil deliveries from three sources. [passage omitted]

[Gunisova] When assessing the countries of the Visegrad Four, the January business supplement of the Canadian daily THE GLOBE AND MAIL notes that your deeds in the sphere of economy are much more responsible than your words, the only problem being the lack of foreign capital. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] Foreign investment is a rather complicated issue. There are substantially more foreign investments in the Hungarian Republic than in our country. Are they substantially better off than we are? The opposite is the truth. Foreign investment alone cannot serve as a criterion of the functioning of the economy. The measure of investment cannot be assessed merely on the volume of foreign investment.

Slovakia is facing several problems in this sphere. The first problem is that it is not sufficiently well prepared for an efficient use of foreign investment. [passage omitted]

Second, every single received crown, dollar, or mark has to be paid back. We did not choose loans but we managed to increase our own reserves by 1.7 billion dollars. We have thus lowered the limit of our indebtedness and dependency and have accumulated our own resources which are sources for future development. [passage omitted]

Investment also comes in the form of capital. We are finding ourselves in a situation when the negative political propaganda is affecting the interest in capital investment in Slovakia, or this interest is limited to lucrative projects which we do not want to give away.

Another factor affecting the influx of investment to our country is its rating, its trustworthiness, in which also political factor is being considered. The political stability or political risks represent the risk level of investment.

The internal political situation is not worse than in other countries where the situation is not being assessed and presented as in the case of Slovakia. Such presentation is also our own fault, including the fault of some constitutional officials who have to bear personal responsibility for it.

The situation in Slovakia is different. The creation of this negative image, which is not based on reality, acts as a barrier for the influx of capital even in cases where it already would be feasible, for example in the communication network and elsewhere. I want to point out that prejudices in the sphere of information and politics are in conflict with the economy, which is favorable also from the domestic point of view. However, foreign companies which already do business in Slovakia, achieve some of the best results within their European or worldwide network.

It is this economic reality that makes people think what is going on in our country. Economically we are good. The country makes fast progress, but there is political discord. These political discords are probably inflated, or those who cause them, luckily, do not have any

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influence over economic policy. That is one of the possible explanation which is being sought in the West.

[Gunisova] The case of the president's son, Michal Kovac Jr., is one of the cases on the basis of which foreign countries unfavorably assess the political situation in Slovakia. [passage omitted] Do you think that this case will end and be done away with soon?

[Meciar] I am willing to devote as much time to Michal Kovac Jr. as to any other citizen of the Slovak Republic who is suspected of criminal activity, wherever in the world he or she may be. Michal Kovac Jr. is one of the citizens against whom an international warrant has been issued. He is in Vienna at present and his fate will be further decided by institutions acting in criminal proceedings. It will be decided neither by the government nor by politicians. We did not intervene in the work of the aforementioned institutions and we shall not do so.

Meciar Addresses Government Meeting in Senica

LD1201130996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Slovak Government met in Senica [west Slovakia] district at its first session this year held outside Bratislava. Peter Toman reports:

[Toman] The many groups of government members, headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and strengthened by parliament Speaker Ivan Gasparovic and deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, met with representatives of the district's self-administration and state administration this morning.

Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar recalled in his opening address the positive economic results of our young state, as well as the government's plans for this year, where priority will be, among other things, road-building. The government wants to invest 6.7 billion korunas in road-building, which is approximately three times as much as last year. Another priority will be subsidies for housing, where the state will provide money to towns and villages not according to the number of inhabitants, but according to building readiness. Another priority will be employment. In this connection the prime minister praised the fact that Senica district has a share in reducing unemployment on average in Slovakia. It is under 10 percent in Senica.

In the political sphere, Vladimir Meciar rejected speculation about early elections. We are interested in stabilizing the situation. Stabilization is our program, destabilization is not, Meciar stressed. Those present at the meeting then heard with great interest the prime minister's report about the government's effort to speed up the reform of state administration and self administration. By 30 June 1996, the current provisional situation in the structure of state administration should end. Let us speed up this process. If we put it up for national discussion, we will never agree. [passage omitted]

Meciar Rejects Speculation on Reconstruction

LD1201013296 Bratislava VTV Television in Slovak 1830 GMT 11 Jan 96

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Anna Vargova in Bratislava on 11 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vargova] For the first time this year, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar today met journalists at an informal discussion. At the beginning, the prime minister focused on Slovakia's foreign policy objectives, as well as on the need to stabilize our political scene. He said, among other things, that it was necessary to tackle relations between constitutional bodies.

[Meciar] It is not feasible for Slovakia to continue the status quo, in which contrasting reports on our internal political scene are being published, especially abroad. With regard to any considerations concerning candidacy for entry into the EU, the first three months of 1996 will constitute a period of monitoring. If the volume and the content of reports continues to resemble the reports originated by the president of the Republic, we shall not be able to join the ranks of candidates. The very significant political pressure from abroad makes us deal with the situation. I can only note that our attempts at changing the way in which the presidential role is being performed, which were made in the second half of 1996, failed.

[Vargova] Does it mean that you cannot see any possibility for relations between the ruling coalition and the president to change in any way, or for the situation to become stabilized? Do you think the only way to achieve this is to replace the current president?

[Meciar] The government coalition has proposed a reasonable compromise through its officials who talked with the president. We respect the president's constitutional powers and his term in office, but he should change the way in which he carries out his job. He should stop being the president of the opposition and become a nonpartisan president. He should stop creating and taking part in an active antigovernment campaign. What he is doing is not an activity striving for a different concept; it is an antigovernment activity. Unfortunately, we failed. That is why all the institutions involved in this issue must again come together this year. We also

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have to discuss the issue with our friends abroad who hold a different view. We have to discuss what to do next.

[Vargova] Some political commentators think that the government could be reconstructed this year by the Slovak National Party and the Association of Workers of Slovakia leaving [the government coalition] and being replaced by the Party of the Democratic Left. What is your view on this?

[Meciar] The government is functional and so is parliament. Success has been achieved, so why should we change horses now? This is done in case of failure or when optimum results are not achieved.

With regard to joining the coalition, we are an open coalition, and anybody who wants to do so can join us and discuss conditions. However, nobody so far had the courage even to talk about it, although there have been such offers. Work in top institutions is responsible. It is easy to break up a system. It is more difficult to create a new, more productive system. This system is productive, and we are keeping it.

SDL's Weiss on HZDS Plan To Dismiss Kovac

AU1301155796 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Jan 96 p 1

[Interview with SDL Chairman Peter Weiss by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "Indecent Proposal by Sergej Kozlik"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A discussion is again taking place among individual political entities, as well as among citizens, on whether the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] might join the government.

[Hrabko] Which body of the party can decide on joining the government?

[Weiss] The formal decision could come from the Republic Council because that is facilitated by the rules of procedure. The Council has decided, however, on the issues for the precongress discussion. This implies that, after evaluating the opinions, the congress should make the decision; otherwise the discussion would fail in its purpose.

[Hrabko] You call yourselves an opposition party. Do you consider it suitable to constantly proclaim your willingness to discuss joining the government, especially after all that this government has done so far?

[Weiss] Yes, we are an opposition party. The question of joining the government has been intensively submitted by those who would like to see the SDL in the government for their own political goals. HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik said quite clearly: The condition for the SDL joining the government is that it should help to dismiss President Michal Kovac. That is a very purpose-oriented condition, and a party such as the SDL should not accept it and I would not believe we are going to.

[Hrabko] You are the chairman of the party and bear responsibility for it. Why did you not clearly state that this is a topic you do not intend to discuss with the HZDS?

[Weiss] I used the conditional tense only because technically there are always some possibilities. The fact is that 13 SDL deputies signed a declaration in which they unequivocally refused to do this. It is wishful thinking on Kozlik's part. I am convinced that the SDL congress will not accept this role.

[Hrabko] Do you believe it is a serious proposal on the part of the HZDS?

[Weiss] The HZDS is disparate and has people with whom I could imagine working.

[Hrabko] Of course, these people cannot make any proposals on behalf of the movement....

[Weiss] So far, it is not a serious proposal; it is a proposal made by Kozlik. He sees the SDL dismissing the president so as to be magnanimously let into the government. If there were a serious proposal, based on a national state interest, such as integration into the EU, and we were to discuss matters of policy and other issues, then yes, certainly. Here, however, some unspecified possibilities of the participation of the SDL in privatization are being offered in exchange for dismissing the president.

Comment: HZDS Trying To Get SDL Into Coalition

AU1601124896 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jan 96 p 10

[Article by Karol Wolf: "The HZDS Is Pressing the Democratic Left Into the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Through statements made by its leaders, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) has been giving ever clearer notice recently of its willingness to enlarge the ruling coalition. The offer, accompanied by strong pressure, is oriented unequivocally toward the postcommunist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), which is unquestionably weathering intense internal tension. SDL Chairman Peter Weiss, who, until now, has sharply rejected his party's entry into the government, has also softened his

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tone and, in a recent interview on this subject, has said that there are forces in the HZDS with which he could cooperate.

The view prevails among observers that the reason inducing Meciar to attempt to enlarge the coalition is, on the one hand, the political unreliability of the Association of Workers of Slovakia and, on the other, the privatization insatiability of the Slovak National Party.

In addition to this cabinet, the coalition partners of Meciar's movement are also making his position on the international scene considerably more difficult. The most recent example, when Meciar was unable to push through the ratification of the Hungarian-Slovak treaty, according to Bratislava commentators, says it all.

"Who would want to be in the prime minister's shoes in a situation in which he is forced to explain to his foreign partners why his deputies do not want to ratify a treaty that he signed?" asked a recent commentary in NARODNA OBRODA.

According to reports from the headquarters of Weiss's party, the unofficial part of the talks on the SDL's entry into the ruling coalition has, in essence, already come to an end, and only one issue was left on the table: that of President Michal Kovac.

The HZDS is insisting on the condition that the SDL, as the new member of the coalition, cooperate in the vote on dismissing the head of state. The SDL has so far officially rejected this condition, which was spelled out publicly by HZDS Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik.

Observers are emphasizing, however, that the final decision will not be made until the SDL congress in March, at which the election of a new party leadership is expected. Weiss has already let it be known that he will not be running, which could mean that the whole wider leadership of the party could change and, thus, its political line.

Apart from this, Bratislava political circles are convinced that the SDL's attitude toward the head of state is not so categorically positive as, for example, that of the opposition Christian Democrats or the Democratic Union. On the contrary, bitterness lingers among the ranks of the former communists from the time when Kovac, in his speech to parliament in March 1994, prompted the dismissal of the Meciar cabinet and, in essence, pushed Weiss into a government with the right wing. Internal sociological surveys then indicated with iron regularity that the SDL lost a considerable number of voters because of this and that Weiss has become synonymous with the deviation from left-wing policy.

The continuing decline in the SDL's popularity and the idea that Michal Kovac was the prelude to its slump could thus become the final reasons for the SDL to make up its mind to join the government even under the condition that the president goes.

In addition to the political reasons, it is also necessary to take into consideration the growing pressure from the business strata, who had bet on Weiss's party and are now entirely out of the admirable pace of privatization carried out in the style of direct sales to owners determined in advance. Reports have even emerged from the Slovak Republic National Property Fund that Meciar personally saw to it that the business strata close to the SDL were rejected prejudicially. The same applies to the SDL district activists who are suffering most from the ruling coalition's purges. This pressure, aimed at instigating a rebellion among SDL ranks, has, according to a number of signals, already to a considerable extent achieved its objective.

SDSS To Talk With SDL on Joining Coalition

AU1201145096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by "iko": "The SDSS: The Government Policy Does Not Satisfy the Conditions for the Social Democrats To Join the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) will initiate talks with the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) in connection with the recent comments by some of its representatives and the contemplations on the conceivable entry of the SDL into the government coalition. SDSS Chairman Jaroslav Volf emphasized that the present government policy does not satisfy the conditions given by both the SDSS and the SDL after the elections for their conceivable joining the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in the government. A change in the consistently opposing stand of the SDSS could occur, according to him, only if the government policy changes very markedly. Volf implied that the entry of the SDL into the government coalition could have a certain impact on its admission as a member to the Socialist International. According to SDSS Deputy Chairman Miloslav Spejl, the government entry of the SDL could mean the demise of the four-member coalition Common Choice.

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Comment Criticizes Hungarian Deputies' U.S. Visit

AU1201135696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Jan 96 p 5

[Commentary by Viliam Fabry: "About the Three Kings From the East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although it would be topical according to the calendar [the coming of the three kings is celebrated at Epiphany], this has nothing to do with the three kings from the East who came to pay tribute to Jesus in Bethlehem. This analogy only came to my mind as I read a report on the visit to the United States of the Hungarian parties deputies to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. They were three—Duray, Bugar, and Nagy—and they, too, went in the first half of July of last year "to pay tribute" to their patrons who support them, and not only politically. It is somewhat belated, yet certainly interesting information, which remains topical.

Disregarding the fact that it was allegedly a private visit (it is easy to figure out who invited them, as the magnanimous sponsor of anti-Slovak propaganda, millionaire Soros, was among those with whom the deputies met), these "three kings" from the East managed to get a lot done in the far West in less than a week.

They Were Solving the Solved Problems

According to the available information, they met with 18 personalities of U.S. political life, of whom only four—as representatives (I am not certain whether from the Congress or the Senate)—were of a comparable rank. All the other partners at the meetings were of lower rank (although it cannot be ruled out that they were influential people). Nevertheless, they used every opportunity to discuss issues of the highest interest for our state, even though they could have been, and most likely were, issues of much lesser importance to the other side. After all, the United States has much more important interests in Europe than solving the status of the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic, which, incidentally, had been resolved for a long time.

They Asked for Guarantees

So, what did our deputies discuss in the United States? As could be expected (that is, on the part of our deputies), it was, above all, the question of the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary. Much less expected or logical was that they sought a faster! ratification of the treaty in the form of a letter to be sent to our prime minister by President Clinton himself. (The poor President would have a lot of writing to do if he were to intervene like this in the affairs of all of the UN-member states!) Our deputies (the pronoun "our" is somehow difficult to pen, as their deeds are aimed against us, but perhaps they will eventually become truly our deputies), however, were not only interested in speeding up the ratification of the treaty because they asked that the admission of Slovakia into NATO be conditioned by some guarantees (unspecified) for the Hungarian minority. These guarantees would make the U.S. Congress intervene against "anti-Hungarian" measures by the present Slovak Government and ensure the implementation of the Council of Europe recommendations as conditions for our admission to NATO. There is absolutely no doubt that they were particularly interested in the questionable, and still invalid Recommendation No. 1201, which, if not immediately, then in the future, ould lay the foundations for a conceivable autonomy for the Hungarians in Slovakia. It certainly was one of the reasons for the recent references by Deputy Arpad Duka-Zelyomi, who would like it best if the autonomy were enshrined in our Constitution, to the states in which autonomy is granted to nations and not to ethnic minorities.

Demarche Data

What our three deputies discussed in the United States can also be deduced from the adviser to President Clinton allegedly describing the danger of dictatorship and state dirigisme, nationalism, and the unsettled status of the Hungarian minority as the three greatest problems faced by Slovakia. In this context, the director of the office of the Democratic Party Foreign Committee [title as received] allegedly spoke about our prime minister in very unflattering terms (from where does he know him?), and used the opportunity to emphasize that, if the attacks against Michal Kovac and the Democratic Union continue, the Slovak Republic should quickly forget its membership in the Partnership for Peace and forget the United States! Although I do not know how this would be possible, if someone more competent uttered such words, it would be serious.

Finally, one more thing: This visit was certainly a source of the information for the demarche we received from the United States last year.

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Horn Discusses NATO, Clinton, Domestic Issues

LD1401232296 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Jan 96

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by correspondents Andras Totfalusi and Janos Mucsanyi in the studio for the "Weekly Courier" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Andras Totfalusi] [Passage omitted] Mr. Prime Minister, over the past year or so, this was the third occasion that a Hungarian-U.S. summit took place. This time it happened under rather unusual circumstances. How do you assess your talks with President Clinton?

[Horn] I would like to stress that this meeting took place on an exceptional occasion, for the U.S. President visited the U.S. base in Taszar. According to coordination talks—one of the numerous ones—in the evening of 12 January, we agreed that linked to his visit, we would also sit down for talks. Well, the weather intervened and he flew to Taszar instead of Tuzla, and we—together with President Arpad Goncz—travelled to Taszar. However, we have managed to discuss all the important issues we had planned to discuss. Therefore, I think it was certainly useful.

[Mucsanyi] What were these issues?

[Horn] First of all, the most important question was our participation in the Bosnian peace settlement process, and specific questions related to it. At my proposal, we have come to an agreement with the president that disputed matters related to financial settlements, or any other issues related to the stationing of the U.S. troops here, will be decided mutually by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti. [passage omitted]

The United States—and in a wider sense NATO—has assumed an enormous role in putting an end to this terrible destruction by the war. The U.S. leadership, among them the President, highly appreciated the fact that the peacemaking and peacekeeping mission could not be practically carried out without Hungary and the base in Taszar.

[Totfalusi] President Clinton mentioned that the NATO expansion had become timely. What does it mean for Hungary? Does it mean a closer deadline?

[Horn] This does not mean a new element, for the U.S. Administration has—for months and months—supported the idea that the new emerging democracies should become NATO members. He also stressed—what has been said several times—that the Russians have no right of veto over this issue. Consultations, naturally, will have to be continued with the Russian leadership, but this will, after all, be a matter for NATO and the applicants to decide on.

[Totfalusi] Could this statement signify a deadline earlier than planned?

[Horn] I do not think so. Just think about the fact that there will be presidential elections in the United States and Russia this year. This will be decided some time around 1997-98. [passage omitted]

[Totfalusi] [Passage omitted] How do you assess 1995?

[Horn] I think, what the government promised for 1995—what has been considered by a lot of people impossible to realize—has been realized, after all. At least this is the case with financial-economic stabilization. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Janos Mucsanyi] Regarding guessing about personnel and coalition matters, let me mention an interview in yesterday's MAGYAR HIRLAP with Sandor Keresztes, honorary chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]. Sandor Keresztes announced, I quote: For the public good, we will behave as a constructive opposition party even if the present government coalition breaks up and the Socialists [Hungarian Socialist Party, HSP] assume the governing role on its own. How can we interpret and assess this gesture?

[Horn] I do not know whether this is a gesture or not. This is a kind of forecast that has several times emerged over the past year and has never come true. This coalition has every opportunity of lasting until the spring of 1998 and complete the cycle. This will not happen because a great idea has united us, but because the two coalition partners have to rely on each other. [passage omitted] And nobody—including me or anybody in the government or any determining figures among HSP deputies—is winking either to the right or to the left. [passage omitted]

[Totfalusi] [Passage omitted] There has been a debate between you and Finance Minister Lajos Bokros about the use of 1995 privatization revenue. [passage omitted]

[Horn] [Passage omitted] An important question such as a decision about the use of the privatization revenue has to be discussed by the government. [passage omitted] On 4 January, Lajos Bokros admitted not bringing the question before the government was a mistake. [passage omitted] The possibility of spending the entire privatization revenue on the repayment of debts, however, is not ruled out, but this has to be preceded by a thorough assessment and debate. [passage omitted]

[Mucsanyi] For that matter, do you think that taking morale-boosting measures would be timely?

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[Horn] Although I was not speaking about this, in my view, it would be very timely to take so-called morale-boosting measures. I think that statements by those who earn several millions a month about a need for further savings is not very credible. [passage omitted] What I am talking about is not measures that will boost morale, but measures that will create the conditions for the pure existence of many people. [passage omitted]

[Mucsanyi] [Passage omitted] In the present situation should it be raised again that there is a need for an economic top ministry? It was exactly you who supported the idea.

[Horn] [Passage omitted] To prevent further debates, the economic top ministry is not on the agenda, for the time being; although, it is necessary since coordination between the ministries remains very poor. [passage omitted] However, I had to accept that I had to find a different solution and I have actually found one.

Beginning 1 February, the strategic workshop within the Prime Minister's Office will start its operation. I consider this fact very important, because preparations for talks with the EU will have to start without delay. [passage omitted] Several matters, which go beyond the sphere of authority of one ministry should be referred to the Prime Minister's Office, as it is the case in Austria, for example. Matters related to churches will be returned to the Prime Minister's Office, as it once used to be the case. The coordination of youth-related social tasks and putting them under the authority of the Prime Minister's Office is still being debated. [passage omitted]

[Mucsanyi] Let us turn to our foreign policy. Recently the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] sent a five-point memorandum on the Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation to the government. In addition to legal guarantees, they also demand institutional guarantees and ask for the reestablishment of the Bolyai University, the return of church properties, and the involvement of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], as a legitimate interest representation organization, in the talks. What is your opinion about these issues?

[Horn] In my view, most of them are forcing an open door—the return of church properties and other issues have been on the agenda of our talks—and we have continuously held consultations with the UDMR, as we have always done with the organizations and parties of the Hungarian community in Slovakia as well. However, I consider it unacceptable that we should set as a condition that they take part in the official Hungarian-Romanian talks, or the basic treaty should only be concluded with their permission or consent. It does not work like that. It seems that FIDESZ invented this to cause the government's efforts to fail. I cannot accept this in this form. [passage omitted]

I have strongly raised, and we continue to raise the issue of the Romanian education law, which we consider to be clearly a discriminative, antiminority law. We have also appealed to international organizations for help. Despite these important tensions, bilateral—economic, political, cultural—ties have developed. This is the dual challenge our government has to face. [passage omitted]

[Totfalusi] The Council of UDMR Representatives ended its three-day conference in Szekelyudvarhely [Odorheiul Secuiesc] just before the beginning of our program. Our colleague, Zoltan Csaky, reports from the scene. Let us now listen to this dispatch.

[Csaky, by phone] [Passage omitted] By voting for the basic principles of the ethnic community's autonomy concept, based on the principle of individual [szemelyi elvue autonomia], the UDMR's internal parliament has decided on a key issue. A statement approved by the forum at Odorheiul Secuiesc lays down: The UDMR considers it inevitable that relations between Romania and Hungary be based on mutual economic interests, which can only be a result of a just solution to the situation of the Hungarian community of Romania.

The representatives of the ethnic community are well aware of the fact that the means available for a little country like Hungary are limited, but ask: If reconciliation with the neighbors and the representation of the interests of the Hungarians beyond the borders cannot be implemented simultaneously for the fault of the neighbors, then which principle will be given priority, Mr. Prime Minister?

[Horn] Thank you, Mr. Csaky, for your report. Look, my firm opinion is that it is not expedient to put the question in this way. We are convinced that improvements in bilateral ties certainly have positive effects on the situation of the Hungarian communities beyond the border. If we do not hold talks, if we do not try to conclude agreements, it will be primarily the Hungarians beyond the borders who will suffer from that. [passage omitted]

[Mucsanyi] [Passage omitted] How does the fact that several millions of Hungarians who live beyond Hungary's borders in the neighboring countries, in a situation full of conflicts, slows down Hungary's European integration?

[Horn] It does not mean a break in a sense that this would be the reason for not admitting us. It is not this fact that causes a problem. There is a paradox situation

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that only applies to us. Hungary is the only country—disregarding Russia, which has other problems as well—where part of the nation lives in separate countries in large numbers. We cannot afford not to protest against violation of rights of the minorities, the Hungarian communities, for it happens quite often.

However, if we raise this at international forums as we do in bilateral ties, it will inevitably lead to tension in bilateral ties, which the international community finds difficult to accept. [passage omitted] What is important for us is not at all as important for them. [passage omitted]

The solution, in the future, will be that we, together with Romania, will be integrated into the EU, the community of the European nations. This is when an ideal, final solution can be found, when the borders will really cease to exist. Until then, we will have to make hard efforts, without giving up our basic aims.

The fact that there was a sharp debate in the European Parliament about the Slovak language law or the Romanian education law will have an effect on the Romanian and Slovak political life and leaders. [passage omitted] They endanger their own integration efforts with these steps.

We keep these issues on the agenda. We have held talks about this with every significant Western partner, there are no talks without these issues, but everybody should believe me that Hungary, on its own, is unable to solve these problems. It requires cooperation with the international community. [passage omitted]

Clinton Visit Presented as Example for Leaders

AU1601094596 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 15 Jan 96 p 3

[Editorial by Endre Gomori: "Lesson in Taszar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. President Clinton left the treadmill of his budget debates and the bitter squabbles of the beginning of the presidential election campaign behind for a moment. He stormed across the site of a U.S. success from the air base in Italy through Taszar to Bosnia and Zagreb. Whatever happens in the still foggy near future, it was, after all, America's political and military pressure that stopped the only—but dreadfully cruel—European war of the past 50 years. In the domestic political battles Clinton is facing, he will refer to this success and that—as they say it over there—he behaved as a president.

However, behind the momentary success, the possible outlines of a more far-reaching U.S. strategy are also emerging. American trainers and advisers prepared and organized the Croatian offensive that tipped the military power balance and forced the Bosnian and Belgrade Serbs to retreat. The Bosnian army is being supplied with arms. The now symbolic American unit that has been stationed in Macedonia for a long time is being strengthened. A U.S. political representation is planned in Kosovo, the Yugoslav province bordering Albania. In some obscure but unmistakable way, Albania itself (which has already provided a base for Italy, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China) is on the way to coming under U.S. influence. Behind the daily political actions, decisions are emerging that can lead to a political and military commitment in the Balkans unparalleled in size in U.S. history.

If this is so, the U.S. base was not set up precisely at Kaposvar and Taszar, only because this is the shortest route with an infrastructure that is still holding, that leads through here from the German bases via Austria toward Bosnia. Perhaps another reason was that this is a sign of Hungary's increased strategic value; because the fault line between the West in terms of civilization and the aggressively inclined orthodox-Slav civilization happens to lie south of the border. Further south than this, ethnic clusters appear that are exposed to Muslim fundamentalist temptations and are, in case of danger, to be stabilized with U.S. help.

Looked at this way, Taszar suddenly rises to a strange symbol. It is the first base of the military organization of the mature Atlantic-European civic civilization that we identify as ours, in a country which, for decades, was a forward southwestern base of another dictatorship permeated with orthodox civilization. And now it might not just be one year; we are not only talking about Taszar or Clinton, but about the possible beginnings of a turn in fortune for Central Europe.

For this very reason, we should now assess the reasons the Hungarian military and political leadership was not able to adequately sense and handle this turn—even if it is only a budding possibility. After the 5 December parliamentary decision, why did they have to become tangled in a mesh of mistakes, surprises, and astonishment for a whole month over what the "individual self-defense weapons" of the few hundred Hungarian sappers to be sent on the basis of voluntary applications may include, what "NATO's defense guarantee" exactly means, and when it comes into force? And when the opposition, using all these questions—because this is its job, rather than to be understanding—forced a defense committee session to be convened, the misunderstandings were merely smoothed over rather than clarified. We escaped from the trap that Hungary could have been the only country whose legislation subsequently reassesses participation in the peacekeeping mission. However, perhaps by making good use of the exist-

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ing bargaining positions at the international preparatory talks, and by better explaining the situation of the political hinterland and the national minority and historical dilemmas, we could have avoided these embarrassing few weeks.

Another, possibly even more important, dimension also exists—talking to the people. In a country, which for decades was the site of a military occupation that excluded publicity, was surrounded by secrets, and therefore created fears, it is normal for the instinct to stay out of it to surface. This is the very understandable human desire to escape toward some abstract neutrality or pacifism (or simply to "be left in peace"). Whether it proves to be the beginning of a turn in fortune, or whether it is less than that, the appearance of the NATO base in Taszar nevertheless meant that foreign soldiers have yet again stepped on this land. On this occasion, perhaps, television should have been used for what it was invented for. With calm, simple, and humane words, the president of the republic or the prime minister could have spoken to the country in this extraordinary situation to tell them what was happening and why, what could be the risks, and why it was not the same as (and not even similar to) the previous one. This kind of address did not take place.

And we have the locals. Now there are no secrets and, for this reason, no fears. The Russians were able to pollute half the country—without a breath of wind. Now the whole country immediately learns if a water pipe is broken in Taszar, a wall is cracked, an antitank shell explodes in Barcs, or a railway barrier is smashed. One now has to talk differently to people. Not (only) the insurance company's spokesman should have been interviewed in front of cameras. The country's leaders should have gone to Taszar, even more than once, to shake hands, talk about roads, walls, water pipes, and what it was like when that helicopter landed in Miklos Beke's garden.

One has to go closer to people—even if out of political instinct or calculation. As Clinton now did with his soldiers for two to three hours—naturally, watched closely by CNN. First, it is already in his blood. Second: He wants to win the November elections.

He has come, he has seen, and he either wins or he does not.

He was here, we saw him, and we remained here—we either learn from it or we do not.

Ministry Following Chechen Events in 'Astonishment'

LD1501125396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The present solution of the hostage drama does not help in reaching a settlement of the Chechen crisis, Hungarian Foreign Affairs Spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi said at his news briefing today. Istvan Kulcsar reports.

[Kulcsar] We, in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been following the events with astonishment, the foreign affairs spokesman replied to a question by Hungarian radio. We consider it unfortunate that the events have taken such a turn, particularly because, as a result of the OSCE mission led by a Hungarian diplomat, talks have begun on a peaceful settlement of the situation. The implementation of methods currently experienced does not help to solve the crisis and the operation of the OSCE.

The spokesman also said that the Polish and Danish authorities have turned to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking for permission to transport their troops by rail. In addition to using Hungary's airspace, Russian troops dispatched to join the international troops in Bosnia will also cross Hungary's territory by rail. All this will take place between 20 January and the first week of February.

Answering a question about the expected return of the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, Gabor Szentivanyi said that Hungary, as it has done during the Yugoslav crisis so far, is likely to coordinate its conduct with the EU. The spokesman—who was pointedly speaking about the federal state of Serbia and Montenegro—stressed that Yugoslavia's legal succession is still ambiguous. At the same time, he recalled that Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn recently held talks in Belgrade, and that Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti is also to visit Belgrade in the near future.

Guarantees Demanded for Troops on Bosnia Mission

AU1101150196 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Jan 96 p 7

[Editorial by Julianna R. Szekely: "We Have Documents...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] While opposition concerns about whether NATO will indeed protect the Hungarian peacekeepers in Bosnia—as claimed by the defense minister—really upset the public, Lajos Fur, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] made an unexpected announcement. He said that, although the

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meeting of the parliament's Defense Committee did not convince him and his party of Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti's argument, he is no longer insisting on convening an extraordinary session of the Hungarian parliament. On one condition: if Keleti produces a written NATO guarantee regarding the protection of Hungarian soldiers. If there is a document, we could say. [reference to Russian occupation of Hungary when citizens had to have documents on everything]. Although this is slightly indecedent in connection with Lajos Fur, it still desribes the psychological background of the decision most clearly.

What good is the paper?

For everything, one side of our ego would say. This side of our ego lived and grew up in a world in which everything and everyone had to prove their existence and truth in writing. This ego of ours constantly collected certificates and document copies, aware of the fact that, when the time came, the administration and justice authorities would not believe one word without papers. Then the time came when nobody believed a single word of ours, in spite of a collection of stamped certificates in our hand, and our other self experienced this, namely, that documents are only worth something if interests stronger than ours also want this. Most people drew the necessary conclusions and turned to a more differentiated way of assessing their rights, namely, through comradely phone calls and fat envelopes, but papers continued to preserve their hegemony. One never knew when documents might, nevertheless, be needed; and there were those who had nothing to put into the envelopes. They were the dossier people. They carried huge briefcases into people's supervisory bodies and newspaper editorial rooms and threw 200 kg of documents onto table: "Do you want a sensational affair? I can prove everything!" Later, some of them wrote from Lipot to obtain the necessary papers. [reference to mental hospital in Lipotmezo where political prisoners were detained]

Things are different in the West, we used to say, where one's given word is sacred and where demanding a written contract shows an outright lack of confidence.

We know, now, that this is not the case and that documents are important things, but only in a world where they do not replace—but only signal—the existing guarantees. We know now that documents can be discarded, shredded, and misinterpreted.

Returning to the Bosnian issue, although every big power knows that there will be peace only if the people living there also want peace, they keep celebrating the document. The peace agreement. As for us, we could read William Perry's statement. The U.S. defense secretary does not quite understand this exaggerated concern. "The Hungarian engineering unit will be part of IFOR [Implementation Force], this integrated military force and, as the IFOR commander is ready to accept them, to ponder on who is responsible for their security is an academic question"—William Perry declared.

All right, we all say, with a little suspicious Lajos Fur in our heart. What if they really shoot in Bosnia, not only in an academic way? They should talk about security in detail and not in general: Who can run to whom and who will shoot back and with what, if we cannot arm ourselves up to the teeth? In the meantime, of course, we feel that it would be much better than any document if, say, one of the commanders of the engineering unit were willing to actually give an answer, instead of merely smiling in confusion, when as recently asked on television whether the Hungarian helmets and bullet-proof vests are adequate.

Moreover, we also feel that, although all the officials' answers on security issues are contradictory, the real problem lies with the questions, rather than with those answers.

These are questions of a region that already knows that guarantees and security as such do not exist. Nobody defends anyone else, except when their interests dictate so. Not on St. Stephen Boulevard in Budapest, not against the wolf that got free in Pecs, and not in Dagestan, where armed Chechen men take newborn babies as hostages; let alone in a region where a shrewd war has been waged for years. Responsibility cannot be transferred, but this does not mean that there is no rational and common defense. It only means that there is also a rational risk.

So then, should we go to Bosnia? Is this too heavy a price for NATO membership? This is a sympathetic idea, and the most secure at the moment, but the question is: What happens if Bosnia comes here? Who would defend us then? And would anyone defend us only because we have a document attesting to this?

These are complex questions.

The basic questions of an age and a region.

Not for everyone. For example, Independent Smallholders' Party Chairman Jozsef Torgyan does not vacillate for a moment. He said that it is insane to go to Bosnia, with documents or without, so if, God forbid, there are Hungarian casualties, no doubt, all of them will prove Torgyan right. As his own martyrs.

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Defense Committee To Oversee Safety Accord

LD1501152396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The parliament's Defense Committee is to oversee the agreement that is to be concluded on the security of the Hungarian technical unit to participate in the international troops [Implementation Force—IFOR, in Bosnia]. This was announced by the committee's chairman, Imre Mecs, at his briefing held today. Zoltan Hortobagyi reports.

[Hortobagyi] [Passage omitted] On Clinton's visit, Mecs said that the U.S. President had praised Hungary's participation in the Yugoslav peacemaking operation and also considered provisions for the U.S. soldiers at Kaposvar and Taszar [IFOR logistics base in southwestern Hungary] to be excellent.

Reassuring those who worried about the safety of the Hungarian IFOR soldiers, Mecs said that the Hungarian technical unit will not wear the poor-quality bulletproof flak jackets received in return for Russian debts, but jackets that comply with international standards.

The Defense Committee's chairman will oversee the agreement to be concluded by the Hungarian defense minister [Gyorgy Keleti] and the IFOR commander on Hungary's participation. The much-debated security guarantees will have to be included in this agreement, for the Hungarian unit can only leave for Bosnia if there are written guarantees, as it was said by Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti last Sunday [7 January].

First IFOR Troops To Leave for Croatia 17 Jan

AU1201175296 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 12 Jan 96 pp 1, 9

[Correspondent's report: "The Unit Leaves for the Sava River"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first preparatory group of the Hungarian engineering unit will be setting off to take up position in a few days, on 17 January. A group of about 90 men will be setting up the base for the entire engineering unit to arrive later. Hungarian experts have already mapped out the location. Asked by NEPSZAVA, Defense Ministry Spokesman Lajos Erdelyi told us that the Hungarian unit's base will be near Okucani, on Croatian territory, some 11 kilometers from the border with Bosnia. However, Hungarian officials are reluctant to disclose further details; they think that too detailed information is not desirable for security reasons. They did tell us, however, that the Hungarians will not be operating on territory that is still at war. "There is peace there and regular and normal life," Lajos Erdelyi said.

Experts who know the area well and who asked not to be named have shared their information with us. According to this, the Hungarian engineering unit will be deployed on flat terrain that, fortunately, cannot be compared to the mountainous regions of the interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of the risk factor. The Okucani area will have no surprises regarding its climate either, because its climate is identical to that of Szeged in every respect.

From a military point of view, however, the recent history of the planned working area has been stormy. Until the first week of May 1995, the Okucani and Pakrac area was under Serb military control, as part of the Serbian Krajina. The region became known as western Slavonia, when, in a military operation started on 1 May, the Croatian Army forced the Krajina Serbs back over to the Bosnian side of the Sava River in the course of three days. This military operation, codenamed "Bljesak" (Flash) was the last military action in western Slavonia. In the wake of this operation, the local Serbs fled the area together with other Serbs that had settled there. At present, a small number of Slovaks live in Daruvar, north of Pakrac, along with Croats who have returned to their homes.

The Hungarian engineering unit's base is not on the former front line. Therefore, the danger of mines is probably reduced. Agricultural activity is going on in the area and, so far, no mine accidents have been reported. However, one has to take into account mined areas 10-15 km from the base in either direction. The land along the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and the banks of the Sava River could be dangerous. Local reports speak of complete silence in western Slavonia since May, life without incidents.

According to our information, the construction of the planned Sava bridge and the construction work in Bosnia could be dangerous for the Hungarian engineering unit. The Sava forms the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and, according to the peace agreement, areas across the river remain under the control of the Bosnian Serbs. The Hungarian units will apparently operate 60 km into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The first coordination talks have already been held with local Serb military leaders. It has transpired from diplomatic sources that the Serbs also welcome the deployment of the Hungarian IFOR [Implementation Force] unit.

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Town Hosting IFOR Base Weighs Gains, Losses

LD1101135596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 11 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kaposvar [town accommodating a U.S. Implementation Force (IFOR) logistics base in southwestern Hungary] will only be able to carry out its tasks related to the Yugoslav peace settlement, if the Hungarian Government does not let the town down, the town's Mayor Karoly Szita said. Laszlo Farago brings the details:

[Farago] To date, the Americans have spent $2 million in Kaposvar, 700 local unemployed have been working in the camps, and the town's three-year budget would not have been enough to publicize Kaposvar to this extent. These are the advantages, but Mayor Karoly Szita also added that the town would only be able to carry out its tasks, if the government did not let Kaposvar down.

The stationing of Americans here cannot take place at the expense of the town's general condition and the resident's standard of living, the mayor said. He added that he, personally, would not like to live along road No. 61, the main transit route of IFOR troops. At the moment, the condition of the town's roads do not show the fact that hundreds of 80-tonne trucks pass through it every day. However, nobody can tell for how long this enormous military traffic will last.

Karoly Sita has received promises about the arrival of further help from the police regiment. U.S. Ambassador Donald Blinken will again visit Kaposvar and Taszar [near Kaposvar] on 16 January. He will attend a large-scale product exhibition, where the town would like to convince the Americans that, providing that the local product is suitable from every respect, they should chose them. Contrary to previous experiences, this would really give economic advantages to Kaposvar.

Budapest Not To Admit Further FRY Refugees

LD1201161796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1503 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Jan. 12 (TANJUG)—The Hungarian Government decided that refugees from the former Yugoslavia would not be admitted to Hungary as of Jan. 15, as the signing of the peace accords in Paris had eliminated reasons for their moving out.

The government decision, however, does not refer to the conventional refugees who, in accordance with the Geneva convention, have the right to asylum if they are persecuted out of national, political or religious motives. Budapest estimates that the life of people in southern neighbourhoods are not threatened now and that they are no longer entitled to temporary accommodation in Hungary on this ground.

Similar decisions which took effect on Jan. 1 have been already taken by Germany and Austria, it was said at a session of the Hungarian Government.

More than 75,000 expelled persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have so far passed through Hungary since 1991, and there are currently about 8,200 people in four refugee camps.

Most of them said they wanted to go to the West, while only a few of them were ready to return to their native towns.

Vojvodina Hungarians Propose Autonomous Region

LD1201232296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2200 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidium of the Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina has adopted the association's autonomy concept, and the party's council will take a decision on it next Sunday. Chairman Jozsef Kasza said the association wanted to have a dialogue with other Serbian nationalities [as heard] in Yugoslavia to achieve its goal, that is, allowing Hungarians living in Vojvodina to decide their own future. Their plan attaches equal importance to personal autonomy and regional self-organization, although there is not much chance for the latter now. As a temporary arrangement, they propose the establishment of an autonomous district on the territory of Vojvodina. The possibility of this is not ruled out by the current law, said the chairman.

Boross Resigns Post as MDF Deputy Chairman

AU1101145996 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 Jan 96 pp 1, 5

[Report by "o.t.g.": "He Supports Sandor Lezsak's Nomination for Chairman—Peter Boross Has Resigned as Deputy Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In November 1995, Peter Boross, politician of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], resigned as deputy chairman and has been working as a member of the executive committee since then. He has not made his decision public before because the executive committee had asked him not to. MAGYAR NEMZET talked to Boross yesterday evening, and he confirmed that he indeed had resigned as deputy chairman at the national executive committee meeting in early November.

To MAGYAR NEMZET's question, the former prime minister justified his step saying that in his view,

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too many unconsidered, immature, and contradictory statements have been made on interparty cooperation by MDF leaders in the past few months. As deputy chairman, Boross' area was interparty relations, and he resigned precisely because of the contradictory statements. To our question, Boross said that he would not run for chairman at the March national meeting, but he hopes that Sandor Lezsak will, whom he will be happy to support. [passage omitted]

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Statement Issued on Clinton-Izetbegovic Talks

LD1301211596 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovina in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Jan 96

["Text" of statement on the talks held between Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic and U.S. President Clinton in Tuzla on 13 January, issued by the BH Press news agency — read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met with U.S. President Clinton, who was on a brief one-day visit to our country, at Tuzla airport this afternoon.

President Izetbegovic was accompanied by Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of our country and Federation vice president; Federation President Kresimir Zubak; Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic; Federation Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic; Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the state committee for relations with the United Nations and minister; and Sven Alkalaj, our ambassador in Washington.

The U.S. President was accompanied by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Congressmen Gilman and Herring, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madelaine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to our country John Menzis, the ever-present Richard Holbrooke, and American Army Commander John Shalikashvili.

During the half-hour-long meeting, the two delegations and two presidents exchanged views on the current military and political situation in our country with a view to the implementation of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. They specifically discussed the realization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation project, and the problems that had arisen in connection with the implementation of the Dayton agreement and with the exchange of POW's.

President Izetbegovic first welcomed President Clinton, stressing that the people of this country see the American president as a true friend of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both presidents expressed satisfaction with the pace of the peace plan implementation, that is, the speed with which IFOR [Implementation Forces] forces have come and the skill with which they had been deployed.

President Izetbegovic stressed that some things have been unfolding at a greater speed than expected, and here he had in mind the U.S. troop deployment in northwest Bosnia. Members of the U.S. Army are especially responsible for this, the Bosnia-Herzegovina president stressed. Certain problems have arisen in connection with the implementation of the peace plan. The two delegations agreed that they should not halt the embarked upon process.

President Izetbegovic said that they were present especially in the Sarajevo area. Sometimes the public is not informed about all aspects of this problem in the Sarajevo area. The issue of whether the Serbs will stay in territories, which should become a part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation under the plan, is almost constantly being given precedent.

The other aspect of the plan is being forgotten: the return of people to their homes, Izetbegovic stressed. The refugees have as much right to return to their homes, estates, properties as do the Serbs to stay. Finally, Izetbegovic stressed, the right to put on trial all war criminals and those who committed criminal offenses must not be forgotten. He said the legal bodies of authority have passed an amnesty bill, which should improve the process of the implementation of the agreement.

President Clinton expressed satisfaction with the amnesty bill adoption, concluding that it could make a significant contribution to the implementation of the agreement. He also stressed that he knew about the details of the terrorist attack on a Sarajevo tram, in which several innocent Sarajevo civilians died. He expressed satisfaction because the incident did not seriously threaten the entire peace process.

Talking about the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation project, the two statesmen agreed that it was of exceptional importance for the entire process. According to President Izetbegovic, most problems arose because of human rights violations in certain parts of the federation. The problem of human rights is a fundamental problem, President Izetbegovic stressed. If it is solved in a satisfactory manner, many things will be improved. In this context, President Izetbegovic said that Croatian President Tudjman, whom President Clinton will meet during his brief European tour, could play a significant role, especially in the Mostar area.

President Clinton voiced concern with the problems besetting the realization of the Federation project, and specifically with the events in Mostar. He said that the protection of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is also the protection of human rights in it, and that it is in a fundamental U.S. interest. He stressed that he would discuss specifically this topic with Croatian President Tudjman.

An important topic of the talks was the exchange of prisoners on all sides. It was noted that the Serb side presented a list of just over 100 prisoners, while the legal bodies of authority are still searching for over 20,000 missing people. The imbalance is obvious. The disappearance of a large number of Srebrenica citizens

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during the Chetnik capture of that area was underlined. [passage omitted]

Following the meeting with President Izetbegovic, U.S. President Clinton held talks with representatives of religious communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He met with reis efendija Ismet Spahic, Bosnian [Catholic] Cardinal Vinko Puljic, and [Serbian Orthodox] Metropolitan Nikolaj of Dabro-Bosnia. The meeting was attended by Predrag Radic, Banja Luka municipal president [mayor], and with Nedjelko Prstojevic, president of the self-proclaimed Serb municipality of Ilidza.

The American President also met refugees from Srebrenica and Zepa, who were expelled from the occupied territories, and a mother with a child whose husband died in a bombardment of Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

Tudjman, Clinton: U.S. Arbitration for Mostar

AU1301202296 Paris AFP in English
1935 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 13 (AFP) — US President Bill Clinton Saturday [13 January] agreed to appoint an American arbitrator to settle problems between the Moslem and Croat communities in the southern Bosnian town of Mostar, the US ambassador here, Peter Galbraith said.

It was not immediately clear who the arbitrator would be or what guidelines the arbitration would follow.

A Croatian official said Clinton, who was visiting Zagreb for the first time at the end of a whirlwind, day-long visit to US troops in Bosnia, Italy, Hungary and Croatia, had agreed with Tudjman that there would be "American arbitration" for Mostar, where tension has recently risen between Moslems and Croats.

US White House spokesman Mike McCurry said earlier that the two presidents "had a good discussion on the (Moslem-Croat) federation (in Bosnia) and the importance that the United States attaches to the federation and also the difficult work making that type of alliance work effectively."

Clinton later left Zagreb to return to Washington.

Adm Smith: IFOR Supports Mostar Reunification

LD1401162596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1540 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 14 (TANJUG) — The commander of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith promised on Sunday that IFOR would back efforts to reunite Mostar but warned that the restoration of law and order in that city was a matter for civilian authorities.

Admiral Smith said after talks with the European Union administator in Mostar, Hans Koschnik, that they had agreed that the situation in that divided city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina was very serious, news agencies reported.

The leadership of the Muslim-Croat federation has signed up for certain things including an integrated police force in Mostar which is a 'key element in the success of the city's future,' Admiral Smith said adding that it was a civilian function, not one for the military.

Spanish troops within IFOR have been policing the lines of separation in Mostar over the past few days. The mayor of the Muslim part of the city, Safet Orucevic, has urged Koschnik to ensure that IFOR forces patrol the entire city.

Koschnik has rejected his appeal by stressing that 'IFOR does no police work'. He added that only a few people were putting obstacles in the way of reunifying the city.

Koschnik criticized the Croat police in the western part of Mostar for creating major problems.

IFOR-UN Liaison Officer

AU1401142796 Paris AFP in English
1241 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 14 (AFP) — US Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of the NATO-led Implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia, said Sunday that an officer would be appointed to liaise between IFOR and the UN administration in the divided town.

He added that he was ready to help reconcile Moslems and Croats in Mostar, southern Bosnia to the extent possible.

Smith was speaking after meeting for more than an hour with Hans Koschnick, appointed in 1994 as European administrator of Mostar, in which the two men agreed the liaison officer would be nominated.

His visit comes a day after US President Bill Clinton and his Croatian counterpart Franjo Tudjman asked US official Roberts Owen to arbitrate the growing problems between Moslems and Croats in Mostar.

Following Sunday's meeting with Koschnick, Smith said: "I think we agree that the situation is very serious."

"We will obviously maintain the dialogue so that if there is a problem that I can assist and we have the forces

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to do it, then I will certainly try to do something," he pledged.

Following his meeting with Smith, Koschnick was to meet German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his Croatian and Bosnian counterparts Mate Granic and Muhammad Sacirbegovic, who also arrived in Mostar on Sunday.

Smith considered the European administration was a "key element" in overcoming differences in the Moslem-Croat Federation created in March 1994 under US supervision.

"We have both agreed that this is a civilian question distinguished from the military," he continued.

The city, whose Moslem and Croat sectors are divided by a no man's land, is an early test for the effectiveness of the US-brokered peace plan for Bosnia.

Tension has simmered between the two sides ahead of the January 20 deadline for reunification of the city under the Dayton peace accords signed in December in Paris.

Smith emphasised that the accords were based on the concept of "a successful federation."

If "the Mostar situation" could not be resolved, therefore, "we will have a very difficult problem," he warned.

For his part, Koschnick said: "We talked about principles. What is to be done by IFOR and what we have to do at the civilian side of Mostar."

"We will have one federation and not two parts of a federation," he asserted.

Mostar was shattered by 11 months of war between the Moslems and Croats between April 1993 and March 1994.

Since March 1994, little progress has been made in overcoming the divisions between the two halves of the town in which Croatia exerts a considerable influence through its control over Bosnian Croats.

German Foreign Minister Arrives for Mostar Talks

Blames Croats for Mostar Tension

LD1401114996 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has blamed the Bosnian Croats for the renewed tension in Mostar. At the start of his visit to the capital of Herzegovina, Kinkel called on the Croats to stop jeopardizing the federation with the Muslims. He appealed to the leaders in Zagreb to exert pressure on militant Croats. The foreign minister met the EU administrator Koschnick this morning. Talks with his counterparts from Croatia and Bosnia, Granic and Sacirbegovic, were also on the agenda.

Meets Croatian, Bosnian Counterparts

LD1401132896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, his Croatian counterpart Mate Granic, and Implementation Force commander Admiral Leighton Smith are in Mostar today. Vederana Krstic-Ivanisevic reports.

[Krstic-Ivanisevic] The Federation will continue to exist, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said briefly upon his arrival at the EU Administration Headquarters in the Ero Hotel in Mostar.

Upon his arrival in Mostar, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel held separate talks first with Hans Koschnick, the EU administrator for Mostar, after which they were joined behind closed doors by Granic, and [Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed] Sacirbegovic. Kinkel, Granic, and Sacirbegovic then had a meeting with the leaders of the Federation, [Federation President Kresimir] Zubak and [Federation Vice President Ejup] Ganic, which was followed by a joint meeting including the mayors of Mostar [Mijo] Brajkovic and [Safet] Orucevic. Zubak and Ganic arrived at the Hotel Ero later, while the talks at ministerial level were under way.

Ganic said: The eyes of the whole world are turned on Mostar today. The world wants to help and the people of Bosnia have had enough of declarations. Overall relations between Bosniaks and Croats are good and there are difficulties only in the field. The restoration of Bosnia-Herzegovina must go through the federation. This is the only way for the evicted Croats and Bosniaks to return to Banja Luka, Posavina, and other areas.

A press conference will be held at the Ero Hotel after a half-hour tour of the town which is now under way now. [passage omitted]

As I speak, a news conference on the meetings between Kinkel, Granic and Sacirbegovic on the one hand and Zubak, Ganic, Brajkovic, and Orucevic on the other has begun.

Urges Stabilization in Mostar

LD1401155896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A series of diplomatic events is taking place in Mostar today, primarily the visit by

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German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his counterparts from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, Muhamed Sacirbegovic and Mate Granic. The main topic of discussion with European Union [EU] administrator Hans Koschnick, and Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, the president and vice president of the Federation, was the further implementation of the Dayton agreement in Mostar and throughout the Federation. Mirsad Bestan reports.

[Bestan] The Federation has got to work. Mostar and Sarajevo must remain united and undivided cities. As for Mostar, we agreed that complete freedom of movement must be ensured. The borders between municipalities must be defined, and the existing police forces in the town must unite. This is what German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told journalists today after meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, his Bosnian counterpart Muhamed Sacirbegovic, administrator Hans Koschnick, and the mayors of both parts of Mostar.

Today's meeting between senior officials at the European administration headquarters in Mostar were also attended by Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, president and vice president of the Federation.

Minister Kinkel conveyed to journalists the words of Croatian Minister Granic that the Republic of Croatia is prepared to send (?more) police troops to Mostar at the request of Koschnick and the Federation (?in order to) help implement the agreements that have already been signed. Kinkel also said that the uncontrolled elements in Mostar which pose a threat to the Federation must be reigned in. What was agreed in Dayton must be implemented, the German foreign minister said. A 14-day deadline was set for the implementation of what has been agreed. Failing this, administrator Hans Koschnick and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] representative Frowick will arbitrate.

This is all for now. There will be more details in our later news bulletins about the events in Mostar today and this morning's meeting between European administrator Koschnick and Admiral Leighton-Smith, the Implementation Force [IFOR] commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia Prepared To Send Police

LD1401161796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After separate meetings between German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation officials, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and the mayors of eastern and western Mostar, a news conference was held at the Ero hotel in Mostar. Kinkel, Franz Koschnick [EU administrator], Granic, Muhamed Sacirbegovic, Kresimir Zubak, and Ejup Ganic were present at the conference. Zeljko Rosko reports from Mostar:

[Rosko] Sarajevo and Mostar are and should remain the symbols of multi-ethnic coexistence, German Foreign Minister Kinkel told correspondents. [passage omitted]

Croatian Foreign Minister Granic had this to say to correspondents:

[Begin Granic recording] We are aware of all the problems, but there is no dilemma for Croatia that the consolidation of the Federation and the application of all Dayton and Washington agreements, especially the agreement on Mostar, is the only way. We think that these are all concurrent processes — the formation of a federal government, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the marking of municipal borders, the establishment of a joint police force, and the securing of freedom of movement. All these processes must be concurrent and immediate.

Finally, I would like to say on behalf of the president that Croatia would be prepared — if needed and if so requested by Mr. Koschnick and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government — to send its own special police forces to help with the revival of the Mostar project. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia's Susak on Police Units

AU1101200396 Paris AFP in English 1927 GMT 11 Jan 96

[Report by Dimitri Kochko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 11 (AFP) — Croatia's defense minister announced Thursday [11 January] his country would provide police to be placed under international command in this divided flashpoint city in southern Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, in a move to "restore calm and order," said Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had agreed to provide a police team to help patrol Mostar.

"We have been asked and Mr. Tudjman agrees to send Croatian police to Mostar under international command," he said after meeting with the mayor of the Croat section of the city, Mijo Brajcovic, and with EU administrator Hans Koschnick.

Susak did not say how many police Croatia was sending.

Koschnick, a former mayor of the German city of Bremen, has appealed for help from the new NATO-led

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Implementation Force (IFOR) charged with enforcing the peace agreement.

DVEVNIK on Muslim-Croat 'Incidents' in Mostar

LD0901135796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1234 GMT 9 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 9 (TANJUG) — The latest incidents between Muslims and Croats in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina city Mostar were a most express manifestation of instability and further proof of a lack of prospect of a Muslim-Croat Federation, a Yugoslav daily set out Tuesday.

"The international community is at last beginning to realize that the greatest danger to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina comes from Muslim-Croat relations," the Novi-Sad based daily DNEVNIK said.

Incidents in Southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, the paper said, "are further proof that the Muslim-Croat Federation is clearly an artificial creation, a pure U.S. product which failed to come to life, apart from the creating of an alliance against Bosnian Serbs."

Bosnian Muslims and Croats have after more than a year of heavy fighting signed in Washington in March 1994 under strong U.S. pressure an accord on forming a Muslim-Croat Federation, which to this day has not become operative amid continued conflicts and misunderstandings.

The Muslims and Croats have earlier expelled about 45,000 Serbs from Mostar and the valley of the Neretva River and looted and burnt their property.

The paper pointed out that the regime in Zagreb "shies from a possible Muslim-Serb accord," that would prevent the realization of already drafted plans on joining the Herzegovina Region to Croatia.

Although Herzegovina was not formally part of Croatia, the paper said, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman appointed and dismissed Bosnian Croat military commanders and the military and local administration was organized under directives from Zagreb, while schools there used the same curricula as in Croatia.

"An escalation of incidents in Mostar (which is divided into eastern - Muslim and western - Croat sections) comes about as the deadline after which full freedom of movement would be guaranteed to all citizens is approaching," recalled the paper.

It pointed out that the European Union urged Mostar become a united city, but that this would be very hard to achieve "as the Croats oppose this and seek the city's division."

DSS Leader: Mostar Situation Threatens Accord

LD1001174296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1600 GMT 10 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 10 (TANJUG) — Democratic Party opposition leader (DSS) Vojislav Kostunica said here Wednesday that repeated clashes between Muslims and Croats in Mostar, a city in south Bosnia, are jeopardizing the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement.

The incidents in Mostar, which under the agreement should be divided into the Muslim and Croat parts, are indicative of the dangers lurking in Sarajevo, which should entirely come under the control of the Muslim-Croat Federation, including the Serb parts of the city.

Kostunica said that the world community should somehow modify the status of Serb Sarajevo, and give sufficient security guarantees to Serbs.

Disputes over Mostar and Sarajevo reflect the weaknesses of the civilian parts of the Dayton agreement, and the reason for that is the erroneous picture the U.S. Administration has about relations between nationalities in Bosnia, which have 'a several centuries- long history of conflict', the DSS leader said.

Institutional solutions for Bosnia, he said, are complicated and at the moment only Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] has an efficient government, while there is no system of government at the level of the republic and in the Muslim-Croat Federation.

The Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia was formed in March 1994, under U.S. pressure, after a year of fierce clashes between Muslims and Croats.

Officer: Mostar Croats 'Trying To Provoke' Muslims

BR1101155796 Madrid EL MUNDO in Spanish 11 Jan 96 p 20

[Report by Jose L. Lobo: "Mostar: Spaniards Caught in Crossfire"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mostar — "It is only a matter of days, weeks perhaps; but neither the Dayton agreements nor NATO will be able to prevent the war between Muslims and Croats from breaking out again in Mostar." It was about 2100 hours last Tuesday [9 January], and the words of one of the Spanish brigade's commanding officers sounded like a premonition: Only a few minutes later, several shells fired from the Croatian sector of the town fell on the eastern zone,

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which is controlled by Bosnian Muslims. [passage omitted]

"Clearly the Croats are trying to provoke the Muslims into a new outbreak of war so that it becomes impossible to implement the Dayton peace agreements. The Bosnian Croats do not want to belong to the Croatian-Muslim Federation, they want to join Croatia," a Spanish officer deployed in Mostar's Muslim sector was saying yesterday.

A sense of helplessness is beginning to take root among the men who make up the Aragon Group. Many of them now believe that, despite the Spanish military presence, civil war between the two communities will flare up again. A Spanish soldier, who had patrolled the Mostar Boulevard for several hours yesterday, expressed his frustration in the following terms: "You spend hours pent up in an armored vehicle, bearing the weight of your bullet-proof vest and gun, going back and forth along the boulevard, and in the end all your efforts are useless, because these guys keep on shooting at each other."

Interview

This new violent incident in Mostar has taken place on the eve of the first visit to the zone by NATO's new Secretary General Javier Solana, who will meet Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb today. In Mostar, everybody is assuming that the critical situation experienced in the town will be one of the key issues discussed by the two officials.

"Either the Croats and Muslims begin to coexist peacefully in Mostar, and this seems impossible at present, or the Federation will go up in smoke," a Spanish officer remarked yesterday. "And if that happens, the Dayton peace agreements will founder," he added.

But neither the Croats in Mostar nor those in neighboring towns, such as Medjugorje, where the Spanish troops have their headquarters, will hear of coexistence with the Muslim Bosnians. In support of this, as an officer of the Spanish brigade's Operational Section pointed out yesterday, is the fact that the Muslim population in the towns located south of Mostar hardly amounts to 1 per thousand of the overall population.

"If the international community forces us to accept Muslims in our region, the only solution will be to have Muslim towns completely separated from us by means of some sort of border," a Franciscan monk of Croatian origin from Medjugorje was saying yesterday.

"We have nothing in common with those people," he added. "We share more things with the Americans than with the Muslims, because our cultures are different."

"Besides," he concluded, "their birth rate is much higher than the Croatian one, and they are pursuing a deliberate strategy to have as many children as possible to eventually absorb us."

Silajdzic 'Disappointed' With Croat Partners

LD1401155096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1445 GMT 14 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 14 (TANJUG) — Muslim-Croat federation prime minister in Bosnia-Herzegovina Haris Silajdzic said he was very disappointed with the behaviour of federal partner - Croats and blamed them for a series of incidents burdening Muslim-Croat relations.

'The decisions in the Muslim-Croat assembly were dictated by those Croats, who, until practically yesterday, called Bosnia-Herzegovina former,' Silajdzic said in a special statement on Muslim television in Sarajevo on Saturday night.

He said it was very difficult to reconstruct Bosnia with those same people who have been breaking it up, as well as the communality of Muslims and Croats.

Stating his impressions after touring parts of Bosnia inhabited by Croats, Silajdzic said he had the feeling that he was in Croatia.

'From uniform to flags, everything is the same and everything looks like one big Croatia,' he said.

Silajdzic emphasized he would never be reconciled with a division of the city of Mostar, southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, into Muslim and Croat sections, as this would imply a division of Bosnia.

Conflicts between Muslims and Croats in Mostar have of late questioned the life of the federation.

Silajdzic called on the administrator for Mostar Hans Koschnick to implement within seven days with the aid of IFOR [Implementation Force] and European Union police the plan of uniting the city or, should this fail, resign.

Mostar was one of the sites of the fiercest fighting between the Croats and Muslims in the course of 1993. The city remained divided even after the forming of a Muslim-Croat federation in March 1994 when it was placed under European Union administration.

Silajdzic blamed the Croat side also for the deteriorating situation in the area of Tesanj and Usora (central Bosnia) where local Croat leaders tried to expand the territory of the newly- formed Croat municipality.

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The problem of Mostar was discussed in talks between visiting U.S. President Bill Clinton and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb Saturday. Clinton appealed for the preservation of the U.S.-sponsored Muslim-Croat federation.

In the meantime, Muslim-controlled Sarajevo Radio reported on Sunday that Bosnian Croats in the area of Stolac (southern Bosnia-Herzegovina) were systematically demolishing and burning the houses into which expelled Muslims were to return.

After the Dayton agreement, the same source said, when the return of Muslims seemed realistic, the local Croat authorities used all means to prevent this from happening despite agreed-on plans and accords.

In the area of Stolac lived before the war about 8,000 Muslims, and there were now a mere 17, mostly older persons, left.

Mostar Muslim Mayor on Measures To Ease Tensions

AU1201201796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic has sent a letter to EU Administrator Hans Koschnick in response to his 6 January letter. Orucevic is proposing to Koschnick to undertake the following measures:

First, with the aim of finally forming the joint police force in Mostar, you should apply the model from Velika Kladusa with Croatian, Bosniak, and European police. We inform you that we agree you should invite the police of the Republic of Croatia to be placed under your control instead of the local Croat police. Thus the political leadership of the Republic of Croatia as a signatory to the Dayton agreement will be directly responsible for the process in Mostar.

Second, we ask you to enable IFOR [Implementation Force] to operate in the city, that is, the blue zone, together with the EU police to remove all the obstacles to a unified city of Mostar, and to enable freedom of movement.

Three, the Mostar model can have a great influence on the internal organization of the Federation. We are asking for an administrative organization of the city with six city districts, while the Croats are asking for an ethnic separation along the confrontation lines within Mostar. We want the administrative organization to preserve the multiethnic character of Mostar, which will be the seat of the institutions of the city, canton, and federation, and all national institutions that make Mostar the seat of the Croats, and the capital city of the Bosniaks of Herzegovina.

Four, in connection with your letter, I think it would have been good if you had sent it to the right address, to those that you in your report marked as the obstacles to the unification of Mostar. Mr. Brajkovic and I are leading the process toward peace, but we both need the EU in certain critical moments so that we can continue the process.

Five, we consider you the most responsible for the continuation of the process in Mostar, and we propose that you make decisions through arbitration that will be in the interest of Mostar and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The adoption of the statute of the city, and the law on elections mark important steps ahead, and we think that the freedom of movement of all citizens except men of military age should not be interrupted. All the obstacles on the streets of west Mostar should immediately be removed. This will create the conditions for us to make a joint reasonable decision by 21 January on unlimited freedom of movement in the city.

Six, I believe that the new organization of the city should be completed while the EU is still present in Mostar. I propose Mr. Brajkovic for the first mayor of Mostar, and a Croat for Mostar mayor while a Bosniak is governor of the Neretva canton, and vice versa.

Seven, I express my deep respect and gratitude for your words that you personally cannot accept the division of Mostar, and that you will resign if it should come to that. If it does, Mr. Koschnick, allow me to join you, and we can resign together, says the letter from Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic to Hans Koschnick.

Requests IFOR Assistance

LD1301140796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1335 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 13 (TANJUG) — Mayor of the Muslim-controlled eastern section of the Herzegovina town of Mostar Safet Orucevic on Saturday called for enabling the Bosnia peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to work together with European police in order to lift all barriers which Croats had imposed on the way to a single town.

Allied at the time when they expelled about 40,000 Serbs from Mostar, local Muslims and Croats later turned against each other and fought pitched battles for a year until March 1994.

After the signing of the U.S.-sponsored federation agreement in March 1994, the town was divided into Muslim and Croat sections and placed under E.U. administration with Hans Koschnick as administrator.

Muslim-Croat conflicts in Mostar, which Bosnian Croats once envisaged as the capital of their state of Herzeg

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Bosna, have never ceased completely and there has even been an increase lately.

Muslim-controlled Radio Sarajevo said that Orucevic had sent a letter to Koschnick, reiterating the request that Mostar be divided into six municipalities, but in such a way that its multi-ethnic character be preserved.

Croatian Radio reported that Bosnian Croats still disagreed with this proposal, requesting to keep present lines of separation which result from earlier Muslim-Croat conflicts.

Orucevic agreed to the arrival in Mostar of neighbouring Croatia's police instead of a local Croat police force, which would be placed under Koschnick's command.

Comments on Incidents With Croats

LD1501121496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1133 GMT 15 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 15 (TANJUG) — Mayor of the Muslim part of Mostar Safet Orucevic said on Monday that violence in the city erupted when the Washington agreement federating the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia was signed.

The agreement was signed under the auspices of the United States, in March 1994, after [words indistinct] fierce fighting over territories in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in Mostar.

Wide-scale conflicts ceased after the agreement was signed and Mostar placed under the administration of the European Union, but occasional skirmishes persisted.

Muslim radio on Monday quoted Orucevic as saying 'not a day goes by that a Muslim is not beaten on his way from the boundary crossing Doljani to Mostar, or a vehicle robbed by the mob from the western, Croat, part of Mostar.'

He said 19 Muslims had been killed in the Croat part of Mostar since the forming of the federation, and the culprits are still unknown.

Bosnian Croat radio has said more than 250 incidents and assaults on Croat troops by Muslim extremists in Usora, Central Bosnia, had been reported since the signing of the agreement.

The Herzeg-Bosnia Defense Ministry has said light had not been shed on the murder of two Croat soldiers in Zabljak, near Usora, committed by Muslims on Christmas day.

Meanwhile, seven more Croat troops have been captured, one Croat military policeman arrested and the local parish priest assaulted and beaten.

Bosnian Croats proclaimed the Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia at the outbreak of the hostilities and still maintain its state institutions despite the federation with the Muslims.

Croat Radio has said several serious incidents broke out in Central Bosnia in the New Year, including a Mujahedin attack on a Croat police patrol, assaults on Croats and their property, and a road communications blockade.

Mostar Croat Mayor on Muslim 'Ulterior Motives'

LD1401184696 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Immediately after the talks, Milan Vego interviewed Mijo Brajkovic, the mayor of western Mostar.

[Begin Brajkovic recording] I think that we will now see an energetic effort to resolve the situation more quickly. Our stand is that one cannot just blame one side. The guilt should be shared, if it exists. There is never just one guilty side. I think we have agreed on this. I mentioned the Croat policeman on duty who was killed. This incident started off all the other events.

Don't you think that there is something strange with this kind of [Muslim] psychology — someone insists on wanting to live with you, while constantly accusing you. They [Muslims] either have an ulterior motive, or there is something wrong with their psychology. It would be very hard for me to accuse someone all the time and yet want to live with them. It all reminds me of a marriage in which either the husband or the wife keep accusing each other, but oppose a divorce. There is something psychologically wrong, or there is an ulterior motive. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Resists Unification Efforts

AU1401205196 Paris AFP in English 2031 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 14 (AFP) — The mayor of the Croat part of Mostar said Sunday [14 January] he would continue to resist plans to reunify the divided city in line with the Bosnian peace accord.

Mijo Brajkovic said he told Foreign Ministers Klaus Kinkel of Germany, Mate Granic of Croatia and Muhamed Sacirbegovic of Bosnia at talks earlier Sunday that Bosnian Croats in the city wanted urban neighbourhoods to remain ethnically pure.

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"The Croat party wants to live together in one town, but on a totally different basis" from the past, Brajkovic told Mostar's Croat radio, adding that his people rejected Moslem proposals for multi-ethnic neighbourhoods.

The reunification plan for Mostar, which along with the Bosnian capital Sarajevo is being seen as a litmus test for the overall implementation of the Bosnia peace accords, divides the city into six neighbourhoods.

The Croat party wants each side to have three "majority" regions, which would effectively remain ethnically pure, while the Moslems have proposed variations on a theme of ethnic reintegration.

The dispute between the two parties, coupled with a looming Saturday deadline for the city's reunification, has served to heighten tension in Mostar in recent weeks.

A number of shooting incidents have left two dead and two injured on both sides, despite the fact that the nominal countrywide alliance between the two feuding belligerents in the Moslem-Croat Federation is a cornerstone of the peace agreement.

Kinkel arrived in Mostar earlier Sunday with Granic and Sacirbegovic as Western powers sought to step up pressure on the two communities to reintegrate their territory into a unitary, multi- ethnic city.

After the talks, at which the beleaguered EU administrator of the town, Hans Koschnick, was also present, Kinkel said all parties had agreed to observe moves towards reintegration over the next two weeks.

He added that Koschnick would draw up a report over the next two weeks monitoring the reunification process, which if negative in tone, would trigger an arbitration process between the supposed allies.

Kinkel did not say what such a process might entail, but did mention Zagreb's proposition of sending Croatian policemen under EU control to Mostar to reason with local Croat police.

"The (Moslem-Croat) federation must be established, Mostar must be a united city," said Kinkel.

Koschnick for his part blamed local Croat militias for the continued division of the town and the upsurge in tension. [passage omitted on Adm Leighton Smith talks with Koschnick]

Rejects Multiethnic Regions

LD1501110196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1030 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 15 (TANJUG) — Mayor of Croat Mostar Mijo Brajkovic has rejected the idea on setting up multi-ethnic regions in Mostar and said he wanted this town in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina to be divided into regions with Croat or Muslim majorities.

In an interview to Croat Radio Mostar, Brajkovic said he had presented this Bosnian Croat stand in talks with foreign ministers Klaus Kinkel of Germany, Mate Granic of Croatia, and Muhamed Sacirbegovic of Bosnian Muslims, the AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE news agency said Sunday evening.

Underscoring that Mostar was the only town in Bosnia-Herzegovina where Croats 'can have their own schools, their churches and their culture,' Brajkovic said Croats 'want to live in that town on grounds completely different from those of the past' when the town had been multi-ethnic.

Before they agreed to form a binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1994 under auspices of the United States, Muslims and Croats in all of 1993 fought heavily for power in central and southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in the area of Mostar, from where they jointly expelled about 40,000 Serbs.

Croats, who formed their own republic of Herzeg-Bosna at the very beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, plan to have Mostar as the capital of the Croat republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is why Croats, as Western politicians have commented these days, are stalling on the unification of Mostar, which is managed by European Union administrator Hans Koschnick.

Usora: Tension Growing Between Muslims, Croats

LD1101201996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 11 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's examples from Usora — where [Croats] are still provoking, arresting [Muslims] and demonstrating their power — illustrate just how much the Muslims really want the federation and the eqality of the two partners. Boro Jelic reports.

[Jelic] Provocations, arrests, and attempted demonstrations of power on the part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units along the Doboj-Teslic main road are both our old and new reality in Usora region. Usora is once again disturbed by new developments and Bosniak provocations. What is it all about? The units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army wish to take advantage of the withdrawal from the separation lines two km into the territory for the transfer of their forces to the Croatian villages of Ularice and Jalbegovci, i.e. the zone controlled by the 110th Usora homeguards' regiment.

After an unsuccessful attempt to establish checkpoints in the above Croat villages, the Doboj-Teslic road was

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seen packed with police patrols this morning, special police units, and units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

While on duty, one member of the 110th regiment's military police was stopped by force and taken to an unknown destination. In the early afternoon hours some 200 members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army — backed by the military police and the army — marched singing and well-armed from Jelah to Zabljak and back.

IFOR [Implementation Force] members and Genera Nash's liaison officer — who wished to remain anonymous — were there to see all this for themselves. When asked to comment on what he saw, General Nash replied he talked with the person who organized this demonstration of power, and was told it was just a simple open air exercise. The British officer will of course inform General Nash about all this because they, as he said, are General Nash's eyes and ears in Usora today.

The tension is growing with every hour and many are awaiting, with trepidation, the denouement of the latest unpleasant events before a cold and uncertain night.

Just before sending this report we learned that the arrested military policeman was released.

'Muslim Forces' Raid Croat Villages

LD1201174096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Unfortunately, there is bad news from Usora. Muslim forces in that Croat area are demonstrating force, deploying artillery and raiding Croat villages and facilities. Boro Jelic reports.

[Jelic] After a series of provocations and demonstrations of force aimed at intimidating the people of Usora, units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army set off from two directions — Jelah-Krasevo and Tesanj-Alibegovci — to take the centuries-old areas of Ularice and Alibegovci. The army is simultaneously moving infantry and deploying artillery. Considerable army forces have crossed to the left bank of the river Usora.

Units of the 110th Usora Home Guards' Regiment are on red alert. The situation is growing more tense by the hour and is reaching boiling point. This evening, Usora is a powder keg dangerously close to explosion, which would assume unforeseeable proportions.

Members of the Implementation Force [IFOR] have come out to the scene of the incident. We have been told at the command of the 110th Usora Home Guards' Regiment that negotiations with the army commanders are underway in an attempt to reduce tensions. All relevant players in the Federation and in the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina have been informed about the difficult situation in Usora.

Muslim Army, Police Attack Croat Area

LD1301142196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1405 GMT 13 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG) — The joint forces of the Bosnian Muslim Army and police attacked on Saturday morning the Croat-controlled area of Usora, in the northwest of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the radio of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia reported from Mostar.

The local Bosnian Croat armed units, the Croat Defence Council (HVO), have been put on red alert, the source said.

In a report from London, the AFP also quoted the radio as saying that local HVO forces were on full alert because Muslim forces had started a deployment of infantry and artillery troops in the area on Friday.

Further on, AFP quoted the radio as saying that tension increased hour by hour on Friday and that in the evening Usora looked like a powder-magazine dangerously close to an explosion with unforeseeable consequences.

AFP quoted the radio as saying that the Implementation Force (IFOR) had sent troops to the sector south of Doboj to monitor the situation. AFP ended its report by saying that HVO and Bosnian Army commanders had met Friday evening in a bid to defuse tension.

The council chairman of the newly-formed Croat municipality of Usora, Franjo Bratic, told the radio that the situation in the area had deteriorated after Catholic Christmas when Islamic fundamentalists killed two Croat soldiers.

Tension in the area of Usora between Croats and Muslims dramatically heightened on Friday when Muslims decided to undertake a military action against zones, as Radio Mostar said, which 'have been Croatian for centuries'.

Bratic urged senior Croat and Muslim authorities in Bosnia- Herzegovina to prevent a conflict and avoid human losses.

Bosnian Croats formed the new Croat municipality of Usora from parts of Tesanj, Maglaj and Zavidovic municipalities by saying that it was in keeping with the Washington agreement reached in 1995. The Muslim radio in Sarajevo said that Muslim authorities had never given approval to such a step.

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Croat 'Defense Ministry' Statement

LD1301231196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the latest events in Usora, especially yesterday's attempt by members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army to take Alibegovci and Ularice, the political department of the Herzeg-Bosnia's Defense Ministry issued a special statement today.

A series of about 250 incidents and physical assaults on members of the Croat Defense Council [HVO] in Usora since the signing of the Washington agreement on establishing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina reached a peak yesterday. Around 3,000 soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, supported by tanks, armored personnel carriers, and special police forces tried to occupy eastern parts of Usora. A more serious escalation was averted only through the presence of mind of HVO members and the police unit in that village, but the situation remains extremely difficult and complex.

The Herzeg-Bosnia Defense Ministry stressed that this action followed a whole series of well-planned and prepared provocations and incidents: the unsolved murder of two HVO members in Zabljak, the attack on a local priest, the detention of seven HVO members, and the arrest and maltreatment of military policemen. Considering that in the same period several serious incidents occurred in central Bosnia, such as a mujahidin attack on a federal police patrol a month ago in Zepce, the blockade of traffic, and other provocations and attacks on Croats, it is difficult to imagine that these are only individual incidents without a deep political background.

Namely, the creation of a climate of insecurity is an attempt to deny Croats political equality at the forthcoming elections, and to secure accommodation for the Muslims evicted from Serb areas. This poses a serious threat for the process of restoring confidence between Croats and Muslims and the overall process of establishing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which the Croats — especially in central Bosnia — have made a full contribution.

We expect the other side to start implementing the Washington and Dayton agreements and promote the fundamental values contained in those documents, relevant for the survival of both nations and of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statement by the political department of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Defense Ministry stresses.

Silajdzic Criticizes Croat Opposition to Federation

LD1301210796 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation in Mostar has calmed down. Both sides have put forward constructive proposals. Official Zagreb showed good will for solving the problems through its Defense Minister Gojko Susak.

But, whenever one problem in the federation is solved, another one appears. This time problems appeared in the Usora area, and elsewhere. According to IFOR's [Implementation Force] official reports, there were no incidents between the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat Defense Council [HVO] in the Usora area, or in other words, IFOR managed to avert any incidents at the last moment. According to some other reports, there have been incidents. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic will speak about new problems in the Federation in a special interview for Bosnia Herzegovina Television news.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Prime Minister, could you please comment on the latest events in Usora?

[Silajdzic] Clashes broke out in Usora between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO because, instead of withdrawing by 2 km in line with the Dayton agreement, the HVO entered territory and tried to unfurl flags. Clashes broke out and IFOR intervened. I hope everything will be all right.

But this shows that something is rotten deep down. There is a whole series of incidents that hamper our relations. Today I received a delegation from Stolac. They told me that during the Christmas and New Year holidays the houses belonging to the Muslims who should return to Stolac were blown up. In Dayton we agreed that people should return to Stolac, Travnik, and so on. More Croat people than agreed returned to Travnik, but no one returned to Stolac. Why? And for how long will this go on?

When you come from Croatia, all the way to the border in Mostar, all the way to the eastern bank [of the river Neretva], you have a feeling you are in Croatia: Everything from the uniforms to the flags is the same, and everything looks like a big Croatia, not like Bosnia.

We have been talking about (?improving) the situation in Mostar for a year and a half, but nothing has happened. On the contrary, what is happening is that a division of Mostar is being cast in stone and legalized in a way, something which some people — myself included — will never accept because a division of Mostar is a division of Bosnia, and this is what we fought against.

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Mr. Koschnick should finally present a plan which he will stand behind and implement within a week with the help of police both Turkish and Croatian — as is happening in [Velika] Kladusa. If that plans fails to be implemented, I would recommend to him that he resign. It is honorable to resign if a task cannot be done. But he should say loudly and clearly once and for all who is refusing to do it.

I think the time has come to speak in these terms. People who until yesterday referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina as former Bosnia-Herzegovina are imposing decisions on us in the assembly. We can draw the following conclusion: I am afraid that what we feared is happening, which is, that it is very difficult to build Bosnia with the people who tried to destroy it. It is difficult to develop a spirit of togetherness between Bosniaks and Croats with those people who do not want any togetherness. [end recording]

Muslims From Stolac Complain of Croat 'Genocide'

LD1301210996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-HerZegovina, has received a Stolac municipal delegation led by Mehmed Dizdar.

The issue of the return of over 8,000 Bosniaks and other citizens who were expelled from Stolac was discussed. The Stolac delegation told the prime minister that contrary to the plans and agreements reached, the return of Bosniaks to Stolac is being prevented by all available means. After the Dayton agreement, when it seemed that the return would become reality, the Croat Defense Council [HVO] started systematically to destroy and torch the remaining Bosniak and Serb houses.

The Stolac citizens believe that there is an unjustifiable silence about this. They insist on the domestic and international public being informed about crimes committed against the Stolac Bosniaks during the war and about the forceful way in which they are being prevented from returning to their homes.

An unforgettable genocide was carried out in Stolac. People were killed, tortured in camps, and expelled from their homes. Mosques and other important historical buildings were totally destroyed. he Stolac citizens intend to present facts about the crimes committed in Stolac to The Hague international war tribunal.

In the course of the talks, Prime Minister Silajdzic expressed his full support for the demand that the safe return of all expelled Stolac citizens be secured. He announced that within its competences, the government will undertake necessary measures to ensure the return of the Stolac refugees.

Silajdzic Presidential Candidacy Rumored

AU1201161796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 12 Jan 96

[Report by Vanja Vardjan from Sarajevo]

[FBIS Translated Text] While ordinary people in Sarajevo are consumed with worrying how to get in and out of town, major behind- the-scenes political struggles are under way in political circles. It seems that the popular Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic will be the victim of these struggles. The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] have already agreed on the division of posts in the new Federal Government. The government will consist of nine Bosniak and six Croatian ministers. The prime minister-designate of this government is a completely unknown Izudin Kapetanovic, a dean of the Electro-Technical Faculty in Tuzla. The most important post of the Croats in the government will be taken by Jadranko Prlic, while the extremist Vladimir Soljic, until now defense minister of the self-styled Herzeg-Bosnia, will be the defense minister.

The post of the prime minister in the much less important Republic Government was offered to Haris Silajdzic. He almost definitely will not accept the post offered.

Because it is envisaged that the elections would be called in Bosnia-Herzegovina in six months, some parties are already preparing for them. The SDP [Party of Democratic Renewal], the party of the former Communists, and UBSD [Union of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats], the former reformists, have already signed an electoral coalition agreement. Those in the know believe these will be the only serious opponents to the SDA at the next elections. It is rumored that the popular Haris Silajdzic might join them as their presidential candidate.

Commentary Condemns SDA-HDZ Deal on Government

AU1501214196 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jan 96 p 2

[Commentary by Jasminka Sabic: "Prime Minister or Prime Minister Designate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The expected has happened. Haris Silajdzic has been put forward as prime minister designate of the new republican government, and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and the Party

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of Democratic Action [SDA] have made sure that it is not as strong as the prime minister wanted it. The interest of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been defeated by the interests and compromises of the two ruling parties!

In the long conflict between Silajdzic and the "opponents" of the strong central Bosnia-Herzegovina government there will be no winners. The loser is the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that the HDZ is interested in the republican government getting as little authority so that the federal gets as much as possible is understandable from the point of their proven ability to steer (and endanger if disrupted) the federation in the direction they intend to take it. What is incomprehensible in view of the sensible thinking about the future in this region is why the SDA supported the view that we do not need strong central bodies at the level of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If they, like the HDZ, have decided that it is not in their interest to ensure a strong influence on the Serb entity, then they have placed a world of a responsibility for the consequences on their own shoulders. One should remember well the latest session of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly and what took place then for the moment when "a strong Serb entity" through the weak central Bosnia-Herzegovina bodies comes home to roost.

The SDA is not that "weak" to back down in the face of the HDZ threats, which leaves another possibility open: That, under Bender's "threats," the SDA used the opportunity to accept another vote on the already accepted "government with six ministries" to clip the prime minister's wings "a bit more" and thus also of the opposition that backs him "out of spite." If there is any truth in this possibility, then the SDA will indeed have to bear responsibility for the central government, which (with its five ministries into which have also been tightly squeezed three state functions) will not be able to function, and hence govern, on the territory of the federation, let alone the Serb entity. Revolted by what his opponents tried (it has become traditional) to "fix" for him in his absence, Silajdzic could do only one thing when he arrived at the assembly session — threaten to take certain measures. Now the prime minister can do only two things: As prime minister designate, he can insist on ignoring the rights of the parties and appoint the people in the central government or threaten to reject the mandate, or he can seek help from "the witnesses."

Sacirbegovic on Possible Delay in Elections

AU1501134396 Paris AFP in English
1305 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stockholm, Jan 15 (AFP) — Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic on Monday [15 January] said it would be better to delay elections in Bosnia than to hold a poll that was not free and fair.

"I must emphasise that the key issue here is not to have elections but to have free, fair and democratic elections," Sacirbegovic said on the sidelines of a meeting to discuss organisation of the vote.

"Just to have elections can turn out to be nothing more than legitimising the existing status quo.

"So we want to see the conditions for free, fair and democratic elections established and, if that happens, I am sure that peace will receive a strong boost," he continued.

Sacirbegovic said he considered it would be "very difficult" to hold the elections by June 14, which is the earliest date set for the vote under U.S.-brokered peace accords signed in Paris in December.

Even to hold the elections by the latest date of September 14 would be "difficult" he said.

According to the Bosnian minister, the aim of the Stockholm meeting was "to make sure that democracy and human rights and freedom prevail in our country ... that we have free, fair and democratic elections and not sham elections."

Swedish Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen added that the international community had "the common obligation" to ensure all obstacles were overcome.

"To carry out elections will be one of the most difficult tasks on the civilian side. It involves considerable technical and organisational problems," she said.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has been given the task of supervising the elections, organised the Stockholm meeting in order to define the problems and find ways of solving them.

Bildt: Deadline 'Not Realistic'

LD1501143296 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1412 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 15 (TANJUG) — The high representative of the international community for Bosnia, Carl Bildt, said on Monday that it would be extremely difficult to meet a September deadline for elections in that former Yugoslav republic.

'Anyone with any experience in organizing elections knows that the time frame is an exceedingly short one,' news agencies quoted Bildt as saying at a meeting in Stockholm.

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Under the peace accords initialled in Dayton, Ohio, (November 21) and signed in Paris (December 14), the elections in both entities in Bosnia — Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation — are due to be held in six to nine months.

'Six months is not realistic. We are looking more at early autumn,' Bildt added.

Bosniaks Must Use NATO 'To Strengthen State'

AU0701194496 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 27 Dec 95 p 10

[Commentary by Fahrudin Salkic: "Not Everybody Who Pulls You Out of Manure Is Your Friend, and Not Everybody Who Pushes You Into It Is Your Enemy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the modest ceremony when Javier Solana, the new secretary general of NATO and former foreign minister of Spain, took over his duty, he pointed out several strategic goals of NATO that he intends to realize during his mandate: "For us the most important thing is the penetration of NATO into East Europe." Did not this military action of the Western military alliance, which carries the epithets of being the first and the biggest after World War II, for the first time enable NATO to enter the living room of East Europe through the big door, and that as a rescuer?

NATO on Strategic Airports

The international troops, which are considered to be the guarantee of the implementation of the latest agreements on the terrain, have already been strategically distributed throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do not the solution and the answer to a big number of questions which originate from the arrival of these troops lie precisely in that strategy of distribution? There is no doubt that such a distribution of any foreign troops, on such an interesting geostrategic territory as the Balkans, would otherwise have provoked disputes among the interested parties with unforeseeable consequences.

It cannot be ruled out that that could even have been a reason for the beginning of World War III. In this way the Americans, with some negligible troops from Scandinavian countries, will fill all the arranged accommodations (and other) capacities in the Tuzla basin. The French have reserved the capital with its close surroundings for themselves, and the British central Bosnia. The Spaniards had to be satisfied with the valley of the Neretva river. As for Russians, the other "entity" can freely be seen as their zone of "occupation." With the authority it was given in Dayton, IFOR [Implementation Force] will be the only military force with the legitimacy to act in a given situation. In that context and with that final aim, is not the war in Bosnia the third act of the bloody performance, the epilogue of which was to establish a protruding defense post of West Europe toward the east? Or an offensive line with four modern airports (Tuzla, Visoko, Sarajevo, Mostar), which in the coming period will enable NATO to realize one of its strategic goals, namely the penetration toward the east? By the way, the possibility of prolonging the length of the operation to two years is already being deliberated.

In the last four years we have acquired a lot of bitter and bloody experience. Some of it has certainly been caused by the (lack of) interest of the international community in the real situation in Bosnia, in the effective protection of human rights, and in fair peace. In that sense it is very hard to believe that IFOR will bring any improvements on the ground with the purpose of protecting the global interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Winner and Victor

In the history of wars there has been no such notion as an unsolved result of war; that is usually the way those wars end which have the perspective of becoming long wars and having as their final aim the defeat or physical destruction of one of the warring parties. In the same way, there have been quite a few cases when megapowers, to realize their strategic interests, started limited war conflicts with an uncertain result, and then appeared on the scene as rescuers and firemen. For the politicians who mediate between the parties to find any sort of ending to the conflict, this unsolved end is in many aspects more suitable than the victory of one or the other side. Whether we want to admit it or not, the recently ended war in Bosnia has ended with a stalemate, and it has all the necessary characteristics for calculations and open questions about the role of the international community, which will remain without an answer for a long time.

All three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their respective position, that of the aggressor, the victim, or the observer and accomplice, have, at least partially, realized some of their interests. But definitely the biggest winner and the only victor is precisely the "international community." Beside the humanitarian and political interest, the IFOR soldiers will secure some other spheres of influence of a very prosaic nature for their countries. They will be a guarantee for the security of the invested capital, a respectable military power on interesting territories (or zones of occupation), and only at the end, a means for the implementation of the signed agreement. And they will not go away before they, in any possible way, enable the realization of the interests of their countries.

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In the 120-day period after the signing of the agreement (around 20 April 1996), all the momentarily available military potential and weapons are to be withdrawn into the barracks, or demobilized, and Army members in the separation zones registered with the local IFOR commands. A joint military commission must be regularly informed about any changes in local military formations, in all the specifically defined aspects: Locations, types, strength of troops and armament of all the forces, positions and description of fortifications, of mine fields, of unexploded arsenal, of means for demolition [as published], all sorts of obstacles and other blockades, ammunition depots, the locations of command posts and communication nets.... Together with all that, there is the authorization (and the threat) that the IFOR forces will react and act against any party which endangers their integrity in any way.

Under the Patronage of the 'U.S. Forces'

Where, in all that, is the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? The United States has completely taken over the responsibility to arm, train, and educate the members of the Army. We will have to rely completely on the U.S. military industry, on the knowledge and the professional help provided through instructors which, to be honest, are the best in the world in their own field. That means that in every aspect we will depend on the United States, which will sell us spare parts for the supplied weapons.

It is not hard to imagine that now, with the arrival of units equipped for offensive action, old appetites could once more come to the surface. And then really become achievable. Particularly if the NATO partners reach a consensus on that, and through joint action facilitate the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina to "eastern" and "western." Or to "Serb" and "Croat." One should have no illusions about the world having any interest in keeping Bosnia united at any price. The world favors any option if it results in permanent peace, and if that also guarantees their presence, the realization of their interests and of exploitation and multiple return of invested capital. Therefore it is now up to Bosniaks to be wise enough and use to the maximum the presence of NATO (IFOR) to strengthen the state, the economy, the Army, and everything that will be necessary for the coming years of shakey peace (?) in the Balkans.

[Box, p 10]

Proportion of Military Potential of the Two "Entities"

As has been agreed in Dayton, the proportion between the military potential of the Army of the Federation and the Army of the "Serbian Republic" should be 2:1 in all aspects (troops and arms of the caliber over 75 mm), the reference being the military potential of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to presently known data, in the later talks it was concluded that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army must be reduced in number to a little over half of the IFOR forces, and the Federal Army will correspond to a little less than the total number of the IFOR troops, which will have around 60,000 soldiers.

Article Examines Defense Bill, Federation Army

AU0701211896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 26 Dec 95 p 5

[Article by Ibrahim Polimac: "Religion Allowed, Politics Forbidden!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A defense bill was adopted by the deputies and the representatives of the Constituent Assembly in their latest session. Having estimated that the offered solutions could be a good basis, they ordered the government to prepare the proposal in which the suggestions heard in the Assembly would also be taken into consideration.

This is how conclusions are formulated when laws are made and when "the hot potato" must be passed to someone else — since the Constituent Assembly did not agree in all matters.

The government must try to reconcile their attitudes and arguments, which are, to begin with, related to the concluding statements of Articles 49 and 96 of the bill, and to the whole of Article 222. The first two articles envisage the possibility that "a section of the Federation Army" is selected in which conscripts will serve in the reserve and recruits accomplish their military service. It is formulated that the communal Defense Ministry branch in charge "will be obliged to make this possible" (Article 49), whereas it is stated in Article 96 that "it will make this possible." The mistakes probably happened because of the short time — the bill was handed out on the same day it was discussed. Critics [as published] also let go unnoticed the formulation in the third paragraph of Article 53, which may be compared to the first two.

Armed Forces

The only choice is offered in Article 222 of the bill. According to one version, "defense tasks and commanding the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council will — in the interim period — be performed by the appropriate authorities in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina that will exist there on the day on which this law takes effect, according to current regulations." The other version offers the possibility that "the function of the commander in chief of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is performed by

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the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of the Croatian Defense Council by the president or the vice president of the Federation (who is a Croat)," naturally only by the time the defense system and the Federation Army are organized in compliance with the law. According to the bill, the president of the Federation will perform — with the consent of the vice president — the duty of the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation in the field of defense. A joint command of the Federation Army is being established for the performance of chief tasks at the Defense Ministry. It will be headed by the commander and his deputy, who are not members of the same constituent nation. The organization of the Army will be established by the commander in chief upon the appropriate request of the defense minister.

The Armed Forces will be composed of the Army of the Federation, which will be joined by the police in case of war. In this case, the police will be put under the Army command. The Federation Army will consist of the units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council, up to the level of the corps and corps areas. It will be made up of units for peaceful times and times of war. The units for peaceful times will include persons employed by the Army, soldiers serving in the Army, and professional personnel. The units for war times are joined by units formed according to the territorial and production [term as published] principle, according to the decision made by the commander in chief.

It is predicted that the Federation Army will consist of the three usual branches: The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Air Defense. The branches consist of 11 combat arms and 15 different fields of specialization.

According to Article 41, "any political activity, establishing parties, and holding political meetings or happenings is forbidden in the Federation Army." The official languages are Bosnian and Croatian in the Latin script.

The Obligation To Conscript

The total size of the Federation Army, the number of Army members and the day that will be celebrated as the anniversary of its establishment will be defined by the commander in chief. Army members will wear uniforms decorated with the coat of arms of the Federation and the badges of military ranks, unique for the Federation Army. The flag of the Federation Army will be defined by a special law. Owing to the freedom to practice religion, it will be possible to organize and perform religious activities in the Army. The bill envisages that "the Defense Ministry — in cooperation with religious communities — defines a temporary structure and the way in which religions activities will function in the Army within three months after this law has taken effect." The military service consists of "the obligation to conscript, to accomplish the military service, and to serve in the reserve." Women are not subject to conscription or military service, but in case of war they can join the Federation Army. The military service will last for 12 months, it will be performed in the Army, and the obligation to participate in the reserve will be fulfilled either in the Army or in the police.

Students who are educated according to the system that they have to pass all examinations prescribed for a university year within that year, will be sent to the military service after the completion of their course of study, at the latest by the end of the year in which they are 27.

A special paragraph in the bill is entitled "Conscientious Objection." Those who out of their religious or moral attitudes are not ready to participate in the performance of military duties may make use of "conscientious objection." Their matter will be discussed by a special Commission for Civilian Alternative Service appointed by the Ministry of Justice. If its decision is positive, the conscript will be allowed to perform the civilian alternative service, which is, as a rule, performing duties at the Federation Army that do not require "carrying of arms," or "in places where they do not use force against other people." Persons who accomplished the civilian service, will never get a permit for the acquisition and carrying of weapons. Still, military service without carrying and use of weapons will last for 24 months.

Apart from that, the regulations on civilian alternative service according to Article 221 of the bill will "not be applied during times of war." And, in the end, transitory and concluding regulations say that "the Federation Army will be formed according to this law by transforming the commands, chiefs, units, and institutions of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council found in the territory of the Federation on the day when this law takes effect." The law will become valid after it has been published in the "Sluzbene Novine Bosne i Hercegovine" ["Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina"]. It is only natural that the proposal will have to be coordinated first, and it is possible for amendments to be made also. After that it will have to be adopted by the Constitutional Assembly.

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Commentary Examines Mujahidin 'Freedom Fighters'

LD1201184496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Jan 96

[Station commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mujahidin, the warriors on the path of Allah whose duty is to die spreading Islam, are causing exceptional problems to Muslim authorities. These jihad warriors appeared in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the first time at the beginning of the war in 1992 as volunteers in the defense of the greater Serbian aggression. Here is our editor's commentary.

First they formed small groups, but now, according to U.S. intelligence services, there are more than 4,000 mujahidin deployed throughout Bosniak Muslim territory, as part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, but some units are independent and act completely on their own initiative, outside the Muslim army.

Little has been known about their efforts and fighting methods in the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina over the four years of war, because there are very few people who crossed their path and remained alive. In their wake, they left only dead bodies and ashes on which they left their messages and oaths to Great Allah in whose name they kill and destroy everything that does not belong to Islam.

More was learned about their religion, morals, and fighting methods only from Bosniak Muslims who could no longer endure their abuse and humiliation, and turned for help to Bosnia-Herzegovina's official authorities. In late August 1995 three local communities in the Zenica municipality sent a letter to the authorities in Zenica, complaining about the behavior of members of the El Mujahid unit, which is deployed in the Podbrezje local community where Croats had a majority before the war. It would be interesting to know why their base was set up in that village.

The letter said that citizens' complaints against improper behavior of El Mujahid unit members has recently increased. Dissatisfied with the way our wives, daughters, and sisters dress, the letter said, some members of this unit display their dissatisfaction in an extremely brutal and improper way. Would our brothers, certain members of the El Mujahid unit, the letter went on to say, stop maltreating our sisters. The letters added: We cannot accept that anyone should try to impose on us their customs by force.

And if such protests are coming from the Muslims, what can we expect from people with other religious beliefs, who were not even allowed to compiain, let alone seek protection.

In this respect, the Bosnian authorities could be faced with a problem without a solution, especially since the mujahidin are increasingly escaping their control. This is because the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina was only an excuse, while the real task was to establish and spread Islam.

They were financed by various Islamic groups and organizations, and most of them are under some form of pressure or threat of expulsion on the part of their governments. The units in Bosnia-Herzegovina, made up of such warriors, pose the biggest threat to peace. This is why one of the basic demands of Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, raised in December 1995, was to seek public guarantees from Mr. Izetbegovic that all the mujahidin would leave Bosnia-Herzegovina 30 days after the signing of the peace agreement.

The guarantees provided by Izetbegovic as president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and later confirmed by Haris Silajdzic, show that groups of the mujahidin were protected by top-level Bosniak Muslim authorities, a fact denied until then. It was even denied that the mujahidin were in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The guarantees were provided, but their implementation will be a big problem, given that many have no longer anywhere to go. It remains to be seen whether this problem will be solved by granting them Bosnia-Herzegovina citizenship, after which they cease to be foreigners, or whether the Muslim army and police will have to observe the annexes of the Dayton Agreement.

Bearing all this in mind, some Muslim papers are justified in asking how much damage the presence of Islamic soldiers has caused, and how beneficial it has been to the freedom struggle of the Bosnian people.

Liberals: Bosnia Electorally Divided

AU0401141896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 28 Dec 95 -4 Jan 96 p 10

[Interview with Rasim Kadic, president of the Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Senka Kurtovic; place and date not given: "Bosnian Partnership for Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rasim Kadic, president of the Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, says that his party cannot be satisfied with the peace solution achieved for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Liberals are aware that the alternative to the agreement would be the continuation of an even bloodier war and taking the risk of losing strong world allies, primarily those from the United States. Therefore it is absolutely out of the question to openly confront Dayton.

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[Kurtovic] In your opinion, what does Bosnia-Herzegovina look like after Paris — a united or a divided country?

[Kadic] Bosnia-Herzegovina remained united, but with an essentially different internal constitutional organization, including also territorial organization. As early as December 1991, on the occasion of the report by the Badinter Committee, the Liberals presented two stands — that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be an independent country, and that we were ready for, in the sense of quality, an essentially different organization of the country. That really has happened. Unfortunately, we have reached those aims on the basis of force, and this is the big, dark historical stain on what we momentarily have.

The Point of New Uniting

[Kurtovic] Nevertheless, you have readily expressed, for many perhaps a paradoxical stand, that today Bosnia-Herzegovina is a very stable country. What is the reason for such an opinion?

[Kadic] After such a bloody war and a passable solution, everyone has flexed his muscle, and I think that for the long term in Bosnia-Herzegovina and around Bosnia-Herzegovina forceful concepts will be given up, as well as the change of its borders, the attempts at marginalizing or destroying whole nations. We have reached a certain point, which is not particularly appealing to anyone, but it could just be the point to make Bosnia-Herzegovina more stable. Perhaps it is some kind of solution which will enable that internal partnership for peace to become a long-term interest and the point of the new uniting of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovinian functions, and perhaps, in the future, a constitutional organization which will not imply entities and territories.

[Kurtovic] Does that mean that, unlike others, you think that there will be no spectacular returns of the people to their homes?

[Kadic] It seems to me that there are reasons to be more skeptical than the others regarding the future national backward movements of the people. We think that the concept, in the name of which people were banished, the way people were banished, killed, or in whatever way the genocide was carried out, is too hard to expect spectacular changes in the "tiger's skin." Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain a multinational country, but, unfortunately, the distribution of population will differ essentially from the situation before the war. For us, as a political party, it is a political challenge, to which we will try to respond. According to all my estimations, we will respond to that challenge by looking for parties which will be our partners in the territory of the RS [Serb Republic].

[Kurtovic] What is the task of the Federation, of the partners in it, that is, of the political parties, regarding speeding up reintegration? What can the Liberals do?

[Kadic] Throughout this whole war, the Liberal Party, headed by Dr. Miodrag Zivanovic, has been active in Banja Luka. It is obviously a very strong opposition to the hard national line of Pale, and it has succeeded in preserving some kind of nucleus of the party and that only in Banja Luka. I am also convinced that there is one, to tell the true, not so strong group of Serb political mood, which could move things in the opposite direction. The Liberals of Bosnia-Herzegovina will do more if they would apply the concept of partnership. We must learn our lessons from this war — that on one side there are collapsed violence and hegemonist forceful concepts. But, in some other way, also other concepts of the internal organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been defeated. Our concept of civic Bosnia-Herzegovina has also been defeated, and it has only proved to be a possibility in the future.

Balance as Reality

[Kurtovic] Which concept has won in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Kadic] The concept of strong national options with a possibility within national democracies, but not democracy in general. Both those who have started to destroy one country, and we, who thought that a civic Bosnia-Herzegovina was possible in reality, must learn our lessons and approach Bosnia-Herzegovina rationally. Therefore we think that now a balance has been achieved, which has become a reality. We believe that precisely from that reality we will be learning our lessons in the Liberal or democratic option of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reintegration will not be that fast and it will be based upon defined political and national concepts.

[Kurtovic] What will be the role of the future elections for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what, in your opinion, will be the structure of the political stage before the elections?

[Kadic] The elections have already been limited by the fact that they are not direct throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The elections are direct in certain entities. For that, the territory of Bosnia- Herzegovina has already been clearly politically and electorally divided, and that fact is sufficiently indicative. There is a possibility that in the territory of the Serb Republic some more radical political shifts from the domination

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of SDS [Serb Democratic Party] toward somewhat more moderate or different political options could occur. That will obviously be a rounded-off political territory which will experience regional political disturbances on the eve of the elections.

New Parties

[Kurtovic] What will determine the political segment in the Federation?

[Kadic] Most certainly it will be the relation between the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. Throughout the war, although under control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a formal and, to a certain degree, real political pluralism has been growing. We do not give up our right and I believe that a large number of people will cast their votes for some new parties. I am convinced that those new parties, or to be more precise, that new party, will be the Liberals. We will appear as a real party of the political center, and on the basis of the historical events we will find a political stand, neither forgetting what has happened, nor to which faith and nation we belong.

[Kurtovic] Having started the political campaign of the Liberal Party two days ago, you said that the Liberals were multinational, that they were not anational, that is — that the Liberal Party was a national party.

[Kadic] That is perhaps a new formulation of this party which is the result of that what we were before the war, and particularly of what has happened in the war. This war has polarized things and in some way is the consequence of the concept of solving national questions after the disintegration of socialist countries. This war has confirmed a new era in relation to the political and national events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The year 1991 is the year before the new era. We understand that in the long term here, as well as all over the world, the national category will be one of the dominant categories, only we have something new here. We have a multinational political party, but also a national one, and we want to get very clearly involved in solving the biggest political problems here. That could be one of the specific electoral qualities of this party.

[Kurtovic] On the first free elections in 1990 you said that the Liberals had a chance in the second, that is, in the third elections. What do you think about it today?

[Kadic] These are not the second elections, these are the first elections. Only formally are these the second elections. The point in question is, in fact, the first elections in — this will perhaps make the Serbs rejoice — I would call it a new Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is now organized in a new way, in a new historical situation. On the elections in 1990, our political objective was to enter parliament. Five years afterward, the political aspirations of the Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina are much more ambitious.

Article Assesses Possible Karadzic Successors

AU0501161896 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 95 pp 16-17

[Article by Perica Vucinic: "An Opening for Obrenovic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When on the eve of the Dayton conference, at the Bijeljina meeting of Serbian intellectuals from both banks of the Drina River, Dobrica Cosic pointed at Radovan Karadzic and warned: "Radovan, you have erred!," the president of the Serb Republic answered: "Oh, God, Dobrica, do not start telling us again about Chetniks and Partisans!" Replying, Dobrica again raised his short forefinger and repeated: "You have erred!"

"Yes, I have," Karadzic beat about the bush, "I have to change over from a phase of Karadjordje [leader of Serb rebels under Turks and founder of the Serb dynasty of Karadjordjevics] into a phase of Obrenovic [the Serb dynasty that followed the Karadjordjevics]."

It seems that after Dayton even the leader of Bosnian Serbs himself does not believe that there is time left for any sort of phases. According to reports from his closest circles, Karadzic is contemplating appearing before the war crimes tribunal in The Hague on his own initiative, and reportedly, he has been so much absorbed in that intention that he is already working out a defense strategy.

A New Karadzic

The end of the war in Bosnia was a sign for the beginning of a new series of speculations about who will succeed whom in the Bosnian Serb hierarchy. For more than a year Nikola Koljevic, member of the Presidency of the Serb Republic, has been persevering as a candidate for Milosevic's new Karadzic. The name of the former Sarajevo literature professor has reached the top of the betting list owing to the fact that he was the first high Bosnian Serb official to meet with Milosevic immediately after he imposed a tough blockade on the Drina in August last year. As for a while nothing more reliable than the frequency of visits to Belgrade and the Serbian president was taken as a criterion for leader of the Bosnian Serbs, General Ratko Mladic, commander in chief of the Bosnian Serb army, topped the list for a certain period as well.

After Dayton, the indictments for war crimes issues against Karadzic and Mladic by the war crimes tribunal

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in The Hague, and Milosevic's promises to international negotiators that he would remove the two from the political scene, a new round of intriguing assumptions is beginning — who will replace them.

Thus Koljevic rates quite high in the world's and Belgrade's betting, but not domestically. "Koljevic is out of the race, he drinks too much," some UNPROFOR members told a reporter of the Belgrade Radio B-92. Those who know Koljevic a little better believe that he is out of race for two reasons: He is not interested in it, and he is loyal to Karadzic. Koljevic's close friends in Banja Luka say they cannot understand his infatuation with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.

In the whole issue one thing is being overlooked, that the election of a new Karadzic can be influenced by the leader of the Bosnian Serbs himself, by his own power and authority. Because, according to the Constitution of the Serb Republic, in war the president is elected by the Assembly, while in peacetime he runs in presidential elections. If he decides not to abide by the will of the Serbian president to leave politics on his own, Karadzic could put his own candidate forward in the Assembly, or go for elections or a referendum. Speculators in UNPROFOR and most of the Serb politicians in Bosnia agree on one point, though, that Karadzic's most likely candidate could be the current chairman of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik.

On the other hand, the excitement accompanying possible shifts in the Serb Republic far exceeds their significance. The entire matter became relative the moment Milosevic was given a free hand and negotiating keys by the Pale leadership for the international negotiations on Bosnia. After much grumbling and contradictory statements like "we accept," "we do not accept," and "we do accept provided that...," the Dayton agreement was initialed even by Karadzic himself.

A New Mladic

A much more delicate problem for the Serbian president, who has taken on a commitment to implement the peace agreement, will be a shift in the Bosnian Serb army's leadership. Milosevic needs a man who will, without objections, peacefully demobilize the army. General Mladic, whose motto has been that only a defeated army retreats, and whom Karadzic considers to be prone to military adventurism, while Milosevic himself (relying on foreign diplomatic sources) considers him to have gone completely crazy, can hardly be that reliable man. An additional difficulty is the general's undoubted popularity in the army and among the people, but also among other commanders of the Army of Serb Republic. Researches carried out by the Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences have shown that Mladic rates high on the right bank of the Drina as well. Among politicians listed in order according to favorable opinions, the Bosnian Serb general ranks second (50 percent), following the Serbian president, who gained 0.9 percentage points more. On the other hand, regarding unfavorable opinions, Mladic won 13 percent less than Milosevic. If he turns against the general beloved by the people, Milosevic must reckon with a fall in rating among the Serbs in Bosnia, as well as with a reduction of the obvious political ambitions he disclosed by forming the SPRS [Socialist Party of Serb Republic] on the left bank of the Drina. Additionally, the loyalty to the commander in chief shown by the top brass of the Serb Republic when Karadzic attempted to remove Mladic in August this year will represent a problem in Milosevic's attempt as well.

As Mladic's replacement, Milan Gvero (Belgrade's man), Novica Simic (until the war in Bosnia he commanded the military police, which could mean a lot of things), and Zdravko Tolimir (he was in Dayton) are most frequently mentioned. Whether it will be one of the three, or some fourth candidate, is a far lesser problem than the question: How? It makes sense to think that Milosevic could ask Karadzic for help in eliminating Mladic, but the question "In what way?" arises again, because Karadzic had already come out of that conflict defeated and embarrassed once. In that conflict, one ought to recall, all the regime press in Belgrade stood by Mladic.

Parallel with the fever accompanying attempts to find short-term cadre solutions within the authorities, in the Serb Republic the ground is being prepared for elections, which, according to the peace agreement, are supposed to take place next year. Even now it is quite certain that two big parties will appear — Karadzic's ruling SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and the SPRS. In establishing a SPRS branch in Banja Luka Milosevic has made a good move. The region of Banja Luka and the Bosnian Krajina, in addition to its being the most populated area, stands out in the Serb Republic for its material, cultural and intellectual potential. Its typical sensitivity to social justice manifested itself through massive support for the Partisans in World War II and the "September 1993" (manipulated) social-military uprising in this war, while the very explicit feeling of regional belonging is being expressed through constant opposition to Pale and its leadership.

New Situation

The mood of the public in the Serb Republic is shown also by the fact that all the opposition deputies in the Serb Republic Assembly are united in the independent opposition deputies' club from northern municipalities,

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from Bijeljina to Banja Luka. As in the mother-country, in the Serb Republic the southern wing is more inclined to the authorities. From sources close to the club of independent deputies led by Milorad Dodik VREME learns that they will run in the elections as well. The political capital they have acquired is their steady opposition to Karadzic and the rest of parliament ever since the moment when they refused to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. To oppose the Pale leadership in conditions of regime-controlled information in unison is a strenuous, but apparently risky job as well, because so far it is the club's leader Dodik, a daring fighter with a sharp tongue, who has been a sole speaker on behalf of the group of deputies, while other members, mostly businessmen and managers, are waiting for a better moment to come. VREME learns that Andjelko Grahovac, successful young director of the firm Univerzal in Banja Luka, has announced that his is joining Dodik's group. The general public has known Grahovac since he was excluded from the SDS (because of pro- Serbia deviations), while afterwards there was a fuss about him when a group of Krajina deputies in the Serb Republic Assembly put him forward as a deputy. As Dodik's group (party) is made up of managers and private entrepreneurs, it makes sense that they would want to fortify their acquired political capital by financial capital.

In Banja Luka the small, but precious Liberal Party, led by philosophy professor Miodrag Zivanovic, has existed throughout the war. It is a party handicapped by war in many respects: It used to mobilize young intellectuals, whereas the intelligentsia fled the war head over heels. It used to be multinational, while the war has made it almost ethnically pure. The chairman and most of its members were on the front, but they do not have the money to promote that advantage among the voters. In addition to all this, they are politically ambitious. Judging by their ideological closeness, as well as earlier private meetings and liaisons made in socialist cadre carousels, they could accomplish their ambitions in symbiosis with the socialists.

As is appropriate, in the Serb Republic, on the model of the mother-country, three radical parties are active, of which that of [Vojislav] Seselj's is rather disorientated due to cadre shifts, that of Glamocanin's is newly-founded, while the authentic radical party of Banja Luka, led by lawyer Dubravko Prstojevic, is broke.

The entire opposition, as can be seen from the above, has settled down in the Bosnian Krajina, which, being the area in which 60 percent of the entire population lives, will have a crucial impact on the elections. Hence the convincing stories that the most serious candidates for the position of Bosnian Serb leader will come from this region. Even Milosevic has reportedly ordered the SPRS to field a strong, well-known personality and native of Krajina, which is a prerequisite, in the elections, which, according to the peace agreement, must be scheduled for August at the latest. For that reason, and also because of the appearance on RTS [Radio-Television Serbia] and TV Politika, everybody is looking at Banja Luka's mayor Predrag Radic. However, being an official who has decided to be his own and city's and Krajina's representative in the first place, he does not fit in much with any combination. In the elections much could be achieved by a mere slogan favoring Banja Luka as capital, while according to people close to the SPRS, in this party one is considering coming out with a campaign poster similar to the one the SPS was sticking all over in the first multi-party elections in Serbia: a portrait of each candidate compared with a portrait of the president of Serbia.

A possible portrait of Karadzic could be accompanied by the following text: "The man who has persevered the longest time without Milosevic's support," but this is no political capital. For the upcoming political campaign the ruling SDS has prepared results achieved, about which the ordinary man in the Serb Republic does not know what to think any longer. The rival SPRS will say — "It is enough, the time has come for peace and prosperity." Those who wonder whether we needed all this stand no chance.

Sarajevo 'Chetnik Chief' Comments on Dayton

BR0501133696 Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Jan 96 p 28

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Slavko Aleksijiv, "Chetnik leader" in Sarajevo, by Arnaud de La Grange in Grbavica; date not given: "Bosnia: Inglorious Retreat of a 'Warlord'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Bosnia, one can move in virtually no time from distributing mail to distributing shells and tracer bullets. Slavko Aleksijiv used to work in the post and telecommunications service before the war. Today he is the most feared Serbian warlord in Sarajevo. The "duke" leads the Chetnik unit in Grbavica, the "Serbian neighborhood" forced like a wedge into the Bosnian capital. For these ultranationalist combatants, who see themselves as the heirs to the Serbian paramilitary groups which have appeared since the beginning of the century, the halcyon days of war are over.

Some 100 meters away from the front line, in a bend in a winding path, the Chetnik hideout is marked by drapes bearing the skull and crossbones. Here, the uniform is a beard and long hair or hair tied at the neck. "Go in, he is

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waiting for you." In his camouflaged mesh, the "duke" is so massive that the enormous dagger he carries on his side looks more like a modest penknife. His black hair vies with his full beard, hanging down to his chest. Except for the sportier look and the absence of slanting eyes, he looks like the guru of the Japanese Aum sect.

This evening the "duke" is articulate. Between two glasses of Slibovic, he says what is on his mind. He has the passion of someone who feels betrayed. "Dayton is a stab in the back. This agreement goes against history." Against his history, at least. According to the peace plan, he and his men must leave the area. Does he intend to resist and defend his fief against the NATO soldiers or, later, the Bosnian forces? No, he is going to withdraw.

He does not do this with a light heart. He lost 30 men defending this urban patch of "Serbian land" against the "Turks." Some 30 out of the 200 which he says he controls. "I also had a section of Russian volunteers. Now they have left." A French intelligence source thinks this number is lower. "Probably between 60 and 100, and in any case no more than 150." Who does he take his orders from? "We are elite troops with a special status." His unit is deployed in the zone of Debelo Brdo, near the Jewish cemetery, one of the hottest spots in the besieged capital.

This part of the neighborhood is controlled by the 2d battalion of the Sarajevo brigade (or 1st brigade). His chief, Captain Kovatchevic, seems to be in control of the forces of Slavko Aleksijiv. Like the regular Army, the Chetniks have therefore yielded to the requirements of the peace plan: The toughest of them have resolved to withdraw in the face of the Implementation Force, the NATO expeditionary force.

The "duke" is pulling out. But he is not laying down his arms. At 40 years of age, he does not feel like being retrained again. He will stay a soldier, a vocation that came late in the day and one which he shares with his wife, "who fights by my side." "The (Bosnian — LE FIGARO editor's note) Serbian Army will be turned into a professional Army. I will have my place in the special forces." In the immediate future, inspired by the example of the Rapid Reaction Force set up at the initiative of the French in the summer of 1995, he plans to create a Chetnik "rapid reaction force."

The Monaco Example

He gets up to show his unit's flag: a skull and crossbones on a black field. "We are death troops. The crown is missing," he apologizes. After all the Chetniks are not just the champions of the "Serbian race," they are also monarchists. My father, like his entire village, was a Chetnik," the "duke" says. "He miraculously escaped a massacre perpetrated by (Tito's) partisans. Ours is a historical struggle." The flag also features the two-headed eagle and two crossed swords. There are also some inscriptions: "For the Serbs, for God" and the name of his unit: "New Sarajevo." In this case new should be translated as Serbian.

Pulling out does not mean giving up. "One day I will have my apartment above the flame of the unknown soldier," Slavko challenged. The monument is located in the heart of Sarajevo. He intends to fight to take back not just Grbavica but the entire Bosnian capital. His rhetoric is that of a wounded soldier who must pull out without fighting. His words betray a feeling broadly shared by the Serbs in the suburbs of Sarajevo: To come back one day. Once NATO has left.

The "duke" is convinced that the entire population will follow them in their withdrawal. "When the Muslims return, there will not be a single Serb left in the neighborhood." Nobody will be forced to leave. The explanation is simple: "Everyone is, or has been, a combatant. It is like in Israel." Consequently, the families will follow the movement. Why not stay in the reunified capital? There are things one does not joke about: "Live under the yoke of the fundamentalists, impossible!" The only acceptable solution would be to have autonomous status. In Grbavica, they are quick to give the example of Monaco. Why could not Sarajevo be a tax haven?

The "duke" displays his spoils of war. In one corner of a poorly lit room, there is a pile of assorted arms. "Just imagine how many Muslims it must have taken to carry all that," he says with a knowing smile. In the middle of a jumble of Kalashnikovs, rocket- launchers, and other grenades, there is a 12.7-mm machine gun. It must be French. Have his men shot at French blue helmets? "Never," he says. "The only time that Serbs shot at the French was because they were being infiltrated with Muslims." Yet the Chetniks were in the front line during the attack on the Vrbanja bridge last May. Two French soldiers were killed in the effort to retake the position.

"Milosevic a War Criminal"

He does not deny that his unit has engaged in sniping. "That is part of training a fighter." But his "elite killers" have never put a civilian in their sights. "We always fight knife to knife, gun to gun." They merely "sniped at the snipers." So who is responsible then for the dozens of deadly shots aimed indiscriminately at innocent passersby and UN soldiers for the past three years? "Civilians," of course. "People out of control," obviously.

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"This is not a civil war, it is a religious war between the Orthodox and Muslims. Look at history," the warlord points out. Indeed, many references are made to history this evening. The "duke" would like to stand history to attention and place it behind every one of his rifles. The problem is that history is rather stubborn and that recently it is taking its orders more from Belgrade than from Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital.

He also severely criticized the Serbian leadership in Belgrade. "Slobodan Milosevic is the biggest war criminal since World War II. Not Karadzic or Mladic," the "duke" thunders. "Milosevic is the one who got us into the war and now he is abandoning us. The Serbian people have been betrayed." The warlord will not retreat like a good boy to Belgrade. "I would get a better welcome in Muslim territory than in Serbia."

The "duke" acknowledges that the French paratroopers, who have Grbavica in their net, are strictly applying the peace plan. But since he has had them in his sights, he has gotten to know them. "They understand the situation." He regrets the fact that it is not the Americans, Germans, or Turks who have the mission of surrounding his area. "We would have known what to do," he says, tapping his holster suggestively.

In Grbavica, people also regret the fact that the French did not come to the rescue of the Bosnian Serbs. There would have been room for cooperation. "You helped us fight the fundamentalists, and in turn we would have given you a hand in cutting down the Muslim areas in your cities."

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Tudjman: Clinton Visit of 'Unequaled Importance'

LD1301194396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1848 GMT 13 Jan 96

[Remarks to the press by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at Pleso Airport in Zagreb following the departure of U.S. President Bill Clinton—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified reporter] Mr. President, could you comment briefly on the U.S. President's visit to Croatia?

[Tudjman] Who am I commenting for?

[Reporter] For Croatian radio.

[Tudjman] It is certainly a big event that the President of the United States, the main world power, came to Zagreb and that we held talks in delegations, and then I and the president alone. I also held talks with a group of senators and congressmen. All this contributes to strengthening the friendly relations between Croatia and the United States and, therefore, this is an event of unequaled importance in the international life of a country, in this case, of sovereign and independent Croatia.

[Reporter] Thank you very much.

[Unidentified reporter in English] [Question indistinct]

[Tudjman in English] Okay. It was very important, the visit of President Clinton. We talked about all important questions in nowadays situation, from Bosnia to eastern Slavonia, and I think that's a sign of good relations between Croatia and the United States. Thank you.

Granic on Clinton Visit

LD1401115096 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2145 GMT 13 Jan 96

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Tihomir Ladisic at the HTV Television Studio in Zagreb on the "Picture versus Picture" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Ladisic] Mate Granic, Croatian foreign minister, is in the studio with us this evening. Good evening and welcome, Mr. Granic.

[Granic] Good evening.

[Ladisic] Let me first ask you the question our viewers are most interested in: What impact will today's meeting between Clinton and Tudjman have on the most important issue in Croatia, the occupied areas and a solution to that problem?

[Granic] President Clinton himself answered that question when he said that it was in U.S. interests to see a reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem into Croatia's legal system as soon as possible. The United States is continually working with us on that problem. They are helping us and we are expecting a UN Security Council resolution on eastern Slavonia as early as 15 January.

[Ladisic] The statement released after the meeting and the talks between the Croatian and U.S. presidents stressed that the U.S. President announced that the Belgian battalion would take the leading role in eastern Slavonia. The U.S. President was accompanied, among others, by Jacques Klein, the interim administrator. What concrete issues were discussed during the meeting?

[Granic] Several issues were discussed. The main topic was eastern Slavonia and its reintegration. Jacques Klein has been appointed to ensure a peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia. He will be in control of both the military and civilian components. The Belgian battalion will have the leading role in the demilitarization of the military component. As I said, a resolution is expected as early as 15 January. The U.S. side has expressed great optimism about the reintegration. We believe that the area will indeed be demilitarized voluntarily and peacefully, and that there will be no major problems. This was our impression after my talks in Belgrade too.

[Ladisic] Will the U.S. leaders see even closer links between the action in eastern Slavonia and the force and presence of NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the appointment of General Klein and the emphasis on the Belgian battalion?

[Granic] I should say that everything that is happening now is part of the Dayton agreement. On the other hand, it is very important indeed for the United States that the entire Dayton project succeed, which means that complete peace should finally be restored in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that all provisions stemming from the Dayton talks should be implemented. It is clear that peace, stability, and security in the whole region will be in doubt without a peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia. So, the Americans feel it is very important that this project succeed due to U.S. domestic reasons, U.S. leadership throughout the world, and their relations with their allies.

[Ladisic] In connection with the U.S. President's visit to Croatia, in addition to the issue of eastern Slavonia, all news agencies stress the concern about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather, within the [Muslim-Croat] federation. Was that a topic of the talks today and was anything specific agreed in order to speed up the resolution of the current problems?

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[Granic] That was the second topic of the talks in which President Tudjman, on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, gave firm assurances for the federation. He also suggested—which the U.S. side accepted—that an arbitrator arrive as soon as possible to solve urgent, difficult issues on which there are differing views on how to implement certain provisions of the agreement on the federation. President Clinton promised that an arbitrator would arrive as early as next week; that he would stay there and would help solve problems and assist the whole process.

On our part, we will support all positive actions leading to the strengthening of the federation. It is for this purpose that I and Klaus Kinkel will go to Mostar on 14 January. Croatia believes that with these activities the project of the federation, which is of crucial importance for the success of the Dayton talks and the whole project on Bosnia-Herzegovina, can be stabilized.

[Ladisic] Why are Bosniak Muslim leaders—I think there was some talk about it in Tuzla today, Silajdzic stressed it in particular—and part of the international public and politicians still accusing Croatia's policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina of being the main culprit for the new crisis? What were the stances of the U.S. delegation and U.S. President Clinton today?

[Granic] This is certainly not true, and it is necessary to have a balanced stance to the issue. The Americans certainly had a balanced stance today. We will support every effort to strengthen the federation, but there are certainly many things that are agreed upon, but never implemented—our partners and allies in Bosnia-Herzegovina should take note of that too. On the other hand, the Croats have made some specific proposals to solve the problems in Mostar, such as to delineate borders between municipalities. I think a solution should be found as soon as possible through compromises because this is beneficial to both sides. Everything should be done to avoid further escalation and to solve problems urgently because Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot succeed without the strengthening of the federation.

[Ladisic] Let us go back to Croatian-U.S. relations. As we said, they will obviously be the topic of many analyses. In a report from Tuzla, CNN's analysis pointed out what seems to be a fresh rapprochement in Croatian-U.S. relations. Let us see their report together. [passage omitted] Can you analyze, from your diplomatic position, the importance of the meeting between this big, strong, top-level U.S. delegation and the first man of Croatia, the Croatian president, and the Croatian delegation at the highest level? It was more than just a visit and brief talks; it was a new political signal. Where does the signal point and what will it mean for the situation in Croatia and for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Granic] There has been a constant improvement in Croatian-U.S. relations since the Washington agreement. There have been frequent meetings between President Tudjman and President Clinton. There have been important ministerial level meetings, including my official visit to the United States this year.

Of course, this meeting and President Clinton's visit certainly represent the culmination in our relations, and they both have symbolic and practical meaning. Its symbolic meaning is that it confirms the state of relations; its practical meaning is that concrete topics were discussed, not only eastern Slavonia and the federation but also the development of bilateral relations, especially economic relations, including the signing of an agreement on double taxation, the involvement of the Republic of Croatia in NATO's structures—first in the Partnership for Peace project for which the United States gives its full support. The operation of that project, which needs approval of all NATO members, will now follow. Some other important bilateral topics were discussed.

In addition to the meeting between Presidents Clinton and Tudjman, accompanied by delegations, there was another important meeting between President Tudjman and President Clinton alone, which lasted almost half an hour. That gave an even greater importance to this visit. [passage omitted]

All these bilateral meetings reflect the atmosphere of relations between the United States and the Republic of Croatia. We believe that things will not stop there and that the implementation of many conclusions reached today will follow: primarily, the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, the strengthening of the federation, the improvement of economic relations, and the inclusion of the Republic of Croatia in the Partnership for Peace project.

[Ladisic] Mr. Granic, thank you very much for the interview.

[Granic] You are welcome.

Spokesman on Talks with Clinton

LD1301182496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Let us contact our reporter Tihomir Vinkovic who is at Zagreb's Pleso airport to see whether he has learned anything about the talks between President Tudjman and President Clinton.

[Vinkovic] Good evening, dear listeners. Let us hear what Mrs Natasa Rajakovic, spokeswoman of the pres-

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ident of the republic, has to tell us. What have the talks been like so far?

[Rajakovic] They have been exceptionally good, held in a very frank and friendly atmosphere. The talks did not last long enough to address all issues, but the main ones were analyzed: implementation of the Dayton peace agreement and implementation of the basic agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem. They also discussed bilateral relations.

[Vinkovic] This is all for now dear listener. In our later news bulletins we will hear what happened later in the talks between Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, and U.S. President Bill Clinton.

Tudjman Discusses Idea of New Yugoslavia

LD1501151296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1008 GMT 15 Jan 96

[State of the Nation address by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on 15 January, at a joint session of the Croatian Parliament's Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of Counties in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] As I have already said, one of our foreign policy tasks is to join the central European cultural and economic area. Although we have made considerable progress in bilateral relations with the most important European countries, we cannot be pleased at the pace of progress in our efforts to join the European integrational process.

Despite the fact that we have fulfilled all the main conditions required for membership of the Council of Europe and for a cooperation agreement with the EU, and that an agreement has been reached in principle on our joining the PHARE [Poland-Hungary—Actions for Economic Reconversion] program, the final decision on this is nevertheless still being postponed. There is a great deal of evidence to suppose that the decision is being delayed in order to maintain the possibility of exerting further pressure on Croatia, which, due its positions and influence in this part of Europe, is not to the liking of some European players as an obstacle to their political goals—which I have already mentioned—which imply taking Croatia back to the old and even wider Balkan framework.

It is no coincidence that recently some circles have been submitting ideas about the need for a new Yugoslav, Balkan, or Adriatic-Black Sea community of states—of a Euroslavia or a union of southeastern Europe. All this is because of an alleged need for better economic, customs, and transport links between this area and the EU. These ideas stem from the belief that the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was unnecessary and that the region could have been maintained by encouraging democracy and market economy.

These ideas are wrong not just because of the ignorance of historical circumstances and the experiences of people different in their cultural development but because they do not correspond to reality and because they are totally unacceptable to Croatia. [passage omitted]

Granic Sees Eastern Slavonia as Key to Peace

AU1301182796 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 13-14 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Josef Kirchengast: "Mate Granic: 'Eastern Slavonia Is the Key Issue for Normalization'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Klagenfurt—For Zagreb the peaceful reintegration of Serb-controlled eastern Slavonia in Croatia is the main precondition for complete normalization of relations with the FRY. "The most important thing for us is a positive attitude by Belgrade toward this process, which was agreed in the Erdut accord," Croatia's Foreign Minister Mate Granic stated on Thursday evening [11 January] in Klagenfurt, where he held business talks with Carinthian Governor Christof Zernatto and representatives of the Hypo Bank.

Granic said that Belgrade could show good will by withdrawing militia leader "Arkan," who is wanted as a war criminal, and his units from eastern Slavonia.

During their latest meeting in Belgrade he, Granic, spoke with Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic "with gloves off," Granic told a small circle. Milosevic only understands clear language. He must realize "that we can get back eastern Slavonia in two days, and then he will have another refugee problem."

For Granic it is out of the question that Croatia might renounce the cape of Prevlaka in southern Dalmatia. Milosevic broached this issue again and again during the peace negotiations, "but our no stands firm." Prevlaka also controls access to the bay of Kotor, where the FRY has a navy base.

All in all, Granic sees the chances for normalizing relations with Belgrade as positive. The UN Security Council's criticism of the Croatian Army for human rights violations during the reconquest of the Krajina is taken very seriously. Croatia intends to fulfill all Security Council demands and to cooperate fully with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Mistakes were made in the military operation in the Krajina "because we did not take care, and then bad things happened," Granic admitted. All Serb refugees, who recognize the Croatian Constitution, may return. In contrast to initial plans, no deadline is set for returning

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their property. A corresponding law is to be adopted next week, Granic stated.

Granic Condemns World's 'Double Standards'

AU1201165596 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Dec 95 -1 Jan 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, by Olga Ramljak; place and date not given: "Clinton, Yeltsin, Kohl, Major, and Chirac Have Asked Dr. Tudjman Not to Go Into the Storm!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Decision and Support

[Ramljak] What happened on the immediate eve of Operation Storm?

[Granic] Many mediators, primarily Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Galbraith, tried to persuade the Serbs to agree to negotiations but without success. The Serbs were just trying to buy time. The day before Storm, at a VONS [Council of Defense and National Security] session, President Tudjman read out messages from President Clinton, Yeltsin, Kohl, Chirac, and Major. All of them asked Croatia not to take any military action. President Tudjman was fully and unanimously supported by all the members of the VONS. The decision was normally the president's because the VONS is only an advisory body, but it showed full understanding for the decision. At 11 PM, we first informed the United States, then Russia and UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia]. I went to Split, where I was supposed to wait for French Foreign Minister de Charette, whom we did not want to take to Zagreb, so as not to endanger him in any way in Operation Storm.

Operation Storm was a real surprise and its success was an even bigger surprise. Many distinguished world players consider Operation Storm a legitimate Croatian act. And hardly anyone has strongly criticized Operation Storm officially.

[Ramljak] We did not get such a good reaction after Storm, though, did we?

[Granic] Some incidents that occurred after Storm should be very definitely condemned. Burning, looting, individual cases of murder—there is no justification for all these, but it should also be mentioned that it was not as the figures claim on the other side. Croatia has suffered 10,000 casualties in this war. Croatia is still searching for 2,825 missing persons, not to mention the number of burnt and looted homes. However, that is no justification for what happened after Storm.

In short, Storm strategically strengthened Croatia but also diminished its reputation in the world with what happened after the military action. Those who committed crimes after Storm are criminals who operated against the interests of the state. Meanwhile, I would like to say first that we have to fight for law and order and respect for human and minority rights, first of all in our own interests. The quality and credibility of a state depend on the extent of observance of human and minority rights. That this is so has also been confirmed by the most recent report of Butrus Butrus-Ghali, UN Security Council secretary general [title as published], which strongly condemned Croatia, although we do not agree with the timing of its release or with the many distortions in it.

[Ramljak] Where do these double standards come from? Croatia was condemned after Storm with every argument, but the international community was not so explicit when the Croats and Muslims were suffering in the war.

[Granic] You are right. Croatia has often been put under pressure because of the balance. There have been 50,000 killed in the conflict with the Russian Army in Chechnya, but Russia on the Security Council favors putting pressure on Croatia. Little countries are being used in relations between the great powers, but, although it is unjust, I repeat, it is in our own interest to try hard to establish law and order, particularly observing human and minority rights in line with the demands of the international community. Unfortunately, we will encounter these double standards in the future, too, so we must count on this and be prepared to give the strongest possible support for our own demands and allow the minimum possible arguments against us.

Denied Access to Banja Luka

[Ramljak] Is the international pressure on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to halt the military actions against the Bosnian Serbs in the Banja Luka region also one of these double standards?

[Granic] Storm brought about a new balance of power in this area, which, along with the successes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulted in the U.S. peace initiative. It was important for that initiative to keep Milosevic as a negotiator. The fall of Banja Luka could also have meant the fall of Slobodan Milosevic because 300,000 refugees would have set off for Serbia. The international community took the view that this could have meant losing the chance of a peaceful solution and losing Serbia from the Western sphere of influence.

[Ramljak] But have all the international assessments have proved wrong, such as those for both Flash and Storm?

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[Granic] Correct. And I must stress that eastern Slavonia at that stage was not within the plan of operations.

[Ramljak] Dayton is still a mystery. Were there any secret negotiations or secret signatures?

[Granic] The mystery surrounding Dayton is the result of the need of some individuals to overemphasize their own roles or to give themselves a significance that they did not have in that diplomatic operation. There were no secret signatures, nor were there any secret negotiations. The U.S. diplomats were holding negotiations on the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the demarcation lines. The German diplomats were in charge of the negotiations on Mostar and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Americans were holding talks on normalizaing relations with Belgrade. All this has been published. The same is true of Paris, where what had been agreed in Dayton was signed. Only the talks between Croatia and the FRY regarding missing persons were held without a mediator.

[Ramljak] Eastern Slavonia was not the subject of talks in Dayton, but the Erdut-Zagreb agreement is part of that diplomatic process. Can you tell us a little more about it?

[Granic] Croatia, naturally, wanted to solve the question of eastern Slavonia immediately. It is true that the Erdut-Zagreb agreement appeared in the atmosphere of Dayton but that Croatian territory was not discussed in Dayton. Milosevic, after all, did not oppose the Erdut agreement, but only asked for it to be a, as it were, softer agreement so as to avoid the exodus of some 140,000 Serbs, which he claims is the number of the Serbs there today. As for Serbia, Croatia has been given written guarantees from the United States in the interpretation of the three main provisions of that agreement: the establishment of Croatian authorities, the application of the Croatian legal system on that territory, and the control of Croatia's internationally recognized borders.

[Ramljak] According to the Serbian interpretation, the police there will be established according the present ethnic structure of the population.

[Granic] The police will be in line with the 1991 census, in the transitional administration Croatia will have its representative, the local Serbs will have their representative, as well as the local Croats and Hungarians, and it is also known where the Croatian border is—on the Danube.

[Ramljak] Were there also misunderstandings over the issue of the normalization of relations, more precisely, regarding mutual recognition and the succession?

[Granic] There are no secrets there, either. Croatia sent a letter to Belgrade, with an interpretation of Article 4, which deals with the succession in case of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition, therefore, does not affect property relations, but we need the normalization of relations because of the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem.

Belgrade Offered Tripartite Exchange

[Ramljak] What about this offer of a tripartite exchange of territories, in which Prevlaka again comes into question?

[Granic] Belgrade arrived in Dayton with this idea but did not condition the negotiations on the demand. Croatia warned Belgrade that the situation was not the same as in 1992, when the Vance-Owen plan envisaged the creation of a union of three republics, which resulted in the Serb and Muslim demands to gain access to the sea. The situation is now different. Croatia wants no changes to the borders nor does the Croatian public. For such a process it is also necessary to call a referendum, that is to get a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to initiate such an action. The statements of President Bulatovic and Minister Milutinovic are only for domestic consumption. There is no document that mentions Prevlaka, nor does the initialed Dayton agreement on the normalization of relations mention it. Croatia is not prepared for any kind of exchange of territories and left Dayton as a whole, with Baranja, Vukovar, and Prevlaka.

[Ramljak] Nevertheless, in Paris such an exchange of territories was set down as a condition for signing the mutual recognition of the two states? Was that a surprise for Croatian diplomacy?

[Granic] Conditioning the signing on such a request came more as a surprise for the international community than for us, because we knew the Serb negotiators and their positions better.

[Ramljak] If you had to sum up the results from Dayton and Paris, what would you particularly stress?

[Granic] Croatia left those negotiations within its own borders and with an agreement on the reintegration of the still occupied territories, while only six months ago nobody gave Croatia any chance of getting them back soon. We have completely secured our southern border from Kostajnica to Prevlaka and the constituent position of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through the Council for Cooperation this security will be further strengthened. Furthermore, the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] has remained a legal army, and the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has been transformed

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into a legal authority in the Federation and the cantons. Bosnia-Herzegovina will become the largest construction site in Europe with an open possibility to integrate into the financial and political system of Europe together with Croatia.

Soon, Croatia will become a member of Partnership for Peace. We would be even happier if the Bosanska Posavina had been incorporated into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now that it is not so, we should emphasize that all human rights are granted to those who return to their homes and that the Bosanska Posavina is completely surrounded by the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Croatia is in a exceptionally favorable geostrategic position to protect its fellow countrymen.

Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—Strategic Interest

[Ramljak] What is the strategic interest of Croatian diplomacy in 1996?

[Granic] Our strategic interest is to normalize our relations with Belgrade and our neighbors. That also includes Slovenia, where we want to apply civilized methods in solving disputes, and Croatia is also ready, if that fails, for international arbitration. Those are, as well, the preconditions of the European integration processes to which we aspire. In the future, Croatia wants to have all its borders stable and to meet the European demand to open all transport routes through our country. Croatia, however, does not want to talk about any integration into the economic area bordering Bulgaria [Serbia], as people like to put it. We want to have settled relations with our neighbors, of which we find relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Federation, strategically important. That will enable us to turn as soon as possible to reconstruction and development. Once more, I want to emphasize that this implies the observance of human and minority rights as the country's wealth and investment for the future. Our objective is also to strengthen the position of Croatia in international relations.

[Ramljak] You mentioned relations with the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina as a special strategic interest. If it is in the joint interest of the Croats and Muslims, how is it that there are arguments about majority rule there?

[Granic] It is in the process of creation a strong Federation and that process is not simple. Everybody must accept his obligations toward the Federation, both the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That process is painful, but it is in the strategic interest of both nations, so they will have to do everything to carry that process through. The Croats must lose their fear of majority rule and the Muslims must maintain their identity, but also understand that their existence and future are certain only in cooperation with the Republic of Croatia. The implementation of the peace agreement will assist in this. The military component is beyond dispute, but it will take much more time and effort to restore mutual trust and to hold free elections. It is very important for the Croats to return to their homes wherever possible, particularly qualified people, because the fewer there are the harder it will be to implement the rights granted by the Dayton agreement.

[Ramljak] What does it mean to reach an agreement by civilized methods, when we are talking about unresolved questions with the neighboring and friendly Slovenia?

[Granic] We will try to do everything that we can to reach agreement on the maritime border and Ljubljanska Banka. These are the two disputed issues and, as for everything else, we have already largely found the solutions. The intensive contacts will start immediately at the very beginning of the next year. I must emphasize that these questions have been more politicized, so they are more difficult to resolve, and when I say civilized methods, it means mediation and arbitration, if there is no agreement. There is no reason not to reach agreement because our two countries have increased trade and there have been no incidents in relations over this last year; moreover, we have been constantly consulting over the succession question and negotiations with Italy and will continue to do so in the future.

[Ramljak] NATO's arrival in this area also means the establishment of new relations between Croatia and NATO. What can you say about this?

[Granic] I believe that we will be joining the Partnership for Peace in 1996. Croatia will be striving to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem.

We have signed an agreement on the deployment of NATO troops, which, according to international conventions, envisages exemption from many duties, but Croatia should nevertheless profit from the agreement. As well as the advantages, however, there are also difficulties, such as the cost of the peace operation.

[Ramljak] Will Croatia finally enter into European integration in the coming year?

[Granic] Before the Dayton agreement, Croatian territory had been excluded from the EU's development plans. Things have changed in the meantime, but we must still put ourselves forward, together with our

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neighbors, for things such as the planning of the construction of roads from central to southern Europe, including all our priority routes. We expect a defrosting of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program and admission to the Council of Europe in the first half of 1996. All those processes will depend upon us and there will be more pressures on Croatia, until they see the development of the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. Croatia expects no problems there. We are ready to spare no pains to reach a solution through negotiations.

Major Problems Are Behind Us

[Ramljak] What can you say to Croatia's citizens? What awaits them in 1996?

[Granic] There will be a lot of work to do, but the major problems are, fortunately, behind us. In the second half of 1996 we will be feeling the direct benefit from the processes that lie behind us. In April 1996, there will be a conference on the reconstruction of the Republic of Croatia, and it is up to diplomacy to follow the state moves in that sphere, too. It is crucial for Croatia to normalize relations with its neighbors and accept European standards. That will enable it to enter into integration and intensify its economic development, establish relations with the great powers, with countries where there is a large Croatian diaspora, and with the Islamic bloc. In all those activities, Croatia must never forget that it is a central European and Mediterranean country and that those are the terms of reference for its development.

[Ramljak] When can we expect the beginning of the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube basin?

[Granic] According to our most recent talks with U.S. officials, including my conversation with Warren Christopher a couple of days ago, in the first half of January we can expect General Klein to be appointed chief administrator of the transitional administration and a UN Security Council resolution on the additional deployment of peace forces, which will then reach a total of 5,000. When the peace forces arrive, the process of demilitarization will begin and that process will be the key test for the success of the whole operation.

[Ramljak] How do you intend to continue the process of normalization with the FRY (that is, Serbia and Montenegro)?

[Granic] We have accepted the proposal of the United States to exchange ministerial visits, so that my visit to Belgrade can be expected in the first half of January. It is our wish to continue the process of normalization and successfully to finish the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. That is a basic Croatian interest, as well as an interest of the international community. Peaceful reintegration of Croatia's Danube basin can be of essential help to the success of the whole operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 4]

Mikelic: Persona Non Grata

[Ramljak] Will Croatia agree to Mikelic's [former head of rebel Serb administration in Croatia] appointment as FRY ambassador to Croatia?

[Granic] Croatia will not agree to this. However, this is only an answer in theory because we have only heard about his candidacy from the media. If Croatia receives such a proposal from the FRY, it will not agree.

[Box, p 5]

Let the Tribunal Make the Decision

[Ramljak] The International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has brought charges against Serbs and Croats. No member of any Muslim units has been accused. How can such a situation assist in the creation of mutual trust in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Granic] The basic issue is for the Muslims to withdraw their charges against Croats and leave them to the Hague. And we expect more balanced approach from The Hague. The cleverest decision would be not to bring charges mutually between the nations that have to live together in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia has forwarded to The Hague all the data collected on the crimes, including those that Muslims committed against Croats. The best idea would be to leave it all to the International Tribunal. According to the data available to us, charges can also be expected against a group of Muslims for war crimes.

Foreign Ministry Calls Mostar Crisis 'Priority'

AU1101151896 Paris AFP in English 1501 GMT 11 Jan 96

[Report by Dimitri Kochko]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan 11 (AFP)—Mostar was tense Thursday [11 January], just ahead of a visit to the southeast Bosnian town, by Croatia's defence minister. [passage omitted]

In Zagreb, the Croatian Foreign Ministry said an improvement in the situation in Mostar was a "priority."

"It would not be in our interest if the problem was not settled quickly," a ministry spokesman said, as he

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confirmed that Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic would go to Mostar on Sunday with German counterpart Klaus Kinkel.

"Isolated incidents cannot be allowed to turned into a serious conflict," the spokesman added. [passage omitted]

Government Closes Zagreb's Bosnian Refugee Camps

LD1501203096 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Herzegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Our Zagreb correspondent Nada al-Isa reports on Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees or, it is preferable to say, those who are in the capital of Croatia, where the Croatian state authorities have decided to close down all refugee camps in the Zagreb area and to move the refugees to a camp in Gasinci.

[al-Isa] Tempo construction company workers, who have been given the task of destroying the camps, have already arrived at refugee camps in Zagreb. People are being threatened that they will be moved by the use of force, the use of the police and dogs. [passage omitted]

The Croatian Refugee Bureau has not informed the Refugee Department of the Bosnian embassy in Zagreb about this. The information has been sent only to refugee camps, as a result of which panic has spread. People are phoning the embassy in Zagreb. They are asking to spend at least the month of Ramadan in peace, not to be moved then. [passage omitted]

Beli Manastir Decides To Settle 'RSK' Refugees

AU1201073496 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 11 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] At today's session of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly, the program for the settlement and housing of the expelled people from the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] was adopted. One of the decisions was that, apart from the authorities, all the other structures in the Baranja area should also be involved in the implementation of this large-scale and very important project. Petko Koprivica has a report.

[Koprivica] Those expelled from the occupied parts of the RSK who are accommodated throughout Serbia would be more than interested in working and living in Baranja. In the past month, only just over 350 persons who used to live in the western parts of the Krajina have arrived in Beli Manastir Municipality. There are now over 1,200 displaced persons here.

It is obvious that the Serb people wish to be in complete control of the area of Srem-Baranja Province, which, by historical right and heritage, indeed belongs to them. They, therefore, have no intention of moving out; on the contrary, they intend to have as many of their people present in the area as possible.

These are some of the elements that were emphasized at the session of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly when the program for the settlement and housing of the displaced persons was being adopted. It was emphasized that Baranja can accommodate at least 5,000 more of the people who are currently in the FRY, where they have the status of refugees. However, this will require considerable financial investment. Nevertheless, it was said that the help of the international community and humanitarian organizations, as well as the modest potentials of this area and other sources of financial support, will be taken into account. Someone said during the discussion that this is the only way for the settlement program to be implemented in accordance with the present idea.

Therefore, implementation of this action should be carried out in a highly organized and responsible way, and all the state and political structures should be fully involved, since much of what has been happening lately on the international political scene as far as the peace process in the former Yugoslavia is concerned is to the benefit of the Serb people in Srem-Baranja Province.

The Erdut Agreement was put together in such a way that it is possible to interpret in various ways. The pessimists and the low-spirited, as well as the enemies of the Serb people, believe it to represent capitulation. However, those who view things realistically and most common-sense people see the Erdut Agreement as an excellent starting point for the domination of power of the majority, that is, the Serbs, to be actualized in Srem-Baranja Province in a peaceful way, with the mediation of international forces.

The stories that the issue is the peaceful reintegration of this province into the Croatian state and that that it is the reason why a UN administration will be established here are completely unfounded. The future administrator, (Jacques Paul Klein), will certainly not come here for a mandate that will last only a year or two, since practice has shown that a UN administration stays in certain regions for 10 or more years. The task of Mr. (Klein) and his mission will primarily be reflected in the implementation of the international conventions on human rights and on the inviolability of the use of one's property. The program for the settlement and housing the expelled in the Baranja area was drawn up accordingly.

One of the obligations of the UN administration will be to make it possible for all the expelled Serbs from the

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western parts of Krajina to live in this area in peace if they wish to do so. This was also regulated by the Erdut Agreement.

The diplomacy and determination of the state and political structures of the Serb side, that is, the authorities that have taken on the responsibility for the future of the Srem-Baranja Province, are now on the move.

The program for settling 5,000 displaced persons in Baranja that was, together with some annexes, adopted today at the session of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly is comprehensive and certainly bears an important political dimension. At any rate, its implementation—at the rate that is stated in the program—will be a big and difficult job, but possible to carry out.

It was therefore concluded that implementation of the program for the settlement of displaced persons should be started as early as tomorrow—selectively and in accordance with the priorities as stated in the program. There is enough room for all the displaced persons who wish to live in Serb Baranja, and the economy and all other areas of creative endeavor here need many professionals and hard workers.

Official on Displaced Persons

AU1501200296 Beli Manastir Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 Jan 96

[Interview with Vaso Zigic, president of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipality, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly has adopted a program to settle and house displaced persons from the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina. The implementation of this program, which has already begun, will require the involvement of the entire state as well as political, economic, and other structures in Baranja.

The settlement of displaced persons and refugees, of which there are already approximately 1,200 in Baranja, is also regulated by the Erdut Agreement. We discussed this issue with Vaso Zigic, president of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipality.

[Zigic] The starting point for the program lies in the fact that the agreement entitles the representatives of the Srijem-Baranja province and the [word indistinct] to make it possible for all displaced persons from the Republic of Croatia—that is, the western parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina—who wish to settle in this area to do so. Therefore, we will fulfill their wishes and create the main precondition for their immediate integration into the economic system of this area.

Priorities were determined at yesterday's session. A certain amount of (?creativity) will be present in this program since the Baranja area is an agricultural area, and we need experts in agriculture, forestry, water resources management, and other parts of food industry and agriculture. Hoping to [word indistinct] the personnel structure, we will aim to [word indistinct] the settlement and housing program as one of the important contributions to the entire Serb corps.

[Correspondent] The settlement and housing of the anticipated 5,000 displaced persons will require considerable material means. Mr. Zigic, which sources of financial support are being taken into account?

[Zigic] One of the constituent elements of the program for the settlement and housing is certainly [words indistinct], which [words indistinct]. It has specified funds necessary for this program. Moreover, we intend to [words indistinct] finances to reconstruct all the housing units that have been identified as possible housing units for the settlement. We are, therefore, taking into account mostly our own finances. As far as the financial support for individuals in reconstructing the housing units they will be using is concerned, we are counting on the help of international organizations and the help of the economic organizations from Serbia that have expressed the wish to help this action and the reconstruction of the [words indistinct] of the Serb people from the Republic of Croatia.

The financial aspect of the program is very interesting; we believe that it is precisely with the involvement of all the sources I have mentioned that we will solve the problem of settlement and housing of 5,000 displaced Serbs from the Republic of Croatia—that is, western parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

[Correspondent] Do you know what the position of the UN administration concerning the settlement and housing program is, and what do you think about the stories that the Erdut Agreement in fact means the acceptance of peaceful reintegration of this area into Croatia?

[Zigic] The fact that the representatives of the Beli Manastir municipality have in the past four years maintained permanent contacts with the representatives of international organizations [words indistinct] the UN, shows that adequate attention is being devoted to this area. After the signing of the Erdut Agreement, these contacts became even more frequent, since the transitory administration and UN representatives [words indistinct] their job. I think that relations with the

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representatives of international organizations and the international community are very cooperative and good.

We are aware of the fact that the signed agreement, defined as it is, must be implemented. It was stated unilaterally that the agreement as it is must be implemented, since it was signed, but the word reintegration is not mentioned in it, which means that the representatives of the Srijem-Baranja province and the representatives of Croatia should not use the term reintegration, particularly [words indistinct] the term peaceful reintegration.

We also have certain indications that the international community looks favorably upon the settlement program, simply wishing that the exodus that has befallen the former Yugoslavia, particularly as far as the Serbs are concerned—since 700,000 of them have experienced exodus during the past four years, and the latest one, from 3 August to [words indistinct], when about 250,000 Serbs from the western parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina were expelled from their homes and have nothing of their own now—and to help take care of these people.

Media React to Accusations Against Tudjman

LD1301133196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1303 GMT 13 Jan 96

[Report by Sava Tomasevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 13 (TANJUG)—Accusations published in Croatia's only independent daily NOVI LIST that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has 'definitely shown he is a brutal dictator,' have prompted a sharp reaction by the pro-government media.

NOVI LIST commentator Roman Latkovic said earlier this week that 1995 would be remembered by the 'final unmasking of Franjo Tudjman as a man who leads the country into ruin.'

One does not need to be a prophet to see that 'Croatia headed by Tudjman is being reduced to a dictatorship, a mafia-type banana republic and everybody's worst nightmare,' said the daily published in Rijeka, the biggest town and economic centre of the Adriatic peninsula of Istria, under control of the opposition Istrian Democratic Alliance.

NOVI LIST said that 'parliament, constitutional court, opposition, people who use their minds, free media, everybody had to do their best to remove Franjo Tudjman from power,' and that this had to be done at 'early elections, under a constitutional court decision, in a referendum, under a parliament decision, in any way because Tudjman is leading us into ruin.'

Croatian State Television (HTV) has reacted to the text with a very sharp commentary in prime-time news, saying that 'certain forces personified by Roman Latkovic have taken off their masks for the first time in free Croatia.'

The forces 'have for the first time launched an open attack and went so far that one can instantly include them into Croatia's enemy,' HTV said.

The HTV commentary said that the Rijeka journalist had 'in a putchist manner, without laws of principles of democracy, simply liquidated the state president, who was elected several times.'

The pro-government Zagreb daily VECERNJI LIST joined the dispute by saying that an 'astonishing amount of hatred' had come from the Rijeka daily.

VECERNJI LIST said that this had been the 'text of a political programme, calling for an immediate change of authority.'

Latkovic responded to these reactions by saying in NOVI LIST that Croatian top authorities were settling accounts with one journalist, one article and one independent paper.

He said that it was unimaginable in the democratic world for a 'state to attack individuals and their freedom of speech so publicly, shamelessly and brutally.'

Latkovic said that HTV's commentary was a 'Bolshevik attack on one man and one paper, which proves that it is about to become a brutal dictatorship (if it is not one already).'

The response of NOVI LIST, known for its criticism of many steps by Croatian authorities, will not be the end of the dispute, because there have been many accusations.

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Gligorov, Slovenia's Kucan Discuss Yugoslav Assets

LD1501145896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1253 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 15 January (SRNA)—Kiro Gligorov, the president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], met with Slovene President Milan Kucan today. They discussed developing and improving relations between the two states created after the breakup of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The two presidents harmonized their stances on the succession and the right to inherit the property of the former Yugoslavia.

Crvenkovski on EU Diplomatic Ties, UNPREDEP

AU1101151196 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Jan 96 p 2

[Statement by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski; place and date not given: "Step Toward Full Cooperation With the EU"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the European Union, Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski gave the following statement for the Macedonian mass media:

"Today's decision of the EU for the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia represents a very big step for the international affirmation of the Republic of Macedonia and opens possibilities of our full cooperation with the EU and its member countries. This is one of the three key activities that must form the base for our cooperation with the EU. The second activity is our admission to the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, on which the Political Committee of the European Parliament made a positive decision yesterday. We expect it to be fully completed by the end of the month. The third activity is the agreement on cooperation with the EU, for which the Commission for Negotiations was given a mandate last month. We expect the negotiations to start at the beginning of February and to be completed in a very short period of time, by which the formal and legal base for cooperation between Macedonia and the EU will be created. Today's establishment of diplomatic relations represents a sign of the EU's willingness to follow our wishes for our further rapprochement, and this is a fact that has been marked in the mandate for negotiations and cooperation. We expect that our ambassador to the EU will soon present his letter of credence soon and that, in due time, an EU embassy will be opened in Macedonia."

Asked whether it is true that Mr. Tosevski is travelling to New York today and how true it is that Cyrus Vance will propose a reference name for the country, "New Macedonia," the minister replied that he is not familiar with the source of the information. "The activities of Ambassador Tosevski are within the framework of what has been previously agreed and published. This is a regular meeting in New York, and reports regarding some decisions of the Security Council that Macedonia cannot accept at all—and I believe that not a single Security Council's country member can accept having a solution imposed by it, particularly regarding something that is the subject of negotiations within its framework and auspices—are pure speculation. Our view is clear, it has been repeated numerous times before, and there are no changes in this regard. I think that it has been presented clearly to everyone that we will not accept and we cannot accept any arbitration regarding the question in dispute. This was cleared up over two years ago, and I see no grounds for such information."

Asked whether the reason for Kofi Annan's visit is, among other things, the announcement of the possible withdrawal of UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] mission from Macedonia, Crvenkovski responded:

"The reason for Kofi Annan's visit is in the framework of the regular visits of the deputy UN secretary general, as the man who is in charge of peace operations. The visit was scheduled much earlier. As far as the UNPREDEP mandate in Macedonia is concerned, by the end of this or at the beginning of the next month, we expect the question of the full independence of the operations regarding Macedonia to be viewed. This means that the operations will be under complete command from New York. As for their stay and mandate, I see no disputes here, and this will not be a topic of discussion with Kofi Annan."

UN Envoy: UNPREDEP Mandate Extended

AU1201202196 Skopje MIC in English 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The mandate of UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has been extended another six months. At the end of that period, I am certain that the Security Council will reassess the situation and decide what further action to take. However, allow me to add that it is not unusual for the mandate to be extended six months, and then to be extended again," Kofi Annan, UN General Under

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Secretary and special UN envoy to former Yugoslavia stated in the exclusive interview for the weekly PULS.

In answering the question as to whether he believes UNPREDEP's mandate should be extended in the coming period, and whether there are even minimal chances of a threat to the Macedonia's security, Annan stated: "I believe that the UN peacekeeping forces are playing a big role, which has proven to be successful so far. I am convinced the member-states will not withdraw their troops before time, and it is also possible that the mandate might be extended after the present six months."

In reference to the various estimates as to UNPREDEP's remaining in Macedonia and whether those estimates reflect the interests of some of the great powers, Annan says: "I wouldn't say that is connected with the politics of the great powers. I believe it was a question of an evaluation of the friendly governments of what has been achieved, and whether the mandate should be extended. I believe that it was not brought under the influence of the great powers, and they are also reviewing the question of sending greater forces as a contribution to the continuation of the mandate, in a much wider context."

Gligorov Thanks Diplomatic Corps for Performance

AU1201080896 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 11 Jan 96 p 5

[President Gligorov's statement at a holiday reception for the diplomatic corps in Skopje; date not given: "I Am Coming Back Next Week"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "As you can see, I am already active, and I can inform you that, starting next week, I will continue to perform my presidential duties in full," President Gligorov pointed out at the reception that he organized on the occasion of the New Year and Christmas holidays for the diplomatic representatives in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

President Gligorov said as follows: "We have passed another year filled with events that will leave deep traces in the history of this region, but also at large in the world. This was a year in which the international community gathered forces to prevent the further spreading of the most outrageous and horrible war conflict in Europe after World War II, by announcing peace in Bosnia as the only alternative and guarantee for peace in Europe. All of us, all the peaceloving countries and people in the world, must do our best for the implementation of the agreements, for the governing of peace.

"The last year was extremely important for the rising international affirmation of our country," Gligorov said. "You have witnessed this development, and in addition to this, in the process of Macedonia's inclusion in the European and world trends, you have incorporated your direct and personal contribution. The Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, and all the citizens of our country, pay tribute and gratitude to you for this."

"I would like the difficulties and problems with which we were occupied in the last year never to be repeated again," Gligorov said. "We see the guarantee for this in the accord that we signed with the neighborly Republic of Greece, whose implementation is in progress. Moreover, lifting the embargo against our northern neighbor is another possibility for economic and every other kind of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with which we are interested in normalizing relations as quickly as possible and in constructing cooperation between two equal countries. We are on the right road to promoting relations with the other neighbors as well, with the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Albania, in a way that will serve the lasting interests of the nations, for peace, stability, and progress in the Balkans," President Gligorov emphasized.

"Finally, I have to recall the criminal attempt that took place on 3 October last year, when my life was attacked. Fortunately, it failed. Our country proved to be ready to endure such attacks. However, that was an occasion for other demonstrations—we, and the entire world, could see the great support and sympathy of a large number of statesmen and outstanding personalities from the entire world; we could see how many friends we have on all four sides of the world. I would personally like to thank you, dear friends, for your direct and humane performance during my recovery," said President Gligorov in announcing his return to his presidential duties.

UK Ambassador Tony Milson delivered his welcome speech on behalf of the diplomatic corps in the Republic of Macedonia. He said as follows: "Allow me, first of all, on behalf of the diplomatic corps in Macedonia, to express our satisfaction at seeing you tonight. I do not wish to go back to the black times, but with the beginning of the new year our thoughts are inevitably going back to that horrible day last October. On that day lives were lost by the hands of evil terrorists. However, I believe that I am speaking on behalf of all those present here tonight when I say that the Macedonian people are not the only ones to be grateful for the fact that you were spared and that you are here with us this evening. At Christmastime it is not uncommon to talk about miracles. Your recovery is a celebration for all those who wish peace and stability in the Balkans."

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Ambassador Milson mentioned Macedonia's admission in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the promotion of relations with Greece, and he praised the resolution of the Macedonian Government after last October to implement fully the commitments deriving from the Interim Accord with Greece. "The fact that the short deadlines were fully respected in spite of the terrorist act speaks about the wisdom and maturity of the Macedonian authority and people," said Milson.

At the end, ambassador Milson said: "I can promise you that in 1996 my colleagues and I will continue to work, develop, and deepen the relations between Macedonia and the countries that we represent. I personally believe that this will be a pleasant and nice task—because it is difficult and nearly impossible for me to think of another country in which I have felt so much at home."

Greek Liaison Office Officially Opens in Skopje

LD1101212596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1606 GMT 11 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 11 Jan (TANJUG)—Stevo Crvenkovski, foreign minister of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today received the credentials from Ambassador Aleksandr Maljas, head of the Greek liaison office in Skopje.

Maljas presented the letters of credence from Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias to Crvenkovski, whereby he officially opened Athens' diplomatic mission in the capital of FYROM. [passage omitted]

It is expected in Skopje that the FYROM liasion office in Athens will open next week.

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President on Political Crisis, EU, NATO

BR1101151296 Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Jan 96 p 3

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Jan Krauze in Warsaw; date not given: "Kwasniewski: Our Democracy Can Emerge Stronger From the Political Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krauze] You are making your first foreign tour at a time when your country is weakened by a serious domestic crisis. Won't that complicate your task?

[Kwasniewski] It is true that things could be easier, but there is no need to exaggerate. I represent a country that has just experienced another year of strong economic growth. Our country has come through a difficult electoral campaign but has shown its maturity with society increasingly involved in the democratic process. I also represent a country which has reasonably good relations with its foreign partners. Of course there are some political difficulties, especially at the top with the accusations being leveled at [Prime Minister] Jozef Oleksy. We have to remain calm, and continue to respect the legal and parliamentary procedures. Polish democracy can emerge stronger from all these difficulties.

[Krauze] Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski assumed great responsibility when they decided to publicly accuse Mr. Oleksy of spying. According to the information we have and the statements of several members of the parliamentary commission of inquiry, this looks to be a very serious matter. Do you also feel that you are responsible for seeing that this business is cleared up so that no doubt remains?

[Kwasniewski] Absolutely. The business is in the hands of the military prosecutor. He must be able to lead an independent investigation and not be put under any pressure. Concerning any details that may have been revealed by certain members of the commission of inquiry, you have to remember that members of the opposition do not necessarily have the same point of view as the coalition deputies. You have to remain as objective as possible.

[Krauze] Was the interior minister right to make the affair public before leaving his post?

[Kwasniewski] When the documents were brought to my attention—or should I say, documents giving information regarding this affair (the president-elect was informed of the affair by the interior minister on about 11 December, almost two weeks before he officially took office—LE MONDE editor's note), I suggested that the necessary steps be taken, but discreetly, so as not to harm the interests of Poland. I also suggested that Mr. Milczanowski should remain in charge of this business as interior minister.

[Krauze] So you suggested that Mr. Milczanowski could retain his post in the government?

[Kwasniewski] As president-elect I had no decisionmaking power. However, I did believe it was necessary to look into the affair and that it should not be taken lightly. If Mr. Milczanowski considered it sufficiently serious then [I said] he could remain in his job. Unfortunately he agreed with President Walesa that he would stand down. Mr. Walesa was responsible for that.

[Krauze] But was not another solution proposed, whereby Mr. Oleksy would resign discreetly and the affair would not be made public?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, some people did suggest that option.

[Krauze] And you refused?

[Kwasniewski] We live in a democratic country which respects certain procedures. We cannot rely on simple accusations made on the basis of imprecise documents.

[Krauze] You announced in advance that your first official visit would be to Germany. Why did you also decide to visit France?

[Kwasniewski] I wanted to visit both of Poland's very important partners and I wanted to do so as soon as possible. This is a way of demonstrating the continuity of Polish foreign policy. I am making these visits in the context of what is called the "Weimar triangle" (an informal association linking France, Germany, and Poland—LE MONDE editor's note). My next visit will be to Brussels.

[Krauze] Members of your political party have suggested that this triangle could become a square by extending it to Russia...

[Kwasniewski] No, I think that instead of looking to extend something that is very informal it would be better instead to give it more substance.

[Text] [Krauze] Due to the situation in the western countries and Poland's domestic situation, have Poland's perspectives for membership of the EU and NATO not been pushed back?

[Kwasniewski] Why should the process slow down? The decision to enlarge NATO and the EU has been made. The decisions made at the recent Madrid summit whereby talks with the countries of Central Europe could start at the same time as negotiations with Malta and Cyprus were positive from our point of view. Because of the elections in Russia and in the United

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States, 1996 is a very important year for the European institutions and for NATO. I will strive to explain to those of our partners concerned by this enlargement (of NATO—LE MONDE editor's note) that it is in no way directed against them. That will take a lot of diplomatic effort.

With regard to Poland's plans for joining the EU, more than anything else it should be stressed that in five years we have come an unimaginably long way. Also, this enlargement is a vision of Europe. Our country has been around for long enough in a divided Europe and has paid quite a high price for it. After the first three stages which were the overthrow of Communism, the reunification of Germany, and the accession to the EU of previously neutral countries such as Finland and Austria, now we have to move into the fourth phase which is enlargement to the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

In Poland itself, 1996 will be a very important year since there are no elections on the horizon and because growth is continuing, and that will help the reforms. What is more, we will be implementing a very important set of reforms for social security, the health system, the mines, as well as setting up a ministry for European integration.

[Krauze] Why did you not take advantage of the replacement of three ministers to show your desire for political openness which you expressed during the electoral campaign?

[Kwasniewski] It is hard to be open when the opposition is accusing the prime minister of spying. There again, I believe that it is better to have politically uniform governments since then it is easier for it to justify its actions to the electorate.

[The 11 January issue of the French daily Paris LA TRIBUNE DESFOSSES on page 5 in an interview with the Polish president by Daniel Vigneron adds: "[Vigneron] You were a member of the Polish Unified Workers' Party (a Communist party), which is where you underwent your training. What kind of relations do you have with the Russian Communists?"

"[Kwasniewski] Let me give you a very clear answer. First of all we have no special relations with the Russian Communist Party. Of course I have met with their leader, Mr. Zyuganov, as with other leaders, Messrs. Yavlinskiy, Zhirinovskiy, and others. But I have no links with the Communist Party. At the ideological level, there are vast differences between the Polish Social Democrats and the Russian Communists: We are in favor of a free market economy, of privatization, of a European security concept, of NATO membership. These do not match Zyuganov's concepts. Having said that, and I will say this to Boris Yeltsin, we want to have the best possible relations with Russia, because it is in both our interests to be on good terms. And if Poland enjoys good relations with its big neighbor, this will mean greater stability in Europe, which for us represents the best way of integrating the European structures."]

Kwasniewski on Results of First Foreign Visit

WS1501123896 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 12 Jan 96 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Ewa Rosolak; place and date not given: "At Least a Very Good Grade"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Rosolak] Mr. President, you said that your first foreign visit was very successful, that it was a visit with which you can be satisfied. What makes you say this?

[Kwasniewski] All first visits are some sort of demonstrations. Everywhere, particularly in Poland, symbolic importance is attached to the first visit, to the direction of the first trip. Now, if we were to try to determine what this visit really means, we would have to go back to the declarations which I made during the election campaign. I said that in the next five years Poland's priority would be the European direction, integration with the structures of EU and NATO.

[Rosolak] Now, there were three main subjects discussed during the visit: Poland's entry to EU and NATO, and Poland's bilateral relations with German and France. Which of them do you consider the biggest success?

[Kwasniewski] If I tried to talk about the best grade, I might be accused of being immodest. However, if I really wanted to tell you how open our German and French partners were, they should be given at least a very good grade. Equally high is my evaluation of the openness with which the mode of integration with the European structure was discussed.

[Rosolak] What about Poland's integration with NATO? Is this still the most remote prospect?

[Kwasniewski] The only dates that have been so far more or less precisely set are the dates of beginning the negotiations. I suggest that we base our actions on these dates only. It depends, among other things, on our determination and efficiency in regulating our internal affairs when these negotiations are concluded.

[Rosolak] Both the Germans and the French stressed that 1996 would be a very difficult year for negotiatiny our integration with NATO. They pointed to the elections in Russia as one of the reasons for this.

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[Kwasniewski] Our aspirations are not determined by Russia's stand. On the other hand, none of my interlocutors concealed that Russia's opinion, as well as its conviction that our presence in NATO is not an action aimed at Russia or any other state are, extremely important to the atmosphere surrounding the unification of Europe. Regardless of whether or not Russia is a formal member of NATO and EU, it must be part of the collective security system and part of European integration. Thus, good relations with Russia are a great advantage in the process of integrating with European structures. [passage omitted]

Assessment of Trip

WS1601091596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13-14 Jan 96 p 5

[Commentary by Katarzyna Kolodziejczyk: "Gestures Are Not Enough"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is nothing else that the Polish diplomatic services need as much as credibility. This means assuring our partners that both the fact that power in Poland has been taken over by the postcommunist camp and the serious political crisis caused by the "Prime Minister Oleksy's case" have not in the slightest changed the goals of Polish foreign policy and have not affected the continuity of this policy, which was specified in 1989 by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, first foreign affairs minister of the Third Republic.

The three gestures that Kwasniewski made—apologizing to Poles for the suffering and wicked deeds experienced in the Polish People's Republic; resigning membership in his party before being sworn into office; and, most importantly of all, deciding to visit Germany and France on his first foreign trip—may, but do not have to, prove that communist Kwasniewski has turned democratic.

The people who would like to believe in this transformation the most are Poles themselves; after all, more than 70 percent supported Poland's integration with the EU and NATO. However, certain facts which only seemingly do not have anything to do with foreign policy force us to remain skeptical.

The fact that he stubbornly persisted with lies (the unfortunate university diploma) and lack of clarity in financial disclosure warn us that President Kwasniewski may be "wrong" too often and that he may completely change his opinions, which in the case of foreign policy would be close to a catastrophe.

The nomination of Dariusz Rosati as minister of foreign affairs was a certain disappointment. Contrary to appearances, he is not an apolitical specialist (between 1981 and 1985 he was the first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party at the Main School of Planning and Statistics). Compared to the strong personalities of Ministers Skubiszewski, Olechowski, and Bartoszewski, he is not a well-known figure to both Poles and to foreign diplomats.

Another issue which forces us to remain skeptical is the political entourage of the president. I do not mean only those of his party colleagues who have gotten into deep water, but also those who were critical of Skubiszewski's foreign policy and who even went as far as to caution Poland against quick integration with European and euro-atlantic structures. When SPD Chairman Oskar Lafontaine met with the leader of the postcommunist PDS in the German Bundestag, Helmut Kohl warned that the party had not yet parted with the legacy of the SED and of German Democratic Republic, as well as with communism. "If the SPD intends to cooperate with the postcommunists," Kohl said, "then it must be certain that its wants a democratic Germany." This statement by the chancellor, with whom Kwasniewski managed to develop fairly good contacts, proves that the choice of the direction in which Poland will go under the rule of the postcommunists will be closely watched by our partners, also due to the political roots of the new Polish president.

Kwasniewski's first foreign trip is undoubtedly a success for him. We should hope that, for the sake of the Polish diplomatic services, the president will not do more than merely make gestures. In the situation in which the Polish state has found itself in, the important thing will be the principles which the head of state will follow in his actions. They must not raise doubts in any of our foreign partners.

Kwasniewski Sets Out Guiding Principles

LD1501210796 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Aleksander Kwasniewski has met representatives of foreign states accredited in our country.

[begin Kwasniewski recording] All our internal problems should and will be resolved in accordance with the principles of law. It is my duty, and I reiterate this also with regard to the state, to look for what unites Poles and not for what divides them.

Sovereignty in foreign policy, democracy, the rules of a law-abiding state, and market mechanisms in the economy are the principles for determining the development of our homeland today and tomorrow.

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The fact that we are ready to take part in the integration processes connected with the expansion of the European Union and NATO to the east does not only mean the fulfillment of Poland's aspirations. This is an element in the natural evolution of our continent, a necessary step in the building of our common Europe. [end recording]

[Announcer] Archbishop Jozef Kowalski, the papal nuncio, spoke on behalf of the diplomats. [passage omitted]

Presidential Economic Adviser Appointed

WS1601091696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 15 Jan 96 p 3

[Aarticle by Agnieszka Kublik: "The President Still Without a Spokesman; Malcuzynski Turned Kwasniewski Down"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Professor Marek Belka accepted the post of aide on the economy at the Chancellery.

Belka heads the Institute of Economic Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences and is an expert in modern economic theories. He is also a member of the Social and Economic Strategies Council, established at the initiative of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Grzegorz Kolodko.

Among those who turned down the president's offer were Professors Leszek Balcerowicz, Witold Trzeciakowski, and Janusz Beksiak. Professor Waclaw Wilczynski most recently resigned.

Professor Belka says of the five years ahead: "We hopped on a rickety train in which we want to catch up with Europe. If we rock it, we will fall out. But the same may happen if we stop it. We cannot go on without reforming old branches of industry, especially mining. Not so much because of possible social unrest, but due to a financial burden we cannot carry."

Biographic Note on New Defense Minister

WS0801113596 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 6-7 Jan 96 p 2

[Untitled report by "PW"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stanislaw Dobrzanski is 46 years old. He is a graduate of the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin. He became an undersecretary of state in the Office of the Council of Ministers in 1993, when the office was headed by Michal Strak. Strak had known him as a member of youth organizations linked to the United Peasant Party and the Polish Peasant Party. Earlier Dobrzanski worked in the National Library and in the Ministry of Culture. He was the director of the Warsaw branch of [Lublin-based] Wschodni Bank Cukrownictwa. Two years ago Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak appointed him a secretary of the newly established Committee for Defense Issues of the Council of Ministers [KSORM]. After the "Drawsko crisis" Pawlak put forward his candidacy for the head of the Ministry of National Defense, but President Walesa objected to this. When last year Dobrzanski was presenting the results of the KSORM work to the Sejm Defense Commission, he failed to answer any questions. His views on the Armed Forces are not widely known. He has the rank of second lieutenant in the reserves.

Communications Minister on 1995, Plans for Future

WS1001150596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Jan 96 p 10

[Article by Dorota Margas: "Communications Ministry on 1995 and Plans for the Future; Decision on Privatization in 1997"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of 1995 there were 5.7 million telephone owners in Poland, which means that 15 in every 100 people had a telephone. In 1995 some 721,000 people received a telephone; in comparison with the end of 1994, last year saw a 14.4-percent growth.

In 1994 some 590,000 people received a telephone, approximately 86,000 of them live in the countryside; in 1995 the figures were 721,000 and 129,000, respectively. Communications Minister Andrzej Zielinski said at a news conference yesterday [4 January] that this year the Polish Telecommunications SA (TP SA) should start rendering telephone services to 1 million new telephone owners. Some 1,400 rural localities would receive telephones. Also, according to the minister, more than 100,000 telephone owners should be connected to the network by operators that are independent of TP SA. By the year 2000, some 30 in every 100 people should have telephones; in the countryside the ratio should be 10 to 100. The Communications Ministry estimates that by the end of 1999 there should be approximately 1 million cellular phone owners in Poland. Cellular phone services will be rendered by four operators: Two of them will operate in the Global Standard for Mobile Communication system (they will be selected in a bidding, most probably as soon as mid-February); one will provide services in the NMT [expansion unknown] system, and one in the DCS [expansion unknown] system. The ministry will invite bids as soon as this year.

Last year the Communications Ministry granted 53 licenses for telecommunication activity, including 22 for

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installing and using telecommunications lines and networks and for rendering telecommunications services by those means; the ministry also granted 21 licenses for rendering services by means of internal networks and nine licenses for rendering services by means of internal networks [as published]. Up till July 1995 the minister granted 136 telecommunications licenses, including 70 licenses for construction of public networks. This indicates that in 1995 telecommunications services should have been provided to some 300,000 new telephone owners, but the ministry officials believe that this probably did not happen.

In the first quarter of this year, the Communications Ministry intends to invite bids for fixed-position telephone services. By the end of this March, in turn, it will complete work on a document concerning privatization of TP SA and submit it to the government. The decision on privatization of TP SA will be made most probably in 1997. Communications Minister Andrzej Zielinski said yesterday that the model of privatization of the national operator has not been finally decided yet. "Three options come into play," Andrzej Zielinski said. "Selling a small number of the TP SA shares on the stock market, finding a strategic investor, or selling the company's capital to selected investors: big companies and banks. Until the year 2000, the TP SA monopoly in international connections will be maintained." As for other long-distance calls, the ministry does not rule out that operators other than TP SA also will provide these services, but, as the minister said, domination of the national operator will be maintained.

Moreover, this year the ministry will begin work on a new telecommunications and post office law. New regulations should be ready in 1998.

Minister Zielinski also recalled that in 1995 Poczta Polska [Polish Post Office] was able to decrease its deficit to 22 million zlotys [Z]. In line with projections, in 1996 the deficit of this company will amount to Z10 million. The state will earmark approximately Z58 million for investment projects of Poczta Polska. In 1997 this company will begin to make a profit, and by the year 2000 or so its earnings capacity should be between 4 and 5 percent.

Poczta Polska has 7,694 offices all over Poland. In 1995 no new offices were set up. Perhaps this year the company's directors will begin opening new offices. In the years 1993-95 Poczta Polska repaired approximately 5,000 of its post offices (1,400 in 1995). Last year it repaired all the post offices in Poznan, and the offices which were repaired in Warsaw constituted 70 percent of all those repaired in Poland. In December an ultramodern Transport Post Office was opened; according to the minister, it will improve the quality of services rendered for customers in the south of Poland.

Former Interior Minister on Oleksy Affair

WS1601123096 Krakow PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 14 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Krzysztof Kozlowski: "The Jozef Oleksy Case"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The accountability of Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, who has been accused of cooperating with Russian intelligence, must be seen in two dimensions: the possible legal dimension (court of law) and the political dimension. [Former] Minister Andrzej Milczanowski did the right thing when he decided to present the Military Prosecutor's Office with materials which seemed to him—to put it cautiously—disturbing. The task of the prosecutor's office is to assess these materials, to try to collect more of them—if it is possible—and to decide whether to pursue the case in a court of law. It is difficult to pass final judgments at the moment, but it does not seem likely that the Oleksy case will be fully elucidated.*

First, because the prosecutor's office, including the military prosecutor's office, is under Prosecutor General Jerzy Jaskiernia, and actions taken by this man are not to be trusted. I am not surprised that Jozef Oleksy does not intend to plead guilty or to admit to having made any mistake. However, the fact that, despite protests from the opposition and not only from it, in such a situation Jerzy Jaskiernia is being kept at the office of the [justice] minister and prosecutor general, casts a shadow on the credibility of the prosecutor's offices' work. The same goes for personnel changes in the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] which Oleksy has recently made: the firing of Henryk Jasik and appointment of Andrzej Anlkewicz in his place, who had been the chief adviser to the prime minister. In MSW there is already one deputy minister of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]—Zbigniew Sobotka; soon there will be a third deputy minister, of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], who will replace Jerzy Zimowski. In such a situation newly appointed MSW head Jerzy Konieczny will have very little freedom of action.

Second, operational materials are quite difficult to handle for courts of law (this goes for courts of law all over the world). It is difficult to bring them into evidence: Such materials are collected by means of unconventional methods, and, as a result, they differ from those which a court of law accepts. Therefore, it seems difficult to state that someone is guilty and even more difficult to sentence a person if the only materials available are operational materials. However, this is a

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problem of the prosecutor's office, and perhaps—in the future—a problem of a court of law, and one should not perform duties that should be performed by the judiciary.

Nonetheless, regardless of whether a court of law finds Jozef Oleksy guilty, there also is the dimension of political accountability. Here the case is very clear. The situation in which Jozef Oleksy has found himself can mean only one thing to a politician: resignation.

Although we do not know whether the evidence of Oleksy's cooperation with the Russian (and previously Soviet) intelligence obtained by the Office of State Protection [UOP] turns out to be sufficiently convincing to a court of law, we know one thing for sure (it has been confirmed by the prime minister himself and by his Russian partners): for a number of years he maintained frequent, close, and friendly contacts with at least one KGB officer. In addition, it was not an ordinary officer, but a colonel who at the same time held the post of first secretary at the embassy. This man, Vladimir Alganov, was one of the key figures in the operation of creating the Soviet intelligence network (which became Russian intelligence later on) in Poland after 1990.

Before 1989 Moscow did not need a voivodship secretary of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] to obtain secret information. The KGB could use the services of the entire MSW, its departments, and even sections. The ministry was committed to "working" cooperation with the Russians; it was obligated to pass information and materials on to them. Incidentally, I believe that things looked very similar in such ministries as the Foreign Affairs Ministry or the National Defense Ministry. I knew the situation in the MSW, where until the spring of 1990 Soviet comrades paid daily visits to the offices. What is more, no one demanded that MSW functionaries inform their superiors, including the head of the ministry, about those contacts. This was looked upon as normal procedure. This situation radically changed in the spring of 1990. From that moment on the Russians began building a regular intelligence network in Poland, just like in other countries of West Europe. The network consisted (and still consists) of not only regular agents. The goal of the Russians was to include in it important people representing various elite groups, who were selected as sources of information or trustworthy people. Such cooperation did not have to involve preparation of espionage reports.

Jozef Oleksy claims today that he did not know that his friend was a KGB agent. However, UOP warned him against these contacts—that is one thing; second, when Oleksy explains his conduct in this way, he—just like his party colleagues of the former PZPR—seems to ignore the fact that in 1989 Poland became an independent state, which means that contacts which in the 1980's were in fact contacts of spies changed quite significantly.

Before the years 1989 and 1990, contacts between Polish and Soviet comrades could be considered "normal"—of course, in the context of the Polish People's Republic [PRL]. At that time, no one in the PZPR saw anything bad in this. On the contrary, for PRL party activists it gave a chance for more rapid career advancement. After all, a good opinion from the Soviet comrades helped make a career.

Jozef Oleksy claims today that he always—also after 1989—acted in good faith; he was not aware of whom he was dealing with. However, after 1990, the very same contacts which were "normal" in PRL became not only equivocal, but even alarmingly dangerous. Cut off from the inflow of information provided by such sources as the MSW, the Russians had to try to find it by other means. One possibility was offered by old links developed in the PRL, and the Russians actually used them, among other things. Nonetheless, this time the information the Russians wanted was not "only" about PZPR cadre reserves and about who was eligible for promotion: they wanted information which was of strategic importance to the future of Poland, which was already a sovereign state. The fact that Jozef Oleksy ignored this difference discredited him.

Oleksy also is saying that he was unaware of the dual role which his interlocutors were playing. This, too, is no political justification for his actions. There is a big difference between, for example, meetings with diplomats held at embassies on the occasion of national holidays, during which pleasantries are exchanged, and close contacts that go beyond the diplomatic routine.

At this point, I would like to recall the story of British Minister Profumo, which was well known in the 1960's. This politician had a lover who, as it turned out later, at the same time was having an affair with a KGB spy in London. No one was interested whether or not Profumo was aware of this. No one wanted to know whether or not the minister had passed some secret information on to the girl, or whether high treason was committed. The reaction of the public was clear: the minister had to go because he had failed to prevent a situation in which the interests of the state might have been jeopardized.

It is a good thing that a special Sejm investigation committee was set up in the Oleksy case. Of course, there was a dispute over this: According to Oleksy and the governing coalition, the commission should confine its interest only to checking whether the UOP actions were legal (it should almost "call UOP to account" for

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its actions). I believe that things should look different: The Sejm commission should, to a certain extent, do the same work as the Military Prosecutor's Office, because prosecutor's offices, which are under Minister Jaskiernia, are neither credible nor impartial. In a normal situation it would be strange if a Sejm committee did such work. In the current situation, however, this is indeed justified.

There is also yet another element in this case: statements (which have been made almost daily recently) by representatives of Russian intelligence, who are trying to give Oleksy some kind of a "morality certificate." Of course, the Russians are involved in this whole affair and it would be naive to accept what they are saying without question. What is remarkable is the nervousness and the number of these statements. I saw such nervousness of the Soviet services back in 1990 when I was internal affairs minister; it was after the UOP made certain arrests. In addition, customs generally accepted in international politics do not allow making statements on an issue going on in a foreign state.

The suspicion that the operational materials may have been fabricated and planted by the Russians (in order to bloc Poland's road to NATO) does not seem to be very probable. The period in which special services officers are trained is quite long and the cost is pretty high; the purpose of this is not only to teach them to obtain information, but also—or perhaps first of all—to verify it and to differentiate between what is credible and what is a provocation. Polish services have a good reputation in the world, and the first thing which UOP officers had to check was the suspicion that the materials on Oleksy might be a provocation.

Nonetheless, can UOP make a mistake? Of course it can. However, in such cases the degree of likelihood is decisive. If a lot supports the thesis that the situation which has developed may be a threat to the state, it is the duty of the UOP and the MSW head to pass this information on to a prosecutor's office. It would be reprehensible to neglect this duty. Therefore, I believe that new MSW head Jerzy Konieczny was too quick to distance himself from what his predecessor in office had done (Konieczny did it only two days after assuming office).

There only remains the question of whether the Russians would be interested in planting these materials. However, what should such a scenario look like? In order to thwart Poland's plans to join NATO, would the Russians have undermined the credibility and reputation of not only Jozef Oleksy, but first of all his political group? Moscow feels much closer to the postcommunists than to the Polish right wing; therefore, political "destruction" of the postcommunists in the eyes of the public will certainly not be favorable to Russia in the long run. After all, Oleksy was not the only person who maintained very close relations with KGB officers. He is "at the forefront" due to the office he holds, but the problem concerns quite a lot of leaders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, people who continued to maintain their old contacts after 1989 and 1990—in an entirely new situation. This is their political mistake which should bring about political consequences.

For me the key element in this entire case is not the possible guilt of Jozef Oleksy, but the fact that the head of the government is able to speak about his contacts with KGB people quite without unconcern. What the man involved admitted to and the fact that he did this so unconcernedly is, indeed, shocking.

Daily Quotes Source on Evidence in Oleksy Case

WS1201160796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "Oleksy Ignored UOP's Warnings; Wilanow and the Mera Tennis Courts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"After having received a warning from the Office of State Protection, [then] Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy more than a dozen times met with two Russian intelligence officers and handed them classified documents," claims a former top state official.*

The explanation of whether Oleksy handed over classified materials to Russian intelligence officers is vital for solving the Oleksy case. The supreme military prosecutor said on Wednesday [10 January] that "at least 'a contingent intention'—the perpetrator's awareness that he is committing a crime—is needed to level espionage charges."

Former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski told POLITYKA that when the Polish mission of Vladymir Alganov (officially the first secretary of the Russian embassy, unofficially an officer of the Russian intelligence services) expired, "Oleksy entered into close contacts with a newly arrived Russian diplomat who also worked as first secretary of the embassy and was a staff intelligence officer."

Information we obtained in circles close to the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicates that Alganov contacted Oleksy with his successor in 1992. He is also said to have informed Oleksy this would be his new supervising officer. Our sources claim that since September 1994 (when Office of State Protection [UOP] Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski officially informed Oleksy that Alganov was a Russian intelligence agent) the then Sejm

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speaker and later prime minister met with both Russian intelligence officers several times.

Our intelligence services tracked Alganov in the course of surveilling the Russian intelligence network in Poland. Alganov was trailed and tapped by our officers. After September 1994 he tried to contact Oleksy. He called him from hotels in which he made reservations not in his own name, but in the name of the company he worked for. On several occasions the UOP officers managed to tap phones in the hotel rooms before he arrived. Our sources claim the UOP has a list of phone numbers Alganov dialed. Among them is Oleksy's private phone number, the Sejm phone number Oleksy used as Sejm speaker, and the number he used as prime minister at the Office of the Council of Ministers. The secret services also have transcripts of telephone conversations held between the Russian agents and Oleksy.

One of the places where Oleksy met with his Russian supervising officers were the Mera tennis courts in Warsaw. Some of these meetings are recorded on video, but without sound. During these meetings Oleksy handed over classified state documents, among them reports compiled by the Polish intelligence and counterintelligence services on the activities of foreign intelligence services in Poland. This fact is allegedly confirmed by documents of the Russian intelligence services purchased by our own services.

Daily on Legal Aspects of Oleksy Case

WS1501122096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "Will the Prosecutor's Office of the Warsaw Military District Launch an Investigation Into the Oleksy Case? Deliberate Treason"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The supreme military prosecutor submitted yesterday [11 January] files on the Oleksy case to the Prosecutor's Office of the Warsaw Military District [WOW], which deals with espionage cases.*

Head of the WOW Prosecutor's Office Colonel Andrzej Komarski told us: "I am the one who will decide whether an investigation is to be launched and how it is to be handled."

Colonel Komarski will form a team consisting of three prosecutors to handle the case. "I received the files without any opinion or comment from the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office [NPW]," he said. "Any decisions I make will be sovereign. Naturally, the chief of NPW, General Ryszard Michalowski, is my superior and he can repeal them."

Col. Komarski has not yet had the time to read the files; ("I have been talking to reporters all day"). The head of the WOW prosecutor's office hopes he will announce a decision by 20 January. He is waiting for the Office of State Protection [UOP] to complete investigation materials.

NPW Spokesman Col. Wlodzimierz Pospiech explained that the materials submitted by [former Interior] Minister Andrzej Milczanowski on 19 December were held so long because of the gravity of the case.

Normally, files are automatically submitted to an ancillary prosecutor's office. Until 1990 the NPW was allowed to carry out investigations on its own, but it was concluded that the right to appeal to a higher prosecutor's office did not exist. Currently, the NPW does not carry out its own investigations.

Once the documents are analyzed—and the additional materials are supplied by the UOP—Col. Komarski will make a preliminary assessment of whether there are grounds for charging the prime minister with having committed a crime. The military prosecutor may decide either not to launch an investigation, or to launch it "on the case," not against an individual. Oleksy could thus be interrogated as a witness (with the right to refuse to testify). If charges are found to be substantiated, the investigation will be against the individual. Charges will be formulated and a sentence passed.

When an investigation is not concluded by a sentence, proceedings are discontinued—for example when investigations prove the suspect is not guilty (if he was unaware he was committing treason) or if he dies.

"As General Michalowski has said, the key issue is whether the crime was committed deliberately," said Col. Pospiech. "Treason, that is to say crimes placing state security at risk, cannot be committed unknowingly."

This is the focal point of the investigation. "Unless the prosecutor's office proves this, it will not even be able to appeal to the Sejm to repeal Oleksy's immunity."

Col. Pospiech denied that the NPW had ever questioned UOP materials only because they were collected without carrying out formal operations investigating Oleksy.

As Col. Komarski explains, if the investigation shows that the crime was committed at a time when the suspect held a high state office (Sejm speaker, prime minister), he will be tried before the State Tribunal. If not, court hearings will be held in front of a military court.

The WOW prosecutor's office has dealt with the majority of the few espionage cases in Poland in recent

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years. In 1993 it handled the dubious case of Anatoliy Lysenko (a major of the Ukrainian intelligence services) and, in the same year, of Marek Zielinski, a former officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who collaborated with the KGB. It has recently reopened inquiries into the case of Ryszard Kuklinski [sentenced for espionage for the CIA].

Col. Andrzej Komarski, 58, is a graduate of the law faculty at Jagellonian University. Prior to his employment at the WOW prosecutor's office, he worked at the Garrison Prosecutor's Office in Olsztyn. He is the only head of a military prosecutor's office who has been cleared by a background investigation after 1989.

Daily: Coalition To Restructure, Oleksy To Resign

WS1501150996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Jan 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "The Government: Adjustment Rather Than a New Structure"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Consultations between the parliamentary opposition and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] are limited to reconnoitering talks held between individual politicians. The majority of PSL support making adjustments within the current coalition. Unofficial sources claim that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy will hand in his government's resignation to the president in a few days.*

Further Than Nearer

"Press reports on changes within the coalition give closer dates than are viable," says Chairman of the Union of Labor [UP] Ryszard Bugaj. His party could become part of a government formed by the PSL, the Freedom Union [UW], and three other groups from the parliamentary opposition—the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, and the Republicans. Whether such a coalition can be formed depends on the PSL, without which it is impossible to create a cabinet that would be in opposition to the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. However, no specific talks are being held between the opposition and the PSL. Our sources claim that individual politicians are probing each other; no talks are being held between the leaders. The suggestion of changing the coalition came from the UW. The presidium of that party stated on Friday [12 January] that Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy must step down because the principle of the impartiality of state organs in elucidating the charges brought against him has been violated.

"Several things may happen," says UW's Deputy Chairman Tadeusz Syryjczyk. "The old party model may be applied—the bad first secretary goes, the government stays. However, changes may run far deeper—the coalition might be changed." This is what the UW pointed out to the PSL, not having yet received a reply. The first test of the PSL's intentions will be how they vote on the motion to dismiss [Justice] Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia in the Sejm this month.

Change of Attitude

The deputy chairman of the UW says PSL is "changing its attitude" in the political assessment of the consequences of violating the rule of impartiality by Prime Minister Oleksy. Tadeusz Syryjczyk claims this is visible "in many PSL centers," but it is difficult to say whether they will be able to reach an agreement.

The peasants are clearly not eager to make a decision. They are waiting until the special Sejm commission formed to check the legality of operations carried out by the Office of State Protection in the so-called Oleksy case announces its verdict and the military prosecutor makes his decision. More and more PSL deputies agree that their party cannot remain indifferent to the opposition and the media. They also say that anything is possible, a change of coalition included. But, everything seems to indicate that the change in attitude is more likely to lead to personnel changes within the current configuration than a change of the coalition. The majority of PSL representatives claim that, first of all, an overhaul of the current coalition has to be considered. The leadership of the PSL—the Chief Executive Committee and the presidiums of the National Council and the party's parliamentary club—are to meet most probably this Wednesday [17 January] so as to discuss the condition of the governing coalition.

Restructuring First

PSL is currently in an exceptionally advantageous position. The opposition's proposal has boosted PSL's status in the current coalition, especially as the argument employed by the coalition partner—that parliament will be dissolved and premature elections held—no longer is valid. Until recently premature elections were a larger risk for the PSL; at the moment the risk is just as large for the SLD. PSL can thus impose its own terms on the left. They might ask for the office of prime minister, but not necessarily. Deputy Chairman of the PSL Parliamentary Club Janusz Dobrosz admits that his colleagues have different views on the matter. Some claim such a change would be logical (a PSL prime minister was replaced by a leftist and should now change places with someone from the PSL once again). Others say that given the circumstances, it is not worth taking on full responsibility. One of the PSL politicians maintains that a restructuring of the government could

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provide an opportunity for agreement on the reform of the central economic administration center.

Retaining the coalition in its current shape provides the PSL with a chance to keep not only its ministerial posts, but also the 30 offices of voivodes and deputy voivodes. If, however, the SLD attempted to give the PSL conditions it could not accept ("for example deciding who is to be prime minister," says Dobrosz), changing alliances could be a real alternative. Also, under this variant, the PSL would deal the cards. A group within the PSL—thus far, definitely a minority—postulates breaking up the current configuration, and not because of warm feelings for the UW. Both groups have long since been apprehensive of each other because of differences in platforms as well as for minor reasons. The PSL, for example, blames the UW for Pawlak's failure to form his first cabinet in 1992. Tadeusz Syryjczyk stresses that currently there are less differences between the two parties than there were in 1990 or 1992. On the one hand, they understand the necessity of moving towards a free market, on the other, they see the need for supporting the rural areas and agriculture in this process. Ryszard Bugaj of the Union of Labor does not exclude the possibility that a new coalition might be formed for the sake of defending the raison d'etat, yet he does stress this would have to be preceded by detailed talks on platforms.

Resignation This Week?

As we learned from unofficial sources, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy might submit his cabinet's resignation to the president in a few days. Article 64 of the small constitution provides that if the prime minister resigns, the president accepts and obliges the government to continue performing its duties until a new Council of Ministers is formed.

This is a very probable scenario considering that recent developments cast a dark shadow not only on the prime minister, but on the entire SLD as well. The SLD would thus spearhead the opposition and prevent the Sejm debate on the dismissal of [Justice] Minister Jaskiernia, as well as the possible motion for the prime minister's dismissal. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Says He Will Not Resign

LD1501105296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1017 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 15 Jan—When journalists asked Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy to comment on the demand from the Christian National Union [ZChN] and Solidarity for his and his government's resignation while handing out nomination papers to the members of the new authorities of the Polish Academy of Sciences [PAN] at Staszic Palace [PAN headquarters in Warsaw] today, he said that he did not intend to do so.

At present, the prime minister said, my personal matter [spying charges] is receding into the background. The government and the coalition are the important thing. I will not submit my resignation in the immediate future, as the ZChN and Solidarity want. I see no justification for that, although the circumstances are tense. Society is being informed all the time by all the news services about successive leaks and misinformation, the prime minister said.

He stressed that he was ready to submit to democratic procedures and appealed again for a stop to statements about his personal matter until the matter was cleared up by the bodies appointed to do so.

Awaiting Outcome of Investigation

LD1501194796 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, who returned to work today after a brief holiday, has said that he does not intend to resign. Jozef Oleksy stressed that he sees no justification for his resignation—despite the situation being tense—because the public is being informed about leaks all the time.

[Begin Oleksy recording] I think that it is important to stress that, in a way, today my personal case is of secondary importance, but the political and propaganda scenario is continuing. When it comes to the possible resignation of the government and prime minister, it is something which would be harmful to the government [as heard], to the coalition, and the political system. And I think that this is clear to everyone.

[Unidentified reporter] So, you are not going to resign in the immediate future as the Christian-National Union [ZChN] and Solidarity want?

[Oleksy] No, I am not going to submit my resignation. I do not see any justification for such a decision, although the circumstances are tense. I am aware that each day, in one news bulletin after another, the public is being informed about new leaks and, unfortunately, about new half-truths and lies. I am keeping calm. I have made a statement and I will stand by it. I am at the disposal of the democratic mechanisms and procedures which have been set in motion with regard to this case. I can only appeal to everyone to maintain respect—as they demanded not so long ago—and await a ruling and decisions to come from the democratic procedures which have been set in motion. [end recording]

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[Announcer] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy is in favor of publishing all documents connected with the accusations against him in the form of a White Book.

Walesa Begins Work at Solidarity Headquarters

LD1501103896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1002 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 15 Jan (PAP)—Former president and former Solidarity chairman Lech Walesa began work as a union consultant at the headquarters of Solidarity's National Commission [KK] at 1015 today by giving an interview to the British weekly the SUNDAY EXPRESS.

Walesa sat in the same armchair which he used at the presidential palace. As Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski said, the formal principles for Lech Walesa's work in Solidarity have not yet been settled. It is only known that the former president's diary is becoming increasing full. Various people are making appointments to see him, first among them Polish and foreign journalists.

To Work as Shipyard Electrician

LD1501122696 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1143 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 14 Jan [date as received]—"I do not intend to be Solidarity's superchairman, I do not intend to interfere in the union's internal affairs, and I will not take any money for the work done here [at Solidarity headquarters in Gdansk]. I am going back to the shipyard as an electrician," Lech Walesa told a news conference in Gdansk on 14 January, as he took up the post of Solidarity consultant. He also declared that he would not run either in the coming parliamentary or presidential elections unless the situation demanded it and a presidential system was established.

Walesa also said that "certain processes can be speeded up." He did not want to make a statement on the Oleksy affair, but said "the issue is more serious than we supposed."

Walesa said he would be doing the same as trade union consultant as he had been doing for many years in various posts, i.e. working for Poland.

Walesa: Oleksy Politically Disqualified

LD1501161596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Former President Lech Walesa thinks Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has disqualified himself politically.

[Begin Walesa recording] I have said I believe [former Interior Minister Andrzej] Milczanowski. He did it [accused Oleksy of spying] at a moment when there was no longer a political game, for it was a foregone conclusion, so it [the accusation] is all the more credible. On the other hand, on the operational and other matters, I do not need any proof, for if that publicly known proof—that if somebody says that he was simply and solely on a friendly footing, that he counted among his friends a person who was sent here at great expense in order to enter into such far reaching collaboration to the advantage of his own state against our advantage that he goes so far as to achieve friendship—well then, as I said, that is pathological. That is already a judgement, that is already an admission of guilt. No other proof is needed. No courts are necessary: That is enough for political disqualification. [end recording]

Poll: 52% Believe Nation 'Split in Half'

WS1201132596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by "KNYSZ": "The Postcommunists and 'S'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Half of the adult Poles claim that the recent presidential elections have renewed the division into postcommunists and the supporters of Solidarity ["S"].

One year ago, the majority of people did not agree that our society was divided along these lines (e.g. one in three Poles, 42 percent, claimed the opposite).

The proportions are currently reversed: 52 percent claim the nation is split in half, and only 26 percent disagree.

Those who believe such a division exists are mainly rightists, members and supporters of the Freedom Union, the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, "S," the Polish Peasant Party, and those who voted for Lech Walesa. However, two-thirds of those polled by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] claim this division does not have any major influence on their lives.

The poll was carried out by CBOS on 24-29 November on a representative sample of 1,175 adult Poles.

Officer Says U.S. Offer on F-16's 'Enticing'

WS1601124296 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 13-14 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "The American Offer: Fighter Planes To Be Leased?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The Americans have offered to lease to Poland seven F-16 fighter planes and to*

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sell 18 aircraft of the same type. "We are very close to accepting this offer," we have found out unofficially in the General Staff. [passage omitted]

"The American offer is very enticing," admitted one of the officers who wanted to remain anonymous. "The final decision will most probably be made after completion of the bidding to provide our Armed Forces with a multipurpose plane." Our informer admitted that aside from the Swedish offer, the American proposal is a complete one, but he is waiting for what their competitors will have to say.

It is worth recalling that for the time being the following planes are in play: Jas-39 Gripen—a Swedish multipurpose fighter plane; the F-16, F-18, Russian MiG-29, and the French Mirage 2000, whose chances are the smallest. [passage omitted]

The most controversial issues are related to production of some elements for the F-16 planes in Poland and to the possibility of making repairs in Europe.

Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski stated that matters related to the selection of a plane for the Polish Armed Forces are "advanced," adding that it may still take a while to complete this issue.

Over $25 Billion Earmarked for Foreign Debt

LD0601213596 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 6 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Poland will earmark more than $25 billion for foreign debt repayment this year. In the following years, we will have around $38 billion left to repay of the loans taken out in the 70s. Even so, this is considerably less than we would have had to repay, if Poland had not reached agreement with her creditors on the remission of almost half the debt in exchange for regular repayments.

We have to give back more than $28 billion to the Paris Club by the year 2014. On the other hand, the debt to the several dozen Western banks of the London Club—amounting to some $8 billion—has to be repaid by the year 2024. Our largest repayments will fall between 2003 and 2010. We will repay several billion dollars annually.

[Begin Deputy Finance Minister Krzysztof Kalicki recording—identified by caption] Later, toward the year 2024, this debt servicing will decrease, of course on condition that we maintain budget discipline and do not create an excessive number of new liabilities. [passage omitted]

In connection with the increase in foreign currency reserves, I would even say the situation regarding the safety of foreign debt servicing is comfortable. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Above all, Poland should export more than she imports. At the moment, although we have a record foreign trade turnover exceeding $50 billion, the 1995 balance will be adverse and amount—according to customs statistics—to around $5 billion. In the Finance Ministry's opinion, it is important that we have started systematic debt repayment, because thanks to this we are again a reliable world business partner, and regardless of the debt repayments, we can avail ourselves of preferential foreign credit aid.

1995 Inflation Rate 'Surprisingly Low'

WS1601133596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by "DAN": "Inflation 1995: How Low"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Everyone was wrong: the finance minister, the National Bank of Poland [NBP] and the majority of economists. The Central Office of Statistics announced yesterday that last year's inflation came to 21.6 percent. One month ago the Ministry of Finance and the NBP predicted this figure would be at best 22.4 percent.

Few seriously treated government projections in early 1995 claiming that inflation would be 16.9 percent. Those optimistic calculations were sapped by the huge—4.1 percent—growth of prices in January. Inflation was curbed in midyear. Prices even fell in July, something Poland had not witnessed for years.

In December prices grew by a surprisingly low rate of 1.5 percent. In recent years, December prices rapidly grew, mainly due to Christmas, employment bonuses and increasing pensions. Last year's inflation was lower than that for 1994 by as much as 7.9 percent. This figure is, however, 4.7 percent higher than the optimistic projection provided for in the 1995 budget law.

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Melescanu Hopes for Early NATO Membership

AU1301214196 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania's Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu stated, in an interview granted to our radio station today, that he hopes NATO will take a decision this year on nondiscriminatory openness towards countries that showed their wish to join that organization.

The head of the Romanian diplomacy also said that he hopes Romania will be included in the first echelon of countries to be admitted into NATO. Teodor Melescanu believes that this expansion will be accompanied by the establishment of a partnership connection between NATO, the new member countries, and the Russian Federation, something that will lead to economic stability. The Romanian foreign minister said that an important aspect in this respect is Romania's participation in the alliance's operations in the former Yugoslavia.

As far as the strategy of Romania's association to the European Union is concerned, the head of the Romanian diplomacy said that the implementation of the association accord provisions should offer a favorable framework for our country's relations with the European Union states.

Teodor Melescanu emphasized that he hopes that, around the year 2000, Romania will become an European Union member country with full rights. In this context, he recalled all options for Romania established in practical terms with the European Union concerning the association, namely, the continuous application of the association accord and the gradual integration in accordance with preferences that the Romanian side grants to products that originate from the countries of the community.

Official: EU Preparations Are Primary Objective

AU1301214796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Preparations for Romania's association to the European Union is the fundamental objective of Romanian foreign policy and of Romanian society as a whole, stated Gheorghe Prisacaru, executive president of the Interministerial Committee for European Integration, to our radio station today.

In the next period, an inspection will be carried out on the way in which the provisions of the European association accord are fulfilled, the accord in fact being a program of preparation for association to the European Union. Prisacaru also said that it has already been established that an upcoming government meeting will urgently discuss a program for preparing experts in European matters and also for establishing a new nucleus of negotiators of the association.

In the same interview, Gheorghe Prisacaru said that it is difficult to believe that, in two to three years, the associated countries will catch up with the economy of European Union countries. However, the issue is that Romania's market economy should function in such a way as to permit integration without shock, Prisacaru said. Romania intends to harmonize its own legislation with the legislation of the community and to establish a functional market economy, so that in 1998, when association negotiations are hoped to begin, our country should be put on the list of the future candidates, said the executive president of the European Integration Committee.

UDMR Leaders Meet on Ethnic Autonomy Status

AU1301153296 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, in the town of Odorheiul Secuiesc, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Council of Representatives began an extraordinary meeting, the agenda of which includes the draft autonomy status of the ethnic Hungarian community of Romania, reports our correspondent, Mirel Prodan.

Laszlo Tokes, the honorary president of the UDMR, stated during today's session that the ethnic Hungarian community's wish for autonomy has nothing to do with ethnic separatism, after which he suggested as a model for this autonomy the autonomy of the cults, as the latter is recognized in our country.

UDMR Executive President Csaba Takacs summarized the gaps in the draft autonomy status, pointing out that it does not stipulate any ties to be established between the autonomy institutions and those of the state. Senator Csaba Jozsef emphasized the fact that the ethnic Hungarian community in Romania has to be recognized as a political subject [subiect politic] and as a minority striving for political autonomy.

Debate Autonomy Issue

LD1301135696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A passionate debate is taking place on the personal autonomy concept at the session of the delegates of the Democratic Union of Hungarianas in Romania [UDMR]. Peter Marvanyi reports from the meeting in Odorheiu Secuiesc.

[Marvanyi] Honorary Chairman Laszlo Tokes asked, and others called to account UDMR leaders even

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stronger, what had happened since the 1992 Cluj statement on the necessity of internal self-determination had been issued, why no autonomy concepts had been drafted to date.

UDMR Chairman Bela Marko sharply rejected the criticism by saying, among other things, that a quick autonomy system would have reflected the opinion of just one of the political forces. A coordinated autonomy concept for all the Hungarians in Romania requires a lot more time.

There was agreement in the morning that the UDMR could not delay further with the so-called autonomy statutes, the representatives obviously had in mind what the organization could present to its electors before the two elections in Romania this year. [passage omitted]

Adopt Autonomy Principles

LD1301200596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 13 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The leading body of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] has adopted the basic principles of its personal autonomy [concept]. On the basis of these, a draft statute will be drawn up, which is to detail the spheres of authority which an ethnic Hungarian self-administration would take over from the Romanian state. The UDMR wants to draw on the help of foreign experts, particularly those of the Council of Europe, in the elaboration of the draft statute on self-government.

At today's meeting, UDMR Honorary Chairman Laszlo Tokes said he set out the proposal of the Hungarians in Romania for a political deal in a letter sent to the Romanian and Hungarian presidents. Beside guaranteeing Romania's territorial integrity, it would also guarantee the equality and collective rights of the Hungarian minority [he said].

UDMR Supports Romanian Political Forces

LD1401143696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of the Representatives [SZKT—main decisionmaking body] of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] will end its session, which started on Friday [12 January], today. A statement has been adopted in Odorheiu Secuiesc [session location] on which our correspondent, Peter Marvanyi reports:

[Marvanyi] The UDMR wishes to support Romanian political forces, which will guarantee a constitutional state, democratic government, and local autonomy, reads the statement which was adopted by the SZKT on the occasion of the start of the year of [parliamentary] elections [in Romania].

The body again proposes a dialogue with the representatives of the majority of the Romanian nation. It warns that a campaign with an anti-Hungarian and nationalist overtone would isolate the country for a further four years. The UDMR wants a European-style campaign which would prevent extremist chauvinist forces from grabbing political power by misleading the public and creating a false image of enemies.

In the morning, the body discussed the issue of Adam Katona, an Odorheiu Secuiesc politician, again. They adopted a stance which states that the UDMR distance itself from Adam Katona's views on an inadequate sense of Hungarian identity and mixed marriages. Manifestations of intolerance of this kind has no place in the union, states the stance in which the delegates rejected nationalism, chauvinism, and anti-Semitism, regardless of its disseminator.

UDMR Leader on Reconciliation With Hungary

LD1401160896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 14 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The honorary chairman [Laszlo Tokes] of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania proposes that a new clause should be added to the [draft of the] declaration of the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation initiated by the Romanian president. In a letter sent to Hungarian President Arpad Goncz and Romanian President Ion Iliescu, Tokes calls for the inclusion of a clause that would lay down that reconciliation between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians living in Romania is an indispensable condition of the Romanian-Hungarian historic reconciliation. Tokes said that, to this end, a roundtable discussion between the Romanians and the Hungarians of Romania should be convened as soon as possible.

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Successor States Agree on Partial Asset Division

AU1101162496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 11 Jan 96

[Report by Sonja Znidarsic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Znidarsic] All four negotiating groups—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]—reiterated at the Zagreb meeting that they would try by all means to safeguard the assets of the former SFRY, which belong to all who used to live together in the past. They agreed to file compensation claims against those who are releasing the assets to Belgrade because these assets should remain frozen until an agreement on succession is reached.

Since the succession talks are at a standstill, all four sides agreed, according to Miran Mejak, head of our negotiating team:

[Mejak] To commence a partial division of the federation's assets.

[Znidarsic] One should not overlook that the legislation of some countries sees no obstacles to the release of assets of the former National Bank of Yugoslavia and:

[Mejak] We absolutely must not forget that the financial assets of the federation abroad were blocked on the basis of sanctions and not on the grounds of disintegration. Now that sanctions have been suspended, we must move on from this suspension to a blockade because this represents our joint assets, which is legally a relatively complicated procedure.

Oppose Ceding Assets to FRY

AU1001183496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 10 Jan 96

[Report by Ilinka Todorovski from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the post-Dayton period, the negotiations on the division of assets of the disintegrated SFRY have come to a halt, while new complications have arisen. Namely, following the resolution to suspend the anti-Serbian sanctions, banks in some countries have been willing to cede financial assets to the FRY.

Head of the Croatian negotiators Marendic said that most problems were occurring in Great Britain and France, where there are also the greatest financial assets. To the great surprise of all four non-Serbian successors of the SFRY, similar problems have also emerged in Austria. It is not known at the moment what sort of sums are involved. However, in 1990 the Yugoslav foreign currency reserves amounted to approximately $6 billion.

At the Zagreb meeting, the negotiators of the four countries [Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia] agreed that they would try to achieve a legal ban on allocating these funds. Dr. Mejak, the head of the Slovene negotiators, said that they would also try to protect the real estate and prevent it from ending up in the hands of the Serbo-Montenegrin state. According to Mejak, there are no major differences in the positions of the four interested countries. All of them insist that SFRY disintegrated and that the entire assets have to be divided equally among all successors. The negotiators will again discuss future concrete steps at a meeting in Skopje.

Since the disbanding of the peace conference on the former Yugoslavia last December, Geneva is no longer the center of succession talks. Brussels is supposed to become the center, but it is not yet known when.

Commission Debates Criteria for EU Membership

AU1301153896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 12 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Chamber Commission for International Relations held a preparatory meeting this morning, prior to the extraordinary State Chamber session devoted to foreign policy. Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler also spoke about the latest initiatives for the regulation of relations with Italy and integration into the EU. Nadja Pengov reports:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] Relations between Slovenia and the EU in the opinion of the government greatly depend on the parliamentary debate and the changes in property legislation. Therefore, we should strengthen our chances of signing the associate membership agreement and, if it proves so, also speedier full membership, through better adjusted legislation. In such a case, Thaler says, Slovenia could count on full membership in the year 2000 or 2001. The proposal for the changes is already before parliament.

The government, according to Thaler, believes that many fears connected to this issue are superfluous today, especially if viewed within the perspective of full EU membership.

What about the Spanish initiative, which the government supports, as does Italy, reportedly?

This involves December's amended version of Madrid's August proposal and represents a compromise. It no longer contains a demand that our way to Brussels leads via a Slovene-Italian agreement, although Slovenia pledges to change its property legislation and, four years after the ratification of the associate membership

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agreement and with clear indications for full membership in the year 2000 or 2001, also to liberalize trade in accordance with European standards. But what about Italy:

[Thaler] A big problem lies in the position of Italy, which evidently wants both. On the one hand, it wants Slovenia to carry out the initiatives and proposals of the EU and, on the other hand, although this is not always completely clear—it adjusts its stance to various situations and the current constellations of power—it also wants a bilateral agreement on the problem of the option-takers, the way it sees it.

[Pengov] The possibility of a compromise contained in the famous document that never existed, referring to the restitution of about 30 to 40 housing units, remains open. [end recording]

Kucan Discusses Foreign Policy Issues

AU0801094596 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 30 Dec 95 p 3

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by Robert Mecilosek; place and date not given: "We Have Become Too Accustomed To Counting on Our Luck"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mecilosek] The debates on foreign policy have often served party calculations rather than the interests of the country as a whole. Do you believe that some misunderstandings that polarized Slovene public opinion occurred because of this?

[Kucan] It is true that assessments of the achievements of the Slovene foreign policy are conflicting. My judgment is that we have done a lot but that we could have done more. The problem that you have broached is not confined solely to the functioning of the Slovene state in the foreign affairs department. It signals a lack of responsibility toward the state in general. There is not enough awareness that the country is the property of no one, neither of individuals nor of parties. Because of this, also, there arise such questions as the national interest and vision, and the strategic determination that, to a great extent, is still "a mystery" for Slovene policy. That is why there is often not enough cooperation. I, myself, have pointed to this on several occasions. In my opinion, an institution, which I give an entirely working name—the national security council—would facilitate cooperation in defining national interests. This council would, as a state institution, comprise all the most responsible leaders of the country, who would consult each other on solutions to the key questions. Unfortunately, all my proposals in this direction have so far fallen on deaf ears and have also met with opposition. The question is, of course, one of who does not want this and why.

Smearing Slovenia Abroad for Domestic Purposes

Therefore, the situation in the realm of foreign policy could not have been any different. All this was followed by a campaign to smear Slovenia and the domestic situation abroad, which in itself was neither "patriotic" nor exemplary. However, this behavior had a clear political goal, as such appearances abroad subsequently served as proof at home of what foreign countries allegedly think about Slovenia. Anyhow, I agree with you that Slovene foreign policy should be freed from slavery to the short-term domestic political and partial party needs. It is mainly certain narrow-minded party people who are working, I hope unsuccessfully, for the division and polarization of public opinion.

[Mecilosek] You have often emphasized that the Slovene way into the world will not always run concurrent with some of our traditional beliefs. Judging merely by some public opinion polls, we have ended up in a situation where a sizable percentage of the Slovene population is opposed to some of the EU conditions, which will greatly complicate any subsequent decision-making?

[Kucan] We must expect this. The problem is that we cannot gauge the objective weight, significance, and role that Slovenia could have in international relations. For five years, we have lived with a lot of luck. We have become too accustomed to counting on it. This had to end eventually. And it has happened precisely at the moment when we have to show what we can do. It is not good that the international community speaks about Slovenia less now. This can be a good sign for the traditional countries that are well established on the international scene. The question, therefore, is why is a country not being talked about? It may even happen that they will start talking about our country as a country that is not a reliable and a trustworthy partner in international relations.

I am afraid that we ourselves also provide evidence that we do not know what we want with our international recognition by foreign countries. This is particularly evident in relations with the EU. Sometimes we act offended and put matters on a razor's edge, as if it were a matter of survival, and, later, we console ourselves and convince ourselves that the rejection and the failure in the talks is nothing terrible, that we must yet see what will happen between ourselves and the EU. In short, it appears that there is no constant policy in our relations with the EU.

As long as Slovene policy does not clearly determine that we want a full-fledged membership in the European Union and under what conditions, it is superfluous to ask citizens about their opinion. The decision for or

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against must be absolutely clear beforehand, as must be the consequences of this or that decision. I think this is responsible behavior and, when it happens, it will also be necessary. We should also strip the foreign policy of its excessive links to personal and party promotion and of courtesy events, lunches, and photo sessions that are made to count more than the actual results. This, as well as excessive garrulousness about confidential talks and communications, which are a normal element of international relations, does not reflect well on Slovenia's reputation as a serious partner in international relations. It also reduces our ambitions because it creates an impression that we are already satisfied by, for example, Slovenia being mentioned during a foreign ministers' working lunch or by somebody being invited somewhere as a matter of pure courtesy.

Italy Is a Partner That Should Not Be Underestimated

[Mecilosek] Do you find it politically correct that we have primarily sought the reasons for our current problems in EU integration in the conflict with Italy, while we have placed less emphasis on some other details that are also important in the process?

[Kucan] No, I do not find it entirely correct even if I discount the fact that we can ascribe several reasons for this to our impatience. It seems to me that we did not study well enough what, objectively speaking, Italy means in Europe today and how great is its influence within the EU, that is, that Italy is a partner that should not be underestimated. However, I personally believe that this brings us back to the question that I have already raised, namely, that Slovene policy evidently has not yet determined what our strategic interests are regarding the EU, as otherwise we would have listened more carefully to the conditions set forth by those who are deciding about our accession to the EU. I am not convinced that we interpret the EU conditions that were set for Slovenia signing the associate membership agreement in the same way in Brussels and Ljubljana. In my opinion, we became unnecessarily tangled up over a question that is, in international practice, considered closed because an appropriate bilateral agreement on it was signed. The appropriateness of agreements can always be discussed, but the agreements nevertheless remain valid. At the very moment we permitted some doubt to enter the legal foundations of our relations with Italy, we ended up in a realm with no legally firm point of departure from which we could venture into the negotiations. I believe that we are to blame a lot for the fact that we are in a deadlock.

[Mecilosek] I find it interesting that, parallel to this issue, we treated integration into NATO as something self-explanatory, something that is, from the security standpoint, understandable, but at least as important as our equivalent place in the European Union.

[Kucan] I agree. The way into NATO was not consistent either, as it may appear. However, it is true that we got less tangled up over this issue also because of the realistic sense of being threatened. The prestige and the type of advantages brought by cooperation in the Partnership for Peace Program—where, in my opinion, with the exception of cooperation in the purely military sphere, we did not exploit the aspects that pertain to democratization and the sensitive relationship between the defense complex and the "civilian" state—probably influenced such a high decree of consensus.

Surprising Statement by Count Otto von Habsburg

[Mecilosek] A few days ago, Count Otto von Habsburg singled you out as the reason for some of the disagreements in Slovene-EU relations. Your recent speech in Brussels was reportedly too sharp. Would you concur with such an assessment?

[Kucan] I have had the opportunity to meet with Count Otto von Habsburg on several occasions. My feeling is that he is genuinely sympathetic to Slovenia. Bearing in mind the paper in which this alleged statement was published, I reserve the right to entertain doubts. If it is true, it comes as a surprise for me because, after the lecture, the count personally came over to congratulate me on my speech. In that lecture, I said nothing that I had not said at home and in my other speeches, or anything that any other Slovene would not say had he the opportunity to speak before the European Parliament. The truth is that the debate, in which 12 European Parliament deputies took part, also involved six Italians who were evidently bothered by my argument that disrespect for the agreements signed after World War II means tampering with the post-war political order of Europe, which can have far-reaching consequences for all of Europe.

[Mecilosek] The second sensitive subject in foreign affairs is relations with Croatia. Are you an optimist regarding the announcement of possible compromises, especially in light of the current Croatian domestic political situation, which is not exactly rosy?

[Kucan] I remain an optimist. However, I do not think that everything will run smoothly and without efforts and goodwill on both sides. Ultimately, the Croatians, too, are defending their attitude toward the unresolved issues with the fact that the Slovene domestic political situation is complex. My optimism is based on the

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simple fact that Croatia and Slovenia both know that the way into Europe will only be open to us if we resolve bilateral issues, especially those regarding territorial and the border issues. We also share interests in the resolution of the question of the succession of the former joint state. Then there are also numerous economic, transportation, tourist, and other interests. Let me also single out the problem of relations with Italy. Essentially, the questions that Italy has raised against Slovenia also apply to Croatia, but on an even larger scale. Last but not least, an Italian minority lives in Slovenia and Croatia, and the cooperation of its members beyond national borders must be facilitated. In brief, there are many interests that speak in favor of reasonable cooperation between the countries, but I do not say that this will all come about tomorrow.

[Mecilosek] Do you agree with the idea that foreign experts should decide on Piran Bay, Trdinov Vrh [Sveta Gera], and our real estate legislation?

[Kucan] I definitely think that Slovenia and Croatia should resolve the controversial issues by themselves, and I am convinced that they can do so. If this does not happen, however, I would not shy from international arbitration because such institutions have been set up specifically to resolve such problems. This is the essential element of so-called preventive diplomacy, which is supposed to muzzle the escalation of conflicts that subsequently burden the entire international community. Of course, here, we must count on the fact that such arbitration usually seeks compromise solutions, which are not to the disadvantage or advantage of one country alone. For that reason, I believe that it would be more sensible if we found such a compromise by ourselves.

[Mecilosek] It seems to me that you are not involved in foreign affairs processes actively enough, which is perhaps also a consequence of a slightly ambiguous constitutional definition of the role of the Slovene president. Should the president participate more actively in strengthening Slovenia's position in the world?

[Kucan] The Constitution is one thing and its interpretation is another. We have a parliamentary democracy. The role and the duties of the president are defined by this. This is not about formal duties but about actual influence and possibilities. I do not believe that any sensible country can dismiss the possibilities that its president has in explaining its views and asserting its interests at the international level. By the same token, this is not about any sort of presidential foreign policy of mine but about the role of the president in realizing the policy of the Slovene state, which must be coordinated strategically and operatively, in the way the present foreign minister is striving for. Of course, the question of autonomy remains. Namely, it is not necessarily the case that I, as a man, agree with every foreign affairs move and keep quiet. Here, Slovenia still has not managed to free itself from a specific struggle for personal prestige, for which the foreign policy and state interests are the most appropriate vehicles. The foreign policy cannot be a vehicle for self-promotion unless it involves the foreign minister, whose function and sphere of activity it represents.

We Can No Longer Play a Special Role

[Mecilosek] The developed world is already thinking about the time after the year 2000, while we often look back. The globalization of the modern world is a fact today, and it could be fatal if Slovenia were to cut itself off from these processes. What should it do to prevent itself becoming a European province?

[Kucan] I think that we will have to do more than others. As I said, objectively speaking, small nations face a danger of losing their identity and, for that reason, it is extremely important that small countries assert themselves with the big ones through their original thinking and understanding of the world, presenting themselves as useful and necessary. The basis of such an identity is culture, and it is a real skill to be able to find the correct answer to what is a productive ratio between the need to open up to the world and the need to preserve one's identity. There are no general answers. Everyone must reach them by himself. Above all, we should affirm ourselves and seek partners in our home environment. For Slovenia, this means central Europe. From this viewpoint, I see the signing of the agreement with CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement] as perhaps the most important foreign policy achievement of the year for Slovenia.

[Mecilosek] In this context, how do you view Slovenia in 1996?

[Kucan] In 1996 we can expect the leaders of the Slovene country to show more responsibility for the country's interests. This year has shown that without major efforts, a very careful formulation of the foreign policy moves, and their assessment in the light of the state's interests and future, we will not be able to fulfill our desires, especially if they will also not be clearly recognizable to the foreigners. The experience with the EU has proved this. The first signs of the currently fragile peace in the Balkans are an objective new fact with which Slovenia must reckon. By all means, our country must show an interest and desire to help create solid foundations for peace and new life in this fragile part of the world together with others, which would also give us a different position and possibilities. Slovenia

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must regulate its relations and establish contacts with the countries that will live this new life, however, they should be identical to those that we establish with other countries in Europe and should be based on the principle of equality of interests.

[Ljubljana MAG in Slovene on 20 December 1995 on pages 34 to 37 carries a 2,500-word interview with Otto von Habsburg that contains Habsburg's comment on Kucan's address in Brussels, referred to in this item: "I believe that he acted just as if he were at a political rally in Slovenia. This, unfortunately, is not the appropriate way to treat the problem. I consider President Kucan to be a very good person otherwise; however, he staged a speech that was unfortunate and that did not help the Slovene situation."]

Commercial Banks Agree to Debt Division Proposal

AU1601102196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari and National Bank Governor France Arhar have received a written report in which the commercial bank-creditors that owe more than two-thirds of the debt originating from the New Financial Agreement [NFA], signed between the Yugoslav debtors and the aforementioned banks in September 1988 inform them that they had accepted Slovenia's proposal [for its share of the debt].

In the middle of 1995 our negotiators reached a general agreement with the representatives of the creditors that Slovenia would assume 18 percent of what was once more than $4 billion worth of Yugoslav debts.

The consensus represents an important step forward toward a final regulation of the relations between the Slovene debtors as specified by NFA, and foreign commercial banks, as well as creation of the condition for the normal functioning of the Slovene institutions on the international financial markets.

The entire agreement still needs to be approved by the State Chamber.

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Serbia

Belgrade Praises Clinton's Policy on Bosnia

AU1501113796 Paris AFP in English 1041 GMT 15 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 15 (AFP)—Yugoslav authorities have praised US President Bill Clinton for treating the Serb and Moslem Croat entities in Bosnia "on an equal footing," the pro-government POLITIKA reported Monday.

The daily paper, which is thought to reflect the views of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, said Clinton's "peace mission" to Tuzla in northern Bosnia had been "exceptionally successful."

The fact that he met Bosnian Serb leaders during his visit Saturday [13 January] showed "all sides will continue to be treated on an equal footing by the United States and the international community as a whole," Politkia added.

It "strengthened the belief that President Clinton and the United States, the last superpower, are firmly committed to peace in the Balkans and in the whole of Europe."

Under the Dayton peace accord, a Bosnian Serb authority co-exists in Bosnia with a Moslem Croat Federation.

The paper said Clinton and Milosevic highlighted the peace efforts and their growing mutual cooperation during a telephone conversation.

POLITIKA Calls Visit Success

AU1601151096 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 96 p 2

[Commentary by H.D.A.: "The U.S. President's Successful Mission in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. President Bill Clinton last weekend ended his extremely successful peace mission in the Balkans.

The visit to the U.S. troops in Bosnia, which for security reasons was in the "high risk" category, reinforced the conviction that President Clinton and the United States, the only remaining superpower, care very much about peace in the Balkans and Europe as a whole.

"The mission of building a safe world" primarily had the goal of boosting the morale of the "heroes of peace," U.S. soldiers whom Clinton thanked as fighters for peace and who are gradually, step by step, surely and safely proceeding with this important task.

While in the Balkans, Clinton addressed the conflict between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats and concluded that this was actually "a conflict between those who want peace and those who want war."

"This is a conflict between those who want a better future and those who are trapped in the past. Choose peace and a future and open your arms to your neighbors," Bill Clinton advised.

What is particularly important for all citizens of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation, that is, Bosnia as a whole, is that the U.S. President treated all the entities equally.

In Tuzla, Clinton also met with a three-member Serb delegation, which comprised Dabro-Bosnian Metropolitan Nikolaj, Banja Luka mayor Predrag Radic, and Ilidza municipal assembly chairman Nedjeljko Prstojevic, which shows that in the future the United States and the international community will be treating all sides equally.

POLITIKA has learned in well informed circles that Belgrade has positively assessed the efforts invested by President Clinton in the implementation of the Dayton agreement and the establishment of a stable peace in the region. This is substantiated by the fact that Clinton had a long telephone conversation with President Milosevic, during which the two presidents expressed satisfaction with the progress in the implementation of the peace agreement and mutual cooperation. In this light, the message that President Milosevic sent to Sarajevo citizens last Friday gains in significance. In the message, he asked them not to leave their city and not to fall prey to irresponsible statements of certain local politicians, but to trust in the peace agreement as a whole, because it protects and affirms their interests.

Official Views Territorial Disputes With Croatia

AU1501200096 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 96 p 9

[Interview with FRY Deputy Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "UN Stays on Prevlaka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] FRY Deputy Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic has very fond memories of the Split Gripe barracks, where he served in the army in the early 1960s, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA found out at the beginning of the interview with Bulajic. He said that he had last been in Zagreb in 1989 and that he was particularly interested in Split and Konavli, since he said that his mother was from Konavli on the Montenegrin side and his grandfather on his mother's side was a Croat from Konavli.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] How do you assess the results of the meeting between Ministers Milutinovic and Granic?

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[Bulajic] I think that it was the first, but very important, step toward the normalization of our relations.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Did you discuss missing persons?

[Bulajic] Yes. It is a very complex issue. First, they are not easy to find and, second, various lists contain various names so this process will be neither easy nor short. I hope that it will continue and that we will find those that are still alive and exchange them, of course.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Will there be an opening of communications?

[Bulajic] Yes. That is the greatest contribution to the normalization of relations and the greatest achievement of this meeting. The ministers agreed on the opening of communications and road, air, and rail traffic. Time is needed for this until various agreements are reached, but that process is under way.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] When do you expect the highway to open?

[Bulajic] I cannot tell you exactly when, but I think that it will be very soon, perhaps in a few weeks.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Did you talk about the Erdut-Zagreb agreement?

[Bulajic] Yes, but you have to ask the ministers about what was agreed. This is one of the sensitive issues. The issue of "the Srem-Baranja region" is one of the sensitive issues, particularly the implementation of the transitional period of one to two years. I think that we are very close to a solution to that and that traffic will be restored through "the region" successfully.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Was the Prevlaka issue discussed, as the Belgrade media had been announcing?

[Bulajic] Yes, the Prevlaka issue has been on the table for a long time. As far as I am informed, this issue had almost been resolved in Dayton, but the Croatian attitude changed after Dayton, which in our view is not good news. I hope that there will be serious discussions on this soon. A resolution by the UN Security Council is expected, probably a technical resolution on the extension of the UN mandate on Prevlaka, that is, the observers on Prevlaka, so as to avoid any incidents in the area. Without such a mandate and without such a mission, I am afraid that incidents could occur. The fact is that the ministers discussed this seriously, and effectively agreed that it is absolutely necessary to extend the mission.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] According to the information from the Croatian side, Croatia will not accept eastern Slavonia and Prevlaka being put in the same package. What are the Serbian views on that?

[Bulajic] The views have not been coordinated. For example, the Croatian side believes that there is no territorial dispute over Prevlaka. We believe that there is a territorial dispute and we have historical evidence for that.

On the other hand, we believe that UN observers should maintain order on Prevlaka, while the Croatian side wants OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers. You know that we are not yet members of the OSCE and cannot influence their decisions, so we cannot accept Croatia's views. I still hope that we will manage to bring our views closer before the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] What is an acceptable solution for Serbia after 15 January to the area of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem?

[Bulajic] The resolution will be adopted regardless of the views of the FRY, Serbia, and the Republic of Croatia. The views of both sides will probably not be taken entirely into account. The important thing is that some of the most important issues have been coordinated in the Contact Group and that the resolution is adopted by 15 January.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] Tell us why there was first a high degree of understanding and accord on the solution to the border areas between Serbia and Croatia in the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, and then the whole thing fell through?

[Bulajic] You reporters are very inquisitive. You want to know more than you can find out. A serious discussion still has to be held about this. I hope that we will be able to find a solution that will be acceptable to both sides, particularly the Serbs who live in that "region." They are the third side in the agreement.

[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA] We started this interview with a question about missing persons. Tell us in conclusion if there is any more information about our colleagues, the missing journalists from Radio Vukovar, particularly Sinisa Glavasevic?

[Bulajic] Believe me, I know nothing about it.

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Kosovo

Possible Mediation by Holbrooke With Serbia Noted

AU1601102696 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 12 Jan 96 p 2

[Commentary by N. Misini: "Is Holbrooke Coming?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almost in chorus, immediately after Dayton and Paris, the Serbian media and here and there even the occasional Serbian public personality have been admitting that the clock is ticking and the hour will inevitably strike for the unsolved problem of Kosova. Showing every sign of disgust and wearing fixed smiles, even the most obdurate Serbian media such as ARGUMENTE, SRPSKA REC and NASA BORBA, as well as, more hesitantly, the progovernment and pro-Socialist papers, are coming to see that dialogue with the Albanians and with President Rugova is unavoidable. In this sudden reversal, which they would rather disclaim than admit to mean "donning the garments of democracy," the Serbian mass media, including those of the opposition, are predicting the start of Albanian-Serbian talks between Prishtina and Belgrade within a few months.

Two Serbian newspapers, without any question marks, bluntly state that none other than U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, famous for his tireless peace marathon around the Sarajevo-Zagreb-Belgrade triangle, has been appointed as mediator in the talks for Albanian-Serbian rapprochement. The Serbian media do not give their sources for such information, and so far no official source has either denied or confirmed the reports. It is entirely possible that the Clinton administration, for reasons of diplomatic tactics, is not showing any desire to launch into confirmations or denials of such Serbian media reports. It is likewise possible that Belgrade's stubborn officialdom "have not heard" what the opposition media in Serbia's front yard are saying. Meanwhile in Prishtina, the capital of the Republic of Kosova, these reports in general fail to provoke comment but are mentioned in passing as having been in circulation. These "expected sensations" do indeed prompt public murmurs, but these generally oscillate between speculation over the real possibility that "Kosova's time has finally come," and doubt over any news that comes via the Serbian media, which are inclined to dig out needles from haystacks. People know that someone is on his way with the file on Kosova in his hand, even though nobody knows when he will arrive and with what formal solution.

It is therefore better not to give way to euphoria and to wait for what the passing of this winter will bring. We are not waiting and have not been waiting for "crumbs to fall from the table of world diplomacy." It is utterly clear that Kosova has been placed at the top of the international agenda as a "current problem." It is also known that there will be international mediation between Prishtina and Belgrade. It has only not been precisely said (and indeed with some reason) when, how, and where the long-awaited Albanian-Serbian dialogue will begin. Those who are now prejudging the conclusion of these talks that have still not begun, and who go so far as to prophesy the formula of solution, are showing no wisdom, and are even showing political naivete. A few days ago, President Rugova even said in public that he "did not wish to prejudge anything..." Meanwhile, notice the subtle political tactics of the Serbian media. Seeing that Kosova is coming onto the agenda, they hurry to pull out of the hat of prophecy some statement by Agostini (why him?), Micunovic, or the "politically extinct" Cosic, and even in the end latch onto and put to use "in all its realism" the statement of Dr. Sali Berisha about approaching the Kosova problem (NASA BORBA 8 January 1996).

Even so, there is no need to totally distrust the Serbian media reports that Holbrooke has been appointed mediator in the Albanian-Serbian dialogue and that he has been handed a bulky file on the most sensitive problem in the Balkans.

It has been said many times, and rightly, that "the talks will be hard..." (Fehmi Agani), but the Albanian side at least has the strongest arguments in its hands—the popular referendum of the Albanians, and a range of other historical, demographic, and geographical arguments. If diplomacy implies compromise, we must agree with all those who think that an independent and neutral Kosova is indeed a compromise for the Albanians.

Whether or not Holbrooke is coming, we must hurry to reach our goal. We must complete the sovereign and independent state of Kosova, if necessary by stages. Does Holbrooke know this or not?

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